Commander x

[dante]

I have been collecting medals with an espionage theme for some time, here is one of the most intriguing;

In the book "Room 40" which details Naval Intelligence during the great war the story of the "Erri Borro" affair in which a Spanish fishing trawler carrying Spanish Wolfram for the German war effort was captured by the Royal Navy and the chase across Spain by a British Naval officer called "Dawson"

The story of "Dawson" was further elaborated in the The Sunday Express, London, October 5th, 1941

THE SECRET MISSION OF COMMANDER X

By George Slocombe

Mr. Churchill’s reference to the possibility of a Nazi thrust through Spain this winter lends extraordinary appositeness to a story I am authorised to relate for the first time.

It concerns one of the most brilliant exploits of the last war, performed by a British naval officer whom I shall describe as Commander X.

In October 1917 Commander X was engaged on anti-U-boat activities in the Bay of Biscay. Suddenly, he was summoned to London to confer with Admiral Sir Reginald Hall, then Director of Naval Intelligence.

Admiral Hall told the commander that the British Government was seriously perturbed at the situation in Spain. Several score thousand Germans, many of them non-commissioned officers, were installed in the peninsula. German influence permeated the court, the high officers in the Army, the Church, and even the Government.

The Minister of War, Sanchez Guerra (afterwards Premier) was committed to a pro-German policy.

Germany was secretly backing a junta of discontented army officers, on whom she relied to overthrow the Government, bring Spain into the war against the Allies, and invade France. Spanish intervention would be doubly dangerous at that moment. It would cut off our supplies of iron ore for munitions making, of which we had only two weeks’ reserves in hand. And since the Pyrenees frontier of Spain was held by only a few battalions of French troops, the road would be open to a Spanish-German attack on the new American supply base at Bordeaux.

This was the alarming situation which Commander X, a young British officer with a perfect knowledge of Spanish and many friends in Madrid, was invited by Admiral Hall to attempt to reverse in our favour.

Two days later he arrived in Madrid. There he discovered that the leader of the malcontents in the Spanish Army was Colonel Marques, a tough, middle-aged veteran and military governor of Barcelona.

Commander X decided to beard the conspirator in his den. He took the night train to Barcelona, requested and obtained an interview with Colonel Marques, and in a long and frank conversation with that officer laid all his cards – and his country’s - on the table. That night Colonel Marques and two others in the conspiracy dined with Commander X and appeared to be honestly impressed by his arguments against Spanish intervention. But they told him that the grievances of the army malcontents were real and not invented, and that the junta of high officers in Barcelona would not readily abandon them. Here the story becomes wilder than a Hollywood screen drama. Hearing that a meeting of the 25 members of the junta had been summoned for the next day, and that it had to make the fatal decision whether or not to face a war with France, Commander X insisted on appearing before the junta in person.
- 2 -


He did so, harangued the 25 Spanish officers for over an hour and to such good effect that they promised to call of their projected pronunciamento against the Government and the Allies if the Government undertook to satisfy their claims by 6 p.m. the next day.

These claims were actually entrusted to the British officer, who undertook to present them to the Prime Minister, Señor Dato, and telegraph the Government’s answer by the appointed time. The next day, in Madrid, Commander X was received by an astonished Prime Minister. The time was now 4 p.m. Only two hours remained. A Cabinet meeting was called, and the British officer awaited its outcome in an ante-chamber. He could hear the sounds of vehement argument. At 5.45 p.m. Señor Dato emerged from the Cabinet room and told him that the matter was settled, the Government would remain neutral. A number of too-active German agents would be politely requested to leave the country. Sanches Guerra, the pro-German War Minister, would resign from the Government, ostensibly on grounds of ill-health. And all the claims of the malcontents in the army junta would be granted. The Premier himself returned the ultimatum of the conspirators to Commander X, with his signature affixed beneath the claims as a guarantee of good faith. And a few minutes before 6 p.m. he, personally, ordered the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs to clear the telegraph wires to Barcelona in order that Commander X might flash the signal of success, in a prearranged code, to the leader of the army rebels.

And now comes the moral of this remarkable incident. In October 1941 the situation in Spain bears an astonishing resemblance to that in October 1917. The Germans have permeated the Government, the army, the Press, the Church.

Sir Samuel Hoare assures us a little naively that we have more friends in Spain that we know of, but the truth is that our friends, numerous as they are, are in Spanish prisons or in hiding, or waging guerrilla warfare in the mountains of Asturias.

Great Britain has lent five million sterling to the Franco Government, but little of this has been spent to alleviate the Spanish population. On the other hand, the Spanish Government has been suspiciously active in building strategic roads, airfields and naval bases – for use against whom?

There is, further, the suspicious affair of the recent torpedo attack against Gibraltar. The small craft which launched these torpedoes could not possibly have come from the nearest Italian naval base in Sardinia. They could only have been despatched from Tangier, Ceuta or Algeciras – all three Spanish ports, or ports under Spanish control.

We have received solemn assurances that the supplies of lubricating oil and petrol which have been allowed to enter Spain with the consent of the British Government will not be diverted to the Axis countries. These assurances, ironically enough, may be sincere, since if Hitler intends to attack Gibraltar through Spain he would obviously hope to find petrol and lubricants for his tanks and planes awaiting him in Spain, thus sparing him the necessity of a double transportation across France. It is significant, to say the least, that the recent release of further supplies of oil and petrol to Spain has been followed by further restrictions on the sale of these commodities for domestic consumption. Moreover, there is strong ground for suspicion that part of the oil supplies released by us has been diverted to Spanish warships and submarines in Spanish ports.


All the signs are, therefore, that Spain may be on the verge of taking grave decisions in the future. We shall not avert those decisions, if they are hostile to us, by the diplomatic methods on which we have relied in our dealings with Franco hitherto. Nor shall we influence them in our favour by holding out to the Spanish imperialists the vague hope that after the war we should be disposed to discuss the future of Gibraltar.

Negotiations with Spain can only be conducted on a basis of ruthless logic and cold realism. We should tell Franco brutally that if he throws in his lot with the Axis, Spain is in a far less favourable situation to make war today than she was in 1917. Then, she could have attacked France with impunity. Now, there is not a half-prostrate land Power to attack, but a tried and victorious sea Power.

Spain’s immense coastline exposes her to every weapon of the sea arena. She would experience the blockade at its deadliest. Moreover, Franco has several million dangerous and stubborn enemies at home whom we should do everything to arm, organise and encourage. If Franco joins Hitler, he should be told that he shares the fate of Mussolini.

There, in brief, is the mission which should be offered in October 1941 to a second Commander X.

Dawson was also involved with a Spanish ship in San Sebastian which used to go out regularly to revictual a large submarine which signalled its approach in Morse. Having learned the signal, Dawson tried for weeks to buy off the skipper of the boat which was carrying victuals to the submarine. On one occasion, he had anonymous letters written to all members of the crew, saying that the most unfortunate things would happen to them if they went on with their work. Some of the crew struck, but the skipper obtained others. Eventually, a way was found to substitute one of the packs of turnips which were to be carried to the submarine. The actual pack which was substituted contained turnips filled with T.N.T. and a time-fuse.

Lt Albert Edward Dawson RNVR temporary Vice Consul at San Sebastian, Spain, born Mar 1882, Oldham, Lancashire, England, About 1900, Moved to Spain to set himself up in business, by 1917 he was extremely successful in his business He also held interests in the Hotel Maria Christina in San Sebastian and a casino in Biarritz.
He was appointed OBE as "Lieutenant Albert Edward Dawson", R.N.V.R. Naval Intelligence Division, Admiralty.

He lived at Villa Tairones, Paseo Atocha, San Sebastian, Spain. And died in 1945 South Harrow, London, UK.

His son Kenneth David Sydney Dawson was killed as a private in the Hong Kong Dockyard Defence Corps 18 December 1941 formally formerly 2nd Officer, Merchant Navy.

Edited January 23, 2013 by dante

[Mervyn Mitton]

Dante - a very impressive post - full of good information. You were indeed fortunate to be able to put all of this together. Mervyn

[dante]

Here is an update, found some photos