Belleau Wood a cockup?

[Chris Boonzaier]

Pershings doctrines and beliefs uttered before the AEF had even reached the front were not only insulting in the extreme, but IMHO should have led to him eating a massive plate of crow by mid 1918 at the latest.

I am doing a bit of a study on the attack on VAux (not the Verdun Vaux)and came accross the following in "Doctrine under Trial:American Artillery employment in World War 1" by Mark E. Grotelueschen

"The different methods utilized in the division’s attacks on Belleau Wood and Vaux are clear. The division and the brigade leadership sent the marines forward into Belleau Wood without sufficient planning and with inadequate or even nonexistent artillery support. They suffered terribly for it. However, when the division leadership made adequate preparations before the attack and employed overwhelming artillery support, as they did from 10 to 12 June and on the final attack of 25 June, the division proved that it could advance, with acceptable casualty rates, even in an environment that was extremely favourable to the defenders. The attack on Vaux was simply the ultimate demonstration of the division’s ability to successfully plan and execute limited, set-piece attacks, making excellent use of those “trench-oriented” skills that had been absorbed during its training period with the French. At Vaux, the officers in the 2nd Division showed that they had learned first-hand at Belleau Wood what the French officers had warned them about: effective artillery support was crucial to any infantry attack. Pershing’s abstract “infantry-based” doctrine had come face to face with the reality of the Western Front, and the reality appeared to win the first battle."

So it appears the initial stages of Belleau Wood suffered because of Pershing's belief in the "virile superior qualities of the frontiersman" and the officers of the 2nd Div managed to find their groove by listening to experiance instead of flatulance.

Not (yet) having read much on Belleau Wood, from the Grotelueschen viewpoint, it was a heroic fight with unneccessary casualties, the 2nd div learning the hard way.

How does this fit in with other descriptions of the battle? Is it sour grapes by an Artillery man? Is it revisionism? or is it a thought that has been around for some time?

Best

Chris

[Chris Boonzaier]

A Jingoistic press seemed to go to town after the fighting for Vaux

Cameron Mackenzie- NY Times

Precisely twelve hours before the infantry advanced the American guns, firing American shells, manned and directed exclusively by American gunners, unlimbered for the work of preparation.

(actually over half the guns and gunners were on loan from French divisions... in fact the rolling barrage was left in the hands of the French 75mms)

[Chris Boonzaier]

And the army was a bit bitter....

The troops that took Vaux

An advertising agency is a good thing at times, but when the advertising agency misrepresents its goods there is a possibility of it becoming a detriment to the advertiser. There are a few organisations in France that really do not need an advertising agency- their work has been honourable enough to speak for itself. There are two regiments of Marines in France and they are part of my division and I know their service has been honourable, let us say just as glorious as many other infantry organisations of the United States Army that are now in France.

But from time to time, and very often too, certain papers in the United States write as if certain organisations were doing the whole thing alone over here. For example, in your pictorial issue of Aug. 11, 1918, you show a picture of the town of vaux, France, and announce that this town was stormed by the marines. Now, as I am in command of the battalion that actually took vaux and as we are all very, very proud of her reputation and of her high standard as a shock outfit, will you kindly correct this error? Also, out of respect for the high standard of veracity The New York Times has ever maintained, please remember that there are today over 1 750 000 American troops abroad, and about 6 000 of them are marines in the two excellent regiments the Navy Department has sent over.

George C Bowen

Major, 9th Infantry, HQ 2nd Battalion

Sept. 24, 1918

[Les]

Pershings doctrines and beliefs uttered before the AEF had even reached the front were not only insulting in the extreme, but IMHO should have led to him eating a massive plate of crow by mid 1918 at the latest.

.................

Not (yet) having read much on Belleau Wood, from the Grotelueschen viewpoint, it was a heroic fight with unneccessary casualties, the 2nd div learning the hard way.

How does this fit in with other descriptions of the battle? Is it sour grapes by an Artillery man? Is it revisionism? or is it a thought that has been around for some time?

Best

Chris

Chris,

Was Pershing a terrible commander? Yes, few would argue otherwise. He was new to the war, had little experience in the command of large scale field operation of hundreds of thousands (let alone millions) of men.

There are more than a few who believed then, and now, that Haig should have been sacked in the fall of 1916, let alone retained through the disasters of 1917 (and a few successes thanks to the Canadians and the occasional Anzac...), and the near collapse that occurred during the spring of 1918. Haig was retained largely because of his "political" and social connections, and the fear that no one else could replace him. Those who were capable of replacing Haig such as Allenby were shuffled out of sight, or perhaps some of the Canadian or ANZACs leaders were not politically acceptable to lead the BEF because they weren't (1) regular pre-war Army, and (2) not "British." So, despite Haig's leadership (or lack thereof) he was retained because some felt he was all they had.

Pershing was under tremendous political pressure from Washington, DC to field an American, and American-led only force. The point of view of the American government was that the United States war effort, was associate with the British and French, but independent of, not going to be subordinated to the aims, methods, or goals of the British and French. The point of view of the American government (Wilson, and others both in the State and War Department) was that America joined the war on it's own, and could leave the war when it chose, without having to consult the British, French, Russians, etc. The US government flatly stated to the Allies, it could if it chose, resolve the end of the American war effort only on it's terms, and if that meant a solitary peace treaty with the Germans, or even a solitary war against German, that was an option the United States government was not giving up.

Pershing was directed by Woodrow Wilson and the War Department, not to agree to splitting up American units and allowing them to be piecemealed into whatever British and French units needed manpower at any given time. His direct orders were to field American forces only when they were led by American officers, and under an overall American command.

In one instance, Pershing agreed to place a component of the US 28ID under French command during the summer of 1918, in the area of Fismes and Fismette. The US commander on the spot withdrew his men from an isolated position where they had no flank protection, and were promptly order back across the Vesle river. Not long after moving back, they were attacked and came close to being annihilated. This raised a -huge- stink in the American papers, and helped foster a "never again" attitude regarding fielding American troops under British or French tactical officers and orders.

Pershing also had to deal with the internal politics of the regular American army and assimilating nationalized National Guard units, wartime-only volunteers and conscripts into a field force that could operate as a single entity. The British faced similar problems in 1914, and were still dealing with the consequences more than a few years after the war had begun. The regular British army point of view that a man in uniform in a soldier, and all soldiers was a firmly fixed idea in the mind of more than a few senior British officers, Sir John French, and Haig among them.

So, yes, the memoirs of National Guard officers and regular US Army officers may reflect a bias towards how each saw the other, and war, it's conduct, and field grade officers, senior commanders and Pershing's leadership (or lack thereof).

Regarding your question about Belleau... Was it botched? Yes, American tactics were often badly planned and executed, however, the net effect was to put the Germans off balance, and had major psychological impacts. The Americans could say they were finally in the war, and the arrival of American troops signaled the start of a larger American effort that would soon put the Germans at a strategic disadvantage.

The Marines get quite a bit of press about Belleau Wood. They got into it, but the operation there was concluded not by the Marines who had to be withdrawn because of heavy losses, and resulting disorganization of several types, but by the Army who were in reserve until the Marines ran out of steam. The Army concluded the operation and finally cleared the Bois de Belleau.

(Probably more than what you wanted to read or know....)

Edited July 24, 2010 by Les

[Chris Boonzaier]

Nope, good post. Will have to wait until tomorrow to get to answering.

Best

Chris

[IrishGunner]

It is my grossly generalized and sweeping opinion that every activity during WWI at both the operational and strategic levels of war was a cockup - on every front and by every force - except probably the Germans on the Eastern Front and the Germans at the Italian Front.

We can only find leadership, innovation and initiative at the tactical level.

But again, simply my opinion... And without corroborating details.

Edited July 25, 2010 by IrishGunner

[Chris Boonzaier]

I dont know...

baby steps... learning by doing etc. etc...

I notice that when I try and tell our little terror not to do things as they will end badly... he does not listen... he has to do them himself... and see it fail... and burn his fingers... then he knows...

The thought

"Our infantry is the best! The enemy wont withstand their elan and force in a direct assault! Heavy Artillery is a waste of time, at the most we need field artillery.... Attack! "

Was an error the French made in 1914... then they learned from it... British and French had learned a lot by 1918...

Then Pershing came along with ...

"Our infantry is the best! The enemy wont withstand their elan and force in a direct assault! Heavy Artillery is a waste of time, at the most we need field artillery.... Attack! "

and noone could persuade him otherwise!

Learning by doing is a painful reality that every army experiances... it is that bit more painful for the soldiers when the high command spills blood by refusing to accept the lessons learned by the neighbour, especially if it is caused by a superiority complex ala Pershing.

Reading a bit on the subject I begin to feel the AEF was a magnificent weapon with lots of potential... but I wonder if they would have done better with a different commander?

One who was just as determined as Pershing to have his troops under his own command. But also more willing to work with and listen to allies.

[dond]

All Commanders are subjects of controversy. Pershing is no different. WW1 was steep learning curve for all the major combatants. Look at 1914-15. Some took a while to realize a stalemate was occurring. Pershing had orders to get over there, keep the Army together, and get the job done. He knew it wouldn't be done by continued trench warfare. Sooner or later a war of maneuver had to take place for real results to be achieved. Pershing didn't want his men to get into the "trench" mindset. He also wanted to demonstrate that Americans could take on the enemy man to man and beat him. They did. The Germans were becoming a hollow force and with a big enough hit their lines would shatter. Then the healthier, fresher Americans would be able to out maneuver them.

We Americans still don't like to fight under foreign officers btw.

[Chris Liontas]

Pershing was a great military/political general, much like Eisenhower during WWII. Pershings idea to have a separate AEF was the right decision for the fledgling American Army. I shudder to think of what would happen if American Doughboys would have been assigned to General Mangins armies. He would have used them as cannon fodder to spare French casualties. So in essence I think Pershing had the right idea at an Army level. However in terms of tactics, he was woefully ignorant of modern warfare.

Pershing and the majority of the general staff believed the Europeans suffered from a lack of both nerve and forethought. Tactical American doctrine pre 1910 emphasized fire and maneuver tactics. American Generals seem to have forgotten this in 1917. In our rush to get an army in the field, America went back to what most generals knew, the rifleman. Generals like Summerall (1st Division) grew up in small brushfire wars in the Philippines and Haiti, they didnt have the experience that European generals had with massed artillery and machineguns. Training of the AEF, except for certain divisions, was poor. National Guard units, like the 37th, paid a heavy price in the Argonne for their lack of training and experience. Their training on Machineguns was, the easiest way to take machineguns, is to take them (ie with the bayonet) . It is sad that America learned nothing from the Somme and Verdun. The bayonet equipped rifleman was our answer to gas, massed artillery, and machineguns in 1918.

The Marine attack at Belleau Wood was a huge cluster. The Marines of that battle deserve every laurel given to them as their were sent into battle as sheep to the slaughter. Army troops from the 2nd division stated the Marines looked like they were on parade as they charged into the machinegun fire of the Germans. Little, if any good artillery or gas perpetration was given. It honestly could have been a reenactment of a French attack during plan XVII in 1914. The bravery of the Marines and Army troops is the only reason America didnt get embarrassed in our first major operation in WWI. Casualties were very disproportionate to what we achieved against a second rate defense.

Sadly this would be repeated again, and again by American arms until Hunter Liggett took command in the Argonne. Summerall, Patton, and Pershing learned nothing in the months preceding the Argonne offensive. The battle of Belleau Wood should have shown the American Army what fixed machineguns could do, and should have spared units like the 91st division their massive casualties at Gesnes. Sadly, the American Doughboy had to learn quickly how to survive in the trenches. America should not have been involved in WWI (another discussion), but when we arrived, we should have been ready. Artillery, gas, machineguns, and BAR assault rifles all should have been used to maximum efficiency, as American had three years of war to study.

Edited July 29, 2010 by Chris Liontas

[Les]

The Marine attack at Belleau Wood was a huge cluster. <snip>

Sadly this would be repeated again, and again by American arms until Hunter Liggett took command in the Argonne. Summerall, Patton, and Pershing learned nothing in the months preceding the Argonne offensive. The battle of Belleau Wood should have shown the American Army what fixed machineguns could do, and should have spared units like the 91st division their massive casualties at Gesnes. Sadly, the American Doughboy had to learn quickly how to survive in the trenches. America should not have been involved in WWI (another discussion), but when we arrived, we should have been ready. Artillery, gas, machineguns, and BAR assault rifles all should have been used to maximum efficiency, as American had three years of war to study.

Pershing was asked by Foch to tell him where he planned to conduct field operations during the later part of the summer of 1918, and through the fall of 1918. Perhsing voluntarily chose to mount an attack in the St. Mihiel area, and also the Meuse-Argonne. Pershing picked the starting dates, and locations for both. Foch asked Pershing if he thought the American forces were capable of reducing the St. Mihiel salient, then quickly shifting southwards to the Meuse-Argonne within a few days. Foch said one of the conditions for accepting Perhsing's plan, was that American forces would continue to hold the St. Mihiel salient when the Meuse-Argonne was kicked off, and also during the operations there. Pershing agreed.

The American offensive in the St. Mihiel area went well, however, what the Americans (and Allies) did not know, was Ludendorf had previously decided on shortening the lines in the St. Mihiel area, and the German/Austrian troops there were in the process of withdrawing when the American attack started.

During the Meuse-Argonne, the American advance did not go all that smoothly, and after the first phase of the offensive was over (there were three phases total), the logistics started to unravel. Troops started to experience shortages which were not critical, but left more than a few units low on food, ammunition, and a serious need of being able to move fighting units forward across the areas torn up by combat, and getting dead and wounded to the rear. More than a few men were separated from the units, either by accident or intent; observers and officers reported men that should have been with their units wandering around, etc.

The overall situation was bad enough that Foch was considering asking the Allied Supreme War Council to demand Wilson replace Pershing (with another American). Arguably, what saved Pershing was the Germans being subjected to almost continuous and "all out" British and French attacks, which prevented the Germans from being able to shuffle divisions from one spot to another along the front in a fire-brigade fashion. If the Germans were able to draw on re-reinforcements to stabilize the lines, Pershing's offensive would have run into even greater problems than it was facing. Arguably, the collapse of the German army and the end of the war, allowed Pershing to see the end of the war, while still in command of the AEF.

Chris (both C's), Wilson started thinking about the US getting into the war, not long after he replaced William Jennings Bryant as Sec. State. Bryant was a believer in strict neutrality, and felt that American banks loaning the Allies money was a violation of true neutrality towards both sides. Wilson's 1916 presidential run and his "peace pledge" might have bound him by his words, however, Wilson was well-aware that if the Allies lost the war, then American chances of recouping loans to the Allies would be almost nil, and American banks would collapse with the result there could be a major US economic depression. Wilson was a man looking for a cause that he could sell the American public. Yes, -this- particular subject is room for at least one, and possibly quite a few threads.

Wilson reportedly was considering Maj. General Frederic Funston to head a future "AEF" before Funston died of an unexpected and massive coronary in February 1917. Funston and Pershing knew each other and served together. Pershing was not Wilson's first choice, although when the time came, and Funston was dead, the list of officers to head the AEF was a very short one. If Funston had lived (he was younger than Pershing), one or the other might have been a potential replacement for the other if things did not go well, or a head needed on a plate situation developed.

[Chris Liontas]

Actually the initial deployment to the Argonne went fairly smoothly. The Americans got nine divisions in from the German positions without General Gallwitz even taking much notice. It was after the main attack that the entire logistics system broke down. The road supplying the troops in the Argonne became a total and complete traffic jam, with troops unable to maintain contact with support units. What always stuns me in this battle, is the American general staff didn’t seem to realize they would need a route for reinforcements and supply once the fighting began. It is interesting to note that the US 32nd After action report of 4 October details that American air recognizance (given by a detachment from the 99th Aero Squadron) was used to find the 32nd Division’s own artillery!! They had become separated and stuck on the route of march due to the traffic jam leading to the Argonne.

Foch was right in being pessimistic about Pershing’s attack; although I think it was Clemenceau that really became furious with American progress. His getting stuck on the route of advance, making him unable to visit the front lines of the 35th division was a real stinker for the Americans to deal with.

I believe Pershing really believed what he was doing was right. You can find his opinions echoed in so many other brigade and battalion commanders during the beginning of, and end of the war. What surprises me is the amount of literature devoted to protecting and defending guys like Pershing and for the extent, Billy Mitchell. American tactics at Belleau Wood were a foreshadow of things to come. At least at Belleau Wood we deployed divisions with a fair number of veteran (not combat but at least trained appropriately) troops; in phase one of the Argonne six of nine units were green national guard regiments that had been amalgamated from their original structure. How they were even able to advance with rudimentary training in field operations is beyond me.

Les brings up a GREAT idea, one that has been actually floating around in my head for some time. Would there be any interest in starting a America in World War I thread, or at least a beginnings of American involvement thread? In my personal opinion, Woodrow Wilson ranks as one of the WORST presidents in American history. America should never have been involved in World War I, and should have actually ended the war soon after Verdun in 1916. Our “neutrality” was a joke and I believe, caused the war to drag on for two more years (and illegally stripped thousands of Americans of their civil liberties by giving in to British propaganda)