archie777

Captains G.J. Scheepers and W.D. Fouche returned to the Midlands at the end of February, and on the 5th March attacked Aberdeen for the third time. The 14 martial law prisoners in the jail were released and promptly joined the commando. The available horses were commandeered, but before the situation could develop any further, the commando was driven from the town by a counterattack by its Town Guard. On the 6th a British column, guided by locals, went in pursuit of Scheepers and Fouche. It came under attack however and, according to the SAFF Casualty roll, 3 British soldiers were killed/died of wounds and 12 wounded.

The town of Lichtenburg and the district surrounding it furnished two Boer commandos, under Commandant H C W Vermaas and Commandant J G Celliers respectively. The town was occupied by the British for a few days in June 1900 and then on a permanent basis from late November 1900. It became an important supply depot and the British garrison of 620 men comprised infantry, artillery and Yeomanry, specifically the 10th Company, 3rd Battalion, IY, and two companies of Paget’s Horse, or the 19th Battalion, IY. On 3 March 1901, Lichtenburg was attacked in a three-pronged assault on the town by an estimated 300 Boers. From the west, Commandant Vermaas assailed the fortified British redoubt in the market square, while the second and third attacks from the east and west were directed against the British pickets on the edge of the town. After facing determined resistance for 24 hours, the Boers were forced to withdraw, General de la Rey coming to the assistance of Vermaas. An Imperial Yeomanry man recounts the action as the Boers rushed the British trenches: ‘How those pickets did fight! The picket trenches never contained more than 7 men, and in one trench only two were left, the others being killed or wounded. When relief arrived, a sergeant was just saying to one comrade “Fix bayonets, we’ll keep the ... back”. The defenders lost 21 men killed and died of wounds (two of them Yeomanry men), and 24 wounded. The Boers lost fourteen men killed and forty wounded.

The village of Pearston (45km north-west of Somerset East) was garrisoned by 25 men of Nesbitt’s Horse and a small Town Guard (white and coloured men). At dawn on 3 March Commandants Kritzinger and Lötter attacked and completely surprised the garrison. 22 men from Nesbitt’s Horse fled to Somerset East, leaving the Town Guard in badly positioned trenches and schanzes. They eventually surrendered and had to look on while the Boers helped themselves liberally to supplies (including liquor). Two stores, whose owners were connected to the military, were completely looted. Apart from prisoners, the Boers took 80 horses, 60 rifles and thousands of rounds of ammunition while 20 local men joined the Rebel commando.

General Christiaan de Wet with some 1500 burghers crossed the Orange River on 10 February 1901 and invaded the Cape Colony for the second time. His attempt to gather support from Cape sympathisers was not a success and he lost 200 burghers as PoWs as well as guns, ammunition and wagons. He had to get back into the Free State, but l the swollen Orange River was a big hindrance. Eventually, on 28 Feb 1901 he and his commando succeeded in crossing the river at Leliefontein, close to Colesberg (this was the fifteenth drift that they had tried). The next day, after their exhausting journey, some 35 of his men were taken prisoner

Captain Strong and some 70 men of Kitchener’s Fighting Scouts were on reconnaissance duty in the Richmond district and were caught in an ambush by a 200 strong Boer commando while passing through a defile on the farm Klipkraal. Eventually, with 4 of his party killed and 7 wounded, Captain Strong surrendered. The subsequent Court of Enquiry found that the party was captured owing to the absence of proper precautions on approaching the defile, the result of want of military training and knowledge. SA Surrenders WO 108/372.

At the beginning of February 1901 Lord Methuen’s column (5th and 10th Imperial Yeomanry, Royal North Lancashires as well as New South Wales and Victorian Imperial Bushmen) left Taung and advanced eastward towards Klerksdorp. On 17 February he obtained information that that a large Boer force made up from the Wolmaransstad, Lichtenburg and Potchefstroom Commandos had concentrated at Hartebeestfontein across the direct Klerksdorp road. When Methuen approached the Boer position on 18 February it turned out to be far stronger than anticipated from maps and intelligence. In addition, he found that General de la Rey had come down from the north and taken overall command of some 1300 men. However, Methuen with barely 900 men, decided to attack. The defile, through which the British had to advance, was dominated by numerous rocky ravines and ridges and the Boers were able to pour an enfilading fire on the column. The 5th IY attacked the Boers on the right in the morning while the 10th IY and the Victorians attacked the Boer left. The Royal North Lancashires were brought in mid-morning and their extra firepower, despite heavy losses, caused the Boers to retreat during the afternoon. The Boers left 18 dead on the field while the British losses amounted to 15 killed and 34 wounded. This spirited action opened the road to Klerksdorp which Lord Methuen entered the next day without further opposition.

Knox took his own troops towards Hout Kraal, where an armoured train and a small column composed of a company of the 3rd Grenadier Guards, two guns and 150 mounted troops under Colonel E. Crabbe had already arrived, expecting to be joined by another under Henniker, which was on the march from Philipstown. These bodies had been hastily formed at De Aar by Sir H. Settle for the express purpose of clinging to De Wet until the regular columns should arrive. At 4.30am on the 15th, before either Knox or Henniker appeared on the scene, Crabbe discovered the Boers in the act of crossing the railway four miles north of Hout Kraal. De Wet had destroyed the track on either side of the crossing, and the armoured train, which promptly steamed towards the spot, could only shell the rear portion of the convoy, whilst Crabbe was too weak to do more than follow in observation. About noon he was joined by Plumer, whose march in pursuit of the commandos would have been rendered intolerable by the morasses had not these exhausting obstacles held so many derelict Boer wagons as to cheer his men with evidence that the enemy’s case was worse than their own. More than twenty wagons, for the most part laden with flour and ammunition, lay embedded in the mud, to be joined soon by as many of Plumer’s. The night’s scurry from Wolve Kuil and Plumer had indeed reduced the Boers to an abject plight. It confirmed the suspicion which had already arisen in the minds of the majority of the burghers that their trusted leader’s sole triumph in Cape Colony was to be that over the floods of the Orange River, a victory which that uncertain stream might yet avenge. They were now without reserve ammunition or the certainty of supply; horses and men were failing as rapidly as their adversaries were increasing around them. “Official History”, Vol IV, p80-1.

Hi Megan, I will try to share those that I have Regards Archie

Plumer made contact with De Wet at 11 am on 12 Feb, a little to the north of Hamelfontein. This was a critical meeting, for all De Wet’s hopes of penetrating into the interior of Cape Colony depended on his being neither delayed nor deflected at this moment. Plumer’s, on the other side, had to keep the invaders from the vitals of the colony by turning them westward. The enemy’s left, in short, was the strategical flank, and Plumer, though he fully recognised this was fortunately served by subordinates able to anticipate his orders before they could be conveyed across the field. It happened that the enemy was first struck into by a reconnoitring squadron of the Imperial Light Horse., commanded by Captain G. T. M. Bridges, R.A. Had this party bungled in its tactics infinite harm might have resulted; but the situation was as clear to Bridges as to his chief. He instantly sprang towards the proper flank and, establishing himself in a defensive position, successfully clung to De Wet and warned him away from the east until Jeffreys’ column, coming up, finally barred the south and east, and bent the hostile fine of advance in the required direction. After a sharp skirmish, in which six of Plumer’s men were wounded, the Boers drew off towards Philipstown, whence another part of the Boer vanguard was beaten off by the small garrison, opportunely supported by Henniker’s Coldstream Guards, after eleven hours’ fighting. “Official History” Vol IV, p79. DCM (VR): Trpr Sopp, Imp.Yeo.; QSA, 4 clasps CC, Rhod, OFS, SA’01: 12040 Cpl. W. Sopp 65th Coy. 17th Impl. Yeo.; 1914-15 Trio: 777 Pte. W. Sopp. Bucks. Yeo.; Melton Mowbray Tribute Medal: Corporal W. Sopp 7th Com. IY (Last without suspender as presented – Hibbard A16) The award of Sopp’s DCM (Supplement to the LG, 25 March 1901, p2103) read “…for gallantry at Phillipstown, on same occasion as Captain Tivey”. Maj Gen Settle’s endorsement of Lt-Col Crabbe’s recommendation for the award of the DCM provides more detail: “Trooper Sopp displayed great courage in running the gauntlet under a very heavy fire, and getting his message through obviated the necessity of Captain Tivey leaving the town which he probably could not have done without heavy loss”. However, a vivid account of Sopp’s heroic effort, written in a style reminiscent of a Victorian novel, was given by Sharrad H Gilbert (who also served in the 65th Company, I Y) in the chapter headed “The Defence of the Jail” of his book “Rhodesia – and After”. “Those in the jail watch the hill eagerly. What will they do? What can they do? They are but sixty strong. But soon it is seen that some attempt is to be made from the hill. A party commence to make their way to the relief across the plain westward of the town. But this is madness. From the jail it can be seen that that side is seamed with dongas bristling with Boers, but evidently unknown to the Australian Captain. If they come that way they will be cut off to a man, but a short mile away, the men who have come to save them are riding to annihilation, all unwitting. And those upon the walls are forced to watch them, hand-tied, helpless. There seems no means. To ride through that zone of fire is suicide— is courting instant death; even was there the man to attempt it. But such a man is found. Trooper William Sopp volunteers to make the attempt, and the offer is accepted. No time is lost. Descending to the yard, Lieut. Munn’s own horse is saddled, with every ounce of useless weight discarded. Then — a cheery word or two, the gate flung wide, and urging his horse with voice and heel, Sopp takes Death by the hand, and makes his dash. For several moments the men above draw their breath, expecting instantly to see the fall of horse and rider. And the Boers themselves seem paralysed by his audacity, for twenty yards is gained before they fire. But not for long. Scores of rifles are swiftly emptied on horse and man. For many hundred yards they ride through showers of lead. The fire on the jail perceptibly slackens, for every rifle seems turned on that flying horseman, who moment by moment grows less as the distance widens. He leaves the road and striking across the veldt, shapes a beeline for the Bushmen’s hill. A horse with outstretched head and straining limbs, the rider sitting tight but still, riding to win. A horse and rider, faint seen through rising dust. A little dark patch scudding o’er an ocean of veldt. On, smaller, till a speck crawling up the far rise, and then – “Hurrah! He’s got through,” — broke from the men. And with a better heart, into the baffled Boers they pour their hail of lead, for they know the Bushmen are saved. And shortly from the hill a black speck comes, and reaching the plain, makes townwards. It is a horseman riding easily, for he has not yet been noticed by the Boers. What is it? — men ask. Surely no one man is so mad. Ah! The Boers have seen him and he is riding under fire, for there is now no lagging in his pace. Nearer, till through the glasses he takes shape, and one says with a gasp — “’Tis Sopp coming back!’ Nearer the flying horseman. This is a different task. To ride into the fire of a hundred rifles is not the same as flying from them. “Pour in your fire! Draw their attention! “shouts Lieut. Munn. And the men strive their best. Nearer the horseman. In the still moments ‘tween the firing the beat of the hoofs can be heard. “Keep up the fire into that donga. There’s where the mischief lies “And for the next few seconds the donga becomes a warm corner indeed for its sheltering occupants. 300 yards away, and the horse still on its feet. The crackle of shots is like fresh thorns on a fierce campfire.” “To the gate!” ‘Tis the last order given. Two hundred yards, —one hundred, and from the road fly little spurts of sand, thick as the first coming of big raindrops on still water. Back fly the gates. There is a sound of splintering glass, as every unbroken pane in the windows of the jail falls shivered by the storm of bullets. And with a clatter and a cheer from the men Trooper Sopp gallops into the yard — without a scratch on horse or man. ‘Trooper’ for that day only. For from that date henceforward he is ‘Corporal’ Sopp — promoted by the Commander- in-Chief for his deed. And, recommended by the Australian Captain, his name appears in ‘orders’. As mentioned by Gilbert Sopp was promoted to Corporal as additional reward for his gallantry. Sopp was in a group of almost 50 “north-country” soldiers whose DCM’s were presented in April 1902 by Maj Gen Thynne at the Cavalry Barracks in York. His address, as given in a newspaper report was ‘The Stables, Newport Lodge, Melton Mowbray’. He died from pneumonia in January 1928.

On the evening of 5 February Maj-Gen Smith – Dorrien’s column camped on the farm Bothwell on the northern edge of Lake Chrissie. Cmdt-Gen Louis Botha’s main aim at the time was to cripple the advance of Smith-Dorrien into the Eastern Transvaal and he decided on a night attack to achieve this and, at the same time, carry off welcome supplies of food, weapons and ammunition. The British camp was well situated but surprise reigned when some 2000 Boers attacked in pitch darkness just before 03h00 on 6 February. A tremendous fusillade broke out, followed by a rush of galloping hooves through the crowded camp. The horses of the 5th Lancers and ILH had stampeded, throwing the camp into turmoil. The burghers achieved initial success in the wake of the stampeding horses and cut up some of the West Yorks pickets but could not gain a foothold on the slopes and were not able to open direct fire on the main camp situated on a plateau. At 04h30, under cover of the thick morning mist, Botha ordered them to retreat. The Boer commando suffered about eighty casualties, including Field Cornet Spruyt of the Heidelberg Commando, and the British seventy-five. About 300 horses of the British force were killed or stampeded: this definitely delayed the British advance and gave the Boer commandos time to re-group.

De Wet was travelling at a great pace; but he was driving before him large flocks and herds, the food supplies for his intended campaign, and lingering to let these gain an offing, he allowed Knox to come up with his rear-guard on the Tabaksberg, forty miles north of Thabanchu, on January 29th. The position was immensely strong, and Knox, sending Pilcher against the front, and Crewe with only 600 rifles and three field guns around the Boer right flank, no less than ten miles distant to the eastward, found his divided forces, which would have been fully employed even if acting together, almost over-matched. Pilcher, attacking doggedly, made ground with difficulty all day against a delaying action, which was dangerous from the accuracy of the shrapnel burst by De Wet’s artillerymen. By the evening, with a loss of fifteen killed and wounded, including two officers, he had sent the Boer rear-guard after its main body, and occupied its ground. Crewe, isolated to the eastward, fared more hardly. His appearance on the flank endangered the enemy’s line of retreat, but he was too weak to push his advantage, and could barely withstand the resistance which his threatening position brought against him. Indeed, only the fine conduct of his troops, especially of the Kaffrarian Rifles, preserved him from destruction, for he was outnumbered by three to one, and it was vital to De Wet to disable him. In a fierce attack made in the afternoon the Boers got so nearly home that they actually surrounded and captured in his lines a Vickers-Maxim gun which had jammed. Crewe was then practically surrounded; but seizing commanding ground in the midst of the enemy he concealed his transport below it, and entrenched himself successfully, beating off another attack delivered during the night. Altogether his casualties numbered thirty-five, making fifty in both columns. The enemy lost about the same number, but they had Crewe’ gun, and had kept their southward road open. “Official History”, Vol IV p76-7.

Lt-Col G C Cunningham was ordered by French to leave a garrison at Rustenburg and to move south through Olifant’s Nek, there to take position in order to prevent De la Rey from moving eastward. Crossing the Nek on 23 January, Cunningham gained touch with the enemy (600 men under Commandant Potgieter) at Middelfontin, 7 miles from the summit of the pass. After some intense fighting the Boers were forced to retreat. Cunningham, unfortunately, chose a position for his camp in a valley dominated on every side by rocky hills. The next day De la Rey appeared on the scene with another 500 men and started an attack at 04h00 before dawn. This was kept up the whole of the day with the British subjected to rifle fire from all sides till darkness fell. Cunningham lost 54 killed and wounded during the 2 days’ fighting and could only extricate his force on 25 January with a further loss of 2 killed and 7 wounded when a relief column was sent by Babington from Ventersdorp. Times History, Vol V, p112.

Captain Wilson, with 50 men, was sent out to try to recover a mail cart taken by the enemy. Major Paget obtained permission to leave Lichtenburg to visit a farm where he had a squadron, and overtook Captain Wilson’s party. As no trace of the mail cart could be found, Captain Wilson decided to return, but Major Paget said that he wanted to surround a farm. He took 12 men, and Captain Wilson followed in support. The enemy attacked in force, and, in retiring, Major Paget and several others were captured. In addition, 3 men were killed and 2 were wounded. SA Surrenders (WO108-372).

Some 300 Boers attacked a supply convoy moving from Vlakfontein to their camp at Rhenosterkop, east of Pretoria. The escort under Captain F Thomas consisted of 20 of his own men (NSW Citizen’s Bushmen) and 53 men from the West Riding Mounted Infantry. After a four-hour engagement, in which the Bushmen lost one man with another mortally wounded and the West Ridings one man killed, the party surrendered. At the Court of Enquiry, it emerged that most of the West Ridings had just been discharged from hospital, had been drinking and had few rifles and little ammunition. The defence of the convoy fell on the Bushmen and the West Ridings surrendered of their own volition once they ran out of bullets. The Boers overran the West Riding positions and the Bushmen had to surrender also. “Shoot Straight, you Bastards” by Bleszynski, p223. Pte Jackson was severely wounded in the Vlakfontein debacle. In “Australia’s Boer War” by Craig Wilcox (p162) a different version of the incident is given in which Captain Thomas is blamed for the surrender: “The first drive to be conducted, as Kitchener intended, burned its way across the eastern Transvaal from the end of January 1901 to the middle of April. It was a response to a month of raids by Botha and Viljoen on railway stations, outposts, and convoys, including the seizure near Bronkhorstspruit station of thirteen wagons, a thousand sheep, and £1000 in soldiers’ pay after the leader of the convoy’s escort, Captain James Francis Thomas of the New South Wales Citizen Bushmen, had surrendered without good reason to a smaller number of Boers.”

Early in January Lieut Gen French’s columns (Babington, Paget, Plumer and Clements) were patrolling the Magaliesberg and Hekpoort Valley. Brig Gen Gordon’s column patrol area was south of Breedts Nek (the Boers chief passage through the mountains). On the 8th Beyers fell in with a convoy for Gordon coming from Krugersdorp. The Boers were repulsed with loss. Official History, Vol IV p129. In a 1903 publication of Beyers and Kemp, it is noted that the incident took place at a plantation on the farm Rietfontein and because “the British took position in the trees” Beyers was unsuccessful.

The night of January 7th exhibited every circumstance of vileness which is prejudicial to defence. It was intensely dark; a fine cold rain fell persistently, and a piercing easterly gale, which deadened the ears of sentries, did nothing to dissipate the driving mist which blinded their eyes. With everything in their favour, the various Boer detachments gathered, and at midnight each hurled itself upon its appointed victim. Machadodorp, the headquarters of Reeves’s section of the line, was attacked by Viljoen’s Lydenburgers from the north, and on the other side by the Ermelo men, under Smuts. The garrison consisted of the 2nd Royal Irish Fusiliers, with guns and cavalry, disposed on three heights, Rocky Hill, Natal Hill, and Signal Hill, all of which were separately engaged by the enemy and stoutly defended. On the first-named where a remarkable combat in which ninety-three men of the Fusiliers and six artillerymen withstood and finally repulsed the onset of nearly seven times as many burghers. Natal Hill and Signal Hill though closely beset, were in little danger from smaller commandos, and by 3am on the 8th the whole attack, decisively defeated, was withdrawn. Belfast, the key of the line, and Smith-Dorrien’s Headquarters had a far more severe trial. Monument Hill, to the north-east of Belfast, and about one and a half miles from it, was crowned by a fort containing a company of the Royal Irish Regiment. The first and heaviest stroke fell upon Monument Hill. Nowhere were the fog and drizzle thicker than here, so dense, indeed, that not only did the sentries fail to detect the approach of an enemy, but the Boers themselves, about 500 Johannesburgers and Boksburgers under Muller, saw nothing until they were through the outlying posts, which, in consequence, fell into their hands. They then broke through the entanglement and rushed upon the fort calling upon the garrison to surrender. The soldiers, unable to stop them with their rifles, answered with defiant shouts as they met them at the parapet, and a fierce melee ensued in which bayonets and butts of rifles were freely used, some even fighting with their fists, whilst others wrestled upon the ground… Amongst so much valour as was displayed the most conspicuous was shown by Private J. Barry (No. 3733). Seeing the regimental Maxim gun surrounded by the enemy, this brave soldier burst into the group and proceeded to smash the lock in order to render the trophy useless; and this, in spite of threats, he persisted in doing, until one of the Boers, less chivalrous than the rest, shot him dead. For half an hour the struggle continued before the garrison, having lost 38 of its number, was overpowered. Official History, Vol IV, p35-8

The Cyferfontein action is also referred to in the ILH History as “Frederikstad” and also “Naauwpoort Nek”. The ILH suffered a serious setback on this date when 2 squadrons under Colonel Wools-Sampson set out as part of General Babington’s column of some 1600 infantry, cavalry and guns to intercept Generals de la Rey and Kemp’s Commandos some 50 km west of Krugersdorp. A number of Boers were noticed on the hills on the farm Cyferfontein and Babington ordered Woolls-Sampson to drive them off. The latter set off impetuously without sending out advancing scouts and at such a pace that his two horse-drawn pom-poms under Captain Brierly could not keep up with him. When he eventually sent out 4 scouts, he still followed them too closely and his party ran into the withering fire of more than 700 dismounted Boers concealed in long grass on the hill-top, some 100m away. The left squadron under Major Briggs managed to deploy in time, but the right squadron, with the rash Woolls-Sampson at their head, galloped straight for the crest. Men and horses were mowed down, but those who survived the first volley leapt from their horses and, taking whatever cover they could find, returned the fire. After 10 minutes the still-mounted Woolls Sampson realised the hopelessness of the situation and ordered the retirement of his men. Brierly however, on instructions from Briggs, only moved the pom-poms to a better location and poured rapid fire into the remounted commando, thereby causing the Boers to retire. In this ill-fated charge the ILH lost 18 killed and 32 wounded. In addition, of the Imperial Yeomanry attached to the ILH, 7 were killed and 7 wounded. .

DCM (Edw VII): 5025 Pte M. Carney. Liverpool Regt.; QSA, 3 clasps: DoL, L Nek, Belf: 5025 Pte M. Carney. Liverpool Regt; KSA, 2 clasps SA’01, SA’02: 5025 Pte M. Carney. Liverpool Regt. Michael Carney was mentioned for “rendering special and meritorious service” in Lord Roberts’ Despatch which was published in the LG of 10/09/1901 (p5939) and his DCM was gazetted on 27/09/1901. Fortunately, the recommendation for the DCM is recorded in Rudolf, p85: “Pte M Carney – During the attack on Helvetia, 29th December 1900, covered by his fire Colour-Sergeant Johnson while the latter was rebuilding a partially demolished sangar, and otherwise displaying great coolness and gallantry” Carney attested in the Liverpool Regiment on 10 October 1895. He died on 10 Sept 1909, aged 31, of Paraplegia and Pulmonary Tuberculosis.

On 3 January 1901, 150 men of the Commander-in-Chief’s Bodyguard under Lt-Col D Tyrie Laing were sent from the farm Plesier to reconnoitre the route to Reitz. At the boundary between the farms Fredericksdale and Kromspruit they walked into an ambush set by Gen Philip Botha with 80 men of the Kroonstad Commando. According to Grant (Vol IV, p55), the party “was in close formation and without even ground-scouts” and were surrounded on three sides by the Boers and subjected to fire. Lt-Col Laing was wounded in the first volleys but maintained control of his men. Later he ordered his men into a donga for some cover, but when Laing was killed by a bullet through the heart the defence petered out, the men surrendered and handed over their arms. According to the SAFF Casualty Roll, 22 Officers and men were killed, another 7 died of wounds and 27 more were wounded. On the Boer side there is a record of one man killed, but the number of wounded is not known

Commandant Gideon Scheepers with some 200 men (mainly Cape Rebels) laid an ambush for the “27 Down” train in a cutting near Sherborne (between Naauwpoort and Middelburg) on 30 December. The train had one passenger coach with civilians, including women and children, and a number of open trucks. In one of these were some 60 Prince Alfred’s Guardsmen and 8 men from Nesbitt’s Horse who were returning home. Scheepers’ men opened fire as the engine drew level with them. The boiler was punctured, the train came to a standstill and heavy fire was exchanged as the soldiers leapt from the truck. Having a limited amount of ammunition, the troops eventually had to surrender with 4 men wounded. The civilians miraculously escaped harm. After a shake down Scheepers freed the prisoners and gave their rifles to his own men. The train was looted, and the rolling stock was set on fire, but the coach was left for the civilians and wounded. The guard was sent off on foot to Sherborne to arrange for an engine to fetch the coach.

The Boers, under General Ben Viljoen, launched an early morning sortie against a British garrison on the strategic crossroads at Helvetia. The British were complacent in their defences, having all but assumed that the war was over and that they would soon be redeployed to India after some much needed leave. Most officers on site were so nonchalant about their task that they blatantly ignored instructions from their Headquarters and did not prepare adequate defence structures or instil any level of discipline amongst their troops. Manning any static position is a rather boring task for the majority of the time. The officers felt this boredom and attempted to spice their life up by entertaining each other with evening dinner parties using the garrison’s ample liquor ration and food for the Christmas and New Year celebrations. The officers had served together for a reasonable spell and were known to enjoy the good life from documented accounts of their conduct while stationed in Pretoria in the preceding months, which included tennis parties, dancing and socializing with the colonial gentry of the day. The consequence of all of this is that the British positions (including the artillery piece – the Lady Roberts named after Lord Robert’s wife) were easily overcome and surrendered with very little fight at all. Of the various emplacements, it was only the King’s Koppie where a Colour Sergeant Johnson took charge of his position in the “absence” of his officer in command. He and his men staged a valiant defence which prevented a total rout of the British position. Johnson won the Distinguished Conduct Medal for leading this brave stand. Johnson opted to keep silent about the ineptness of his officers according to the unwritten warrior code. He was not even called as a witness to the resultant court martial in case his evidence was contrary to what Kitchener required. After the war, the Regiment sent a simple telegram with the words, “We are mighty proud of you!” to Johnson. All in all, this was certainly not the mighty King’s Liverpool Regiment’s finest hour. By first light the Boers had retreated with almost the entire battalion in tow as prisoners of war. Once again, the festive rations were imbibed and Gen Viljoen wrote later in his memoirs that about 30 members of the garrison had to be left behind near Dullstroom as they were too drunk to walk. He also recounted how three of the officers had to be woken from their beds to be taken captive. Now that the actual battle had finished, the political intrigue and cover up began. This is the part that had remained “under the carpet” for so many years and Peter Goodship’s research has recently brought to light. Kitchener was devastated at a third consecutive loss and demanded that a plausible explanation was established. The British government was furious as they had been assured that the war was all but over. “Home by Christmas” was the saying of the day, and these defeats were a major embarrassment (especially in the light of a looming election). The garrison’s commander, Major Cotton, was summonsed before a court martial for surrendering to the Boers. Evidence was led in his defence regarding the fact that he was recovering from a serious bout of malaria that saw him carried to Machadodorp on a dhoolie by Indian bearers. This is the Ghandi connection as Mahatma Ghandi organised the bearers for the Regiment. He was also shot in the head by a bullet early in the fracas and spent most of the battle wandering around in a serious state of concussion. The court ignored this crucial evidence and Cotton found himself the sacrificial lamb that shouldered the full blame for the incident. Although Cotton bore the full brunt of the political hostilities, Kitchener revoked his court martial a few months later with little fanfare or restitution (he remained a civilian for the rest of his days). His name was also removed from all official War Office records of hostilities and to this day does not appear in any official government records of the Boer War. It is here that Goodship surmises that the Arthur Conan Doyle link fits in. Conan Doyle was vociferous in his comment on the war in South Africa. He publicly questioned the verdict of the court martial, but to no public acknowledgement. Conan Doyle and Kitchener no doubt continued their communication off the record. Both were members of the Masonic lodge and were known to frequent similar social gatherings. It appears that some form of amicable agreement was reached between them that lead to Cotton’s pardon. Conan Doyle received a knighthood soon afterwards and Kitchener was given his promotion to Commander in Chief of the Indian Army. And so, ends an intriguing part of history that appears to have been brushed aside to further the bigger picture. Official sources state that British losses amounted to 11 killed, 29 wounded and 253 captured, while the Burghers suffered “light casualties”. Conan Doyle stated that 50 Liverpool’s were killed but there is evidence that he was reporting selectively and was biased towards trying to influence the outcome of Major Cotton’s court martial. The SAFF Casualty Roll lists 10 men as killed and 35 wounded.

My mistake Megan. Do you have pictures of all the Metro Police Medals

After a quiet Christmas based at the Oceana Mine near Grootvlei, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Colville, 1st Battalion, Rifle Brigade, proceeded on a farm-clearing expedition, with a small column consisting of six companies of the 1st Battalion, a squadron of the 13th Hussars, four guns of 63 Battery, Royal Field Artillery, as well as one ‘pom-pom’. Colville left ‘F’ Company under the command of Captain Radclyffe, as well as some artillerymen, to guard the baggage wagons based at the mine. The Column moved out in the direction of Roodewal, where after five miles they became involved in a small skirmish at the first of the target farms. During the skirmish, a large party of approximately 450 Boers were spotted heading towards the Oceana Mine and a signal was sent to Captain Radclyffe informing him of this development. He at once set about disposing his small force in an attempt to protect the baggage, with the pom-pom located near a small hollow. After a couple of hours had passed a number of mounted Boers appeared on a ridge a thousand yards away. As Radclyffe’s men opened fire the Boers dismounted, pushed forward, and sent out small parties to the left and right in an encircling movement against the Rifle Brigade position. Under heavy and accurate fire the pom pom was moved down towards the hollow and back towards the compound- of the nine men who assisted in moving the pom-pom one was killed and the other eight all wounded. Seeing that the enemy were now advancing in considerable force, Radclyffe decided to send the baggage back to the Column, whilst attempting to hold the Boers in check for as long as possible. Under cover of heavy Rifle Brigade fire from behind the wagons, the native teams began inspanning the oxen. When they were ready to move the native teams started off the wagons in the direction of Colville’s column and, as they did so, the small Rifle Brigade covering party came under very severe fire and had to retire, as the Boers saw that they were losing their target. During this time, Radclyffe and his sections continued their holding action but suffered a number of casualties, with their ammunition running out fast. With the baggage now well on its way, Radclyffe, who was lying wounded, ordered those in advanced positions who could do so to retire to the compound so as to avoid capture. No.1 section provided covering fire until their ammunition ran out, at which point the Boers advanced rapidly, forcing their surrender, along with the wounded soldiers. Fortunately, at this point, the main column appeared on the horizon, forcing the Boers to withdraw, leaving their wounded prisoners behind. For some time, the wounded on the ridge were exposed to fire from both the returning column and the Boers, and a corporal was seen to make a valiant attempt to carry the wounded Radclyffe to safety. Total losses that day were heavy, with 13 Officers and men killed, 44 wounded, and 19 taken prisoner. For his gallantry in defending the position, Captain Radclyffe was awarded the DSO.

“Hertzog, who had occupied Philipstown on December 19, now threw out his feelers to reconnoitre the most favourable direction for an advance. Forced by the presence of Settle’s columns at Hanover Road to abandon his intention of a direct march to the south, he moved rapidly west, engaged an armoured train at Houtkraal (De Aar - Orange River line) and passed some of his men across the line at this point.” Times History, Vol V, p128-9. Myles Adams, Cape Government Railways, as “Wounded and died of Wounds: Houtkraal, 20 December”. On the QSA Roll for the Mafeking Railway Volunteers he is noted as “Killed in action at De Aar” and on the QSA roll for the Vryburg Town Guard a marginal note for 152 Private Miles Adams reads “Shot in armoured train. Died at De Aar October or November 1900”. He is buried in De Aar. The incident was recorded on the Boer side, albeit with a slight discrepancy regarding the date: “Hertzog went via Philipstown and on 18 December he crossed the railway line at Houtkraal, north of De Aar. It was here where Klaas Havenga “die penkop van alle penkoppe” charged on his horse Harry alongside the railway line and tried to shoot the driver of an armoured train with his revolver!” Hertzog Series (Booklet 2), Free State Museum Service, 1984 (freely translated from Afrikaans) Klaas Havenga, in his attempt to shoot the driver of the armoured train, managed to fatally wound the stoker, Myles Adams. The 18-year-old N.C. (Klaas) Havenga was the Secretary of Gen Hertzog. When Gen Hertzog became Prime Minister in 1924 Havenga was appointed Minister of Finance, a position he filled for 21 years.