Indonesian Police Qualification & Unit Badges.

[leigh kitchen]

I posted this photo 2 years ago in "Rest of the World: Medals & Militaria > South East Asia", these badges are those of a man I worked with, a friend.

He was a member of the Indonesian "Brimob", & a counter terrorist officer.

The central badge of these 5 is, I believe, the Indonesian Navy frogmans badge (he hed served in the navy), I had forgotten what the other badges were for,

Dave Danner supplied the following info:

Selam Polri means "police diver". Polri is the short-form acronym for Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia, the National Police of the Republic of Indonesia.

Pelopor means "scout". The badge incorporates the Polri coat of arms, so it is police as well.

The jump wings also incorporate the Polri coat of arms.

Bri-Mob is the Brigade Mobile Polri, or the Police Mobile Brigade.

[leigh kitchen]

From wikipedia:

Brigade Mobil (English: Mobile Brigade, BRIMOB) is one of the oldest Indonesian National Police special operations force units

Formed in late 1945, it was originally assigned the tasks of disarming remnants of the Japanese Imperial Army and protecting the chief of state and the capital city.

It fought in the revolution, and its troops took part in the military confrontation with Malaysia in the early 1960s and in the conflict in East Timor in the mid-1970s.

In 1981 the Mobile Brigade spawned a new unit called the Explosive Ordnance Devices Unit.

Organisations

In 1992 the Mobile Brigade was essentially a paramilitary organization trained and organized along military lines. It had a strength of about 12,000. The brigade was used primarily as an elite corps for emergencies, aiding in police operations that required units to take quick action.

The unit was employed in domestic security and defense operations and was issued special riot-control equipment. They were trained to deal with mass demonstrations. Since the May 1998 upheaval, PHH (Pasukan Anti Huru-Hara, Anti Riot Unit) have received special anti-riot training. Elements of the force were also trained for airborne operations.

Branches

GEGANA

Gegana is the Indonesian Police special response unit. This unit was formed in 1976 as a detachment. Later in 1995, with the expansion of Brimob, the Gegana Detachment was expanded to become 2nd Regiment BRIMOB. Its duties are anti-terror, deal with armed criminals, close protections, search and rescue (SAR), and explosive disposal operations in urban settings. In general, each Gegana personnel is capable to perform those duties. However, there are a selected few who are very skillful in these special duties.

Gegana does not have Battalion or Company. The Regiment is broken down into several detachments. Within each detachment they are split into sub-detachments (sub-den), and within each sub-den they are further sub-divided into several units. Each unit usually consists of 10 personnel. One sub-den consists of 40 personnel, and one detachment consists of about 280 personnel.

One operation is usually assigned to one unit. Therefore, from the 10 people in that unit, six are required to have special skills: two for EOD (Exploasives and Ordnace Disposal), two for SAR operations, and two for counter-terrorist operations. In any operation, two experts are designated Operators One and Two while the rest of the unit members become the Support Team.

For example, in counter-terrorist operations, the designated Operators must have sharp-shooting skills, ability to negotiate, and be an expert in storm-and-arrest procedures. These skills and operations are not meant to be lethal because the main goal of every Gegana operation is to arrest suspects and bring them to the court. Unless there is a situation that Gegana has to do otherwise, there will be no shooting.

In SAR operation, the personnel are required to have the basic capabilities of diving, rappeling, shooting, and first aid. In anti-bomb operation, the Operators have to be the expert in their respective fields. Each Gegana personnel has been introduced to various types of bombs in general, including the risks of handling them. There are specific procedures for handling each bomb, including the required timing.

Currently, Gegana has three Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) tactical vehicles. This number is far from sufficient because ideally each Gegana unit is supposed to have one. Other than three EOD vehicles at Gegana offices, there is one EOD vehicle in West Java Police Department (PD), Central Java PD, and East Java PD. So, overall there is only six EOD units available in Indonesia.

The Indonesian Police Chief has the highest command in each Gegana operation, executed by his Operation Assistant.

Since I worked with this man, 1999 - 2000, "Special Detachment 88" has been formed:

Special Detachment 88 (Detasemen Khusus 88), or Delta 88, is the Indonesian counter-terrorism squad, and part of the Indonesian National Police. Formed after the 2002 Bali bombing, it is funded, equipped, and trained by the United States.

The unit has worked with considerable success against the jihadi terrorist cells linked to Central Java-based Islamist movement Jemaah Islamiyah.[

Detachment 88 was formed after the 2002 Bali bombing and became operational in 2003.

Detachment 88 has disrupted the activities of Central Java-based Islamist movement Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and many of its top operatives have been arrested or killed. Abu Dujana, suspected leader of JI's military wing and its possible emir, was apprehended on June 9, 2007. Azahari Husin was shot and killed in 2005.

Detachment 88 is assisted by foreign agencies, including the Australian Federal Police, in forensic sciences including DNA analysis, and communications monitoring. In pre-emptive strikes in Java, the unit thwarted attack plans to material assembly.

Detachment 88 operators were involved in an operation in Poso, where 10 people, including a policemen, were killed in a gunfight during a high-risk suspect arrest operation on January 22, 2007.

In 2007, Detachment 88 arrested and interrogated West Papuan human rights lawyer, Iwangin Sabar Olif, and charged him with incitement and insulting the head of state, because he sent an SMS text message critical of the Indonesian military and president. Detachment 88's operations include using US intelligence officers in its Jakarta headquarters to tap the phone calls and read the SMS text messages of Indonesian civilians.

According to Brig. Gen. Pranowo, the Indonesian Police Headquarter Anti-Terror Director, the number '88' is taken from the number of Australian fatalities in the 2002 Bali bombing, the largest number from a single country.

Training

This special unit is being funded by the US government through its State Department's Diplomatic Security Service. The unit is currently being trained in Megamendung, 50 km south of Jakarta, by CIA, FBI, and US Secret Service. Most of these instructors were ex-US special forces personnel.

Detachment 88 is designed to become an anti-terrorist unit that is capable to counter various terrorist threats, from bomb threats to hostage situations. This 400-personnel strong special force went to full operation in 2005. They consist of investigators, explosive experts, and an attack unit that includes snipers.

[leigh kitchen]

The police officer concerned, wearing black & red embroidered versions of the insignia:

Edited May 26, 2009 by leigh kitchen

[Mervyn Mitton]

An interesting uniform - must have been difficult to launder with all the insignia. Do you still keep in touch with him ? They have been having a lot of problems with insurgents. Did he wear their usual cap with a high peak?

[leigh kitchen]

The headgear for all when we worked together was the UN beret. I don't think the olive drab uniform with black & red embroidered badges would be too much of a problem re laundering, but I have the grey shirt/brown combat pants version of the uniform, with all the badges in full coloured embroidery - red, whte, yellow etc, perhaps more of a laundering issue there.

He was from the north of the island network, he lived right on the coast - a beach, so I would think not a good place to be come the tsunami not that he'd necessarily be there at that time.

I lost all my addresses at the time we left the UN Mission, so I've had no contact with him since, which is a pity, a great guy.