archie777

“The convoy got safely across, and we camped at a pan of water in the flats. About an hour after camping, some of the officers, among whom was the captain of the New Zealand squadron, said they were anxious to see Cronje’s last stand, and whether, if permission was granted by Major Paris, I would go with them. I agreed, and shortly after saw Major Paris, l who said he would allow them to go, providing I went in command. I agreed, and we started about 2pm. One captain of the 4th Scottish Rifles, staff officer to Major Paris, also accompanied us. We reached the memorable camp of General Cronje about an hour later, and after placing a couple of lookouts on points of vantage, I allowed the party to scatter and look for curios. We were about sixty five all told, chiefly New Zealanders, scouts, and some Royal Welsh Fusiliers, who were attached to me under Lieutenant Holroyd. After spending about half an hour, I gave orders to return- the column had meanwhile gone on—and after some little difficulty got the party collected, and we started back through the river, when I at once extended the men and sent out the necessary scouts. When almost opposite Kitchener’s Kop (so called, being the position held by Lord Kitchener during the shelling of Cronje’s camp and trenches along the river banks), firing was reported on our left, and shortly after I noticed two of four men, New Zealanders, I had sent forward on our left point coming on at a gallop…” ‘A Fight to a Finish” by Major C G Dennison. “Were with a patrol of about 60 men. Hearing that the left flank was being attacked, Captain Dennison rode out to it. About 60 of the enemy cut them off, and they eventually surrendered.” “SA Surrenders” (WO108-372). According to the SAFF Casualty Roll one man was killed and Captain Dennison and 4 men (one of them severely wounded) were taken prisoner. One of the prisoners, a New Zealander, 2634 Tpr Frank Perham covered the incident and his early release by the Boers in a book “The Kimberley Flying Column”

One of the most serious conflicts in which the Natal Police took part in was the defence of the magistracy at Mahlabatini on 28 April 1901. About a score of the police under Sgt Locke were brigaded at Dundee and received orders to entrain for Zululand. From the Tugela they rode up to Melmoth, where a standing camp was pitched for some weeks until further orders were received for them to go on a four days’ patrol to Mahlabatini. A camp was established outside the courthouse and every morning before dawn a four-man patrol was sent along the road towards Emtonjeneni. This patrol went out as usual on the day of the attack. As the men were riding past a mealie patch, about two miles from the camp, a shot was fired, and one of the patrol galloped back to camp reporting the incident. The whole force quickly moved out under Sergeant Locke, with Mr. Wheelwright, the magistrate, and Colonel Bottomley. They rode quickly down the road, made a thorough search of the mealie patch. Finding nothing they went along the veldt towards the Emtonjeneni store, about three miles away, until they came to where the road divides with the main track passing to the left, and a path going straight on through some wattle trees. The magistrate, with four men, went to the left, galloping to the top of a ridge, where they came under a hail of bullets. The sun was just rising, showing the troopers up very clearly on the skyline, and providing an excellent target for the Boers, who were concealed in the trees. On hearing shots, the advance party of the men who had gone along the path got into skirmishing order, and entered the trees, where they were ambushed. They were shot down to a man, every one of them receiving two or more wounds. The remainder of the troop hastily opened out, and arrived on the scene at a gallop, just as a Boer named Van Niekerk, more courageous than the others, came out of the trees to demand the surrender of the whole troop. This was refused, so he instantly fired, hitting one of the horses; but he in return received a bullet fired by Trooper J. Smith. The police dismounted and took cover, spreading well out and firing at the slightest movement of the enemy. After some hours the Boers were driven off and the dead and wounded troopers were placed in a police wagon. Sergeant Locke had been very badly injured within an hour of the opening of hostilities. He was found lying on the ground with his head on his saddle, and Van Niekerk, also badly wounded, being near him. Sergeant Locke was with difficulty lifted on to the wagon, which went slowly towards the camp, but as the jolting was so bad a stretcher was improvised. No natives had been seen about all day, but fortunately at this moment a party of thirty of them in full war paint appeared. They were told to carry the stretcher in which Sergeant Locke was lying, but they were in a violent frame of mind. Killed: Sergeant Collett (seven wounds in one leg), Troopers Cameron, Salmond and Nelson. Mortally wounded: Sergeant Locke and Trooper Aldwinkle. Wounded: Trooper Smith. Sergeant Locke died the same evening and Trooper Aldwinkle about a month later. Trooper Smith recovered and became a warder at the central gaol at Pietermaritzburg. The defence had been maintained by 3 non-commissioned officers and 19 troopers of the Natal Police. It was afterwards discovered that the enemy had numbered about 150 (some reports suggest 400), and the little British force killed nine of them. The rest went back, and, thinking they had been opposed by a regiment, shot their native spies, who had told them that there were only a few men of the police there. When they discovered how many troopers there really were at Mahlabatini they sent along a disconcerting message to the effect that they would pay a visit to the camp on the first moonlight night and wipe out every man there. In “The Nongqai” – the official police magazine – a photograph of the survivors appeared along with a brief account of the action which read as follows: “The Magistracy, Mahlabatini, Zululand, was attacked by a large force of Boers at 5am yesterday. The defence was maintained by a detachment of the Natal Police Field Force, comprising 3 N.C.O’s, 19 men and 2 civil servants. The fighting lasted 6 hours, and resulted in the defeat and repulse of the Boers, who numbered 400 strong (according to computation of prisoners captured).

On 22 April 22 two hundred men of the 8th M.I. were escorting a supply convoy from Cyferkuil to Klerksdorp when it was attacked on Reebokfontein Farm by 700 of De la Rey’s burghers. During the fight Lieutenant Percy Goodwyn, who was in command of the left flank guard, saw sixty Boers making for a kopje which commanded the position from which the British guns were firing. Gathering ten of his men, he raced the enemy for the top of the hill. As the East Lancashires galloped for the kopje, Corporal Connery received five wounds, and his horse was hit twice, but still he rode on. Both sides arrived simultaneously, and, although overwhelmed by numbers, Goodwyn and his men maintained their position long enough for the guns to withdraw. The Boers massed 180 men against the little band, who were eventually rushed with the loss of two killed, three wounded and the remainder taken prisoners, but not before Private Burrows had collected rifle bolts from the casualties and thrown them away to prevent the enemy getting them. For gallantry on this occasion, Lieutenant Goodwyn was awarded the DSO and Corporal Connery and Private Burrows were Mentioned in Despatches and received Special Promotion from Lord Kitchener for Distinguished Conduct in the Field. Red Roses on the Veldt, p277.

On 21 April 1901 Commandant Manie Maritz with 10 mounted men surprised a 15-man patrol of the Western Province Mounted Rifles who were on their way to the farm Nelskop, some 40 km south of Brandvlei in the direction of Calvinia. After a short skirmish the majority of the WPMR men remounted and made for a nearby hill, Swartkop. Maritz and five men charged in parallel and ascended Swartkop on the opposite side as the British. As Maritz dismounted near the summit, he received a flesh wound in the arm. One of his men helped him to get up and as he started a charge up-hill he received two further light wounds in the arm and back. He again got up and stormed the WPMR men. At this stage he was joined by the rest of his party and after a short exchange of fire the WPMR party surrendered. The British losses were two men killed, Lt Tidmarsh and 2 men wounded, and 9 men taken prisoner. The Boers gained 13 horses and 13 rifles with ammunition. Maritz was the only casualty on the Boer side, and he was nursed on a nearby farm T’Boop by the owner’s wife, Mrs Hessie Nel. Later in the war the farm was to become a hospital for wounded Boer rebels. Translated from Memoirs of Commandant Manie Maritz.

After the successful Rietspruit action Lt-Col Monro set out again 2 nights later towards Ventershoek. In the Ruigtespruit vicinity the party became entangled in difficult country, and owed its escape with but seven casualties largely to its being mistaken for friends by the Boers, who were met with in considerable strength. Official History, Vol IV, p163.

DCM (Vic): 2828 Sqdn. Sgt. Major A.E. Hurst 5/Drgn. Gds.; QSA 5 clasps RoM, Elandsl, DoL, Tvl, SA’01: 2828 Sq: S. Major A. Hurst, 5th Dragoon Guards Arthur Hurst was in South Africa with his parent unit when the war broke out and saw action at Elandslaagte and during the Defence of Ladysmith. He was one of 3 Sergeants “imported” from the 5th Dragoon Guards by Major B R M Glossop when Adjutant of the 1st Imperial Light Horse and he earned his Relief of Mafeking, Transvaal and SA1901 clasps with his adopted unit. In “The Story of the Imperial Light Horse” by Lt G F Gibson it is related that during the action at Cyferfontein on 5 Jan 1901, when Colonel Woolls-Sampson was trying to get his men to retire from heavy fire, RSM Hurst was seen to ride down the whole Imperial Light Horse line, waving the men away and yelling “Retire! Retire!” Miraculously neither Colonel Wools-Sampson, Major Briggs, Captain Normand nor RSM Hurst, although remaining mounted were touched, but their chargers were wounded in many places and their saddlery and clothing were pierced by many bullets. Hurst displayed much coolness under fire that day, but, as the history of the ILH informs us, he reacted a lot more hotly to a visiting member of the Army Service Corps that evening: Hurst was yarning to the members of his mess, including a visiting Sergeant-Major of the A.S.C., about the day’s experiences; he was particularly sore about the damage to his hat, which had received more than its arithmetical quota of attention from the enemy that morning, no less than three bullets having torn through it and shot it to rags. His miraculous escape from death concerned him less, knowing the workings of the supply side, than the prospect of having to replace the hat at his own expense. Sourly regarding his wrecked headgear, he commented fluently upon the parentage, upbringing and morals of the “New Hat Department.” The Sergeant-Major from the A.S.C., his branch of the Service involved, imprudently intervened: “What would happen if every soldier wanting a new hat merely fired three bullets through his old one and then claimed a new one?” At this interjection (and possible innuendo) Hurst warmed to his work in real earnestness. Expurgated of his Rabelaisian ornamentation and the choicer cuts and thrusts of army lingo and shafts of pious wit (this out of consideration for our more gently nurtured readers) his homily on the scale of values, rank and precedence in the army, but nothing about ‘hats’ ran:- “Look here, my lad (glaring maliciously). You are talking to the R.S.M. of the I.L.H., and a S.M. of the 5th Dragoon Guards, two fighting regiments, FIGHTING regiments. My Colonel, who is a just bloke, would choke me off like Hades if he saw me talking with one of your sort. It would break his precious heart if he heard that I had talked with a Creator Condemned Grocer, and as for arguing – if he knew that I, a cavalry soldier, had condescended to argue with one, do you know what he’d do? Of course, you don’t – pity the ignorant! He’d have me on the peg and reduced to the ranks in a brace of shakes. Now, no more ruddy talk from YOU about my hat.” Of true fighting spirit, Arthur Hurst was killed in action at Hartebeestfontein. In the London Gazette of 9 July, 1901 (p4561) RSM Hurst with 2 other men (Pte Langham, 4th NZ Rgt and Cpl Moy, 6th Imp Bushmen) are “Brought to notice by General Babington for their conduct in capture of guns and convoy at Vaal Bank on March 23rd and 24th, 1901”. In the “Remarks Column” is stated “Awarded DC medal”. Langham and Moy were definitely mentioned and rewarded for this particular action, also known as Wildfontein. However, SSM Hurst’s name is out of place when coupled to Vaal Bank as he had been killed on 22 March! As the Hartbeesfontein rear-guard action led to General Babington’s success at Vaal Bank it seems that he commented on the 3 days’ combined operations (22 to 24 March) in his despatch to Kitchener. This is borne out by the particulars and dates in the LG mentions by Babington: 22nd and 23rd March 1901: Sixteen Officers are mentioned under the reference “General Babington’s despatch on capture of Boer guns and convoy at Vaal Bank” 24 March 1901: Fifteen men (including Hurst) are mentioned under the reference “General Babington’s despatch, dated 29th March, on capture of Boer guns and convoy at Vaal Bank.” 22 March 1901: Only three men are mentioned under the reference “General Babington’s despatch on action of Imperial Light Horse.” Based on the above, it is concluded that Hurst’s DCM must have been awarded for the Hartbeesfontein action. It is hoped that Babington’s Despatch(es) will one day be traced to confirm this! Warrant for Municipal or Metropolitan Police Service Ten Year Loyal Service Medal 2008.pdf

A detachment of 150 mounted men and a pom-pom under Lt-Col Monro set off on 10 April from Dewetsdorp in pursuit of a Boer commando. After a 3 hour chase the enemy was found, l outspanned near some farm buildings and protected by a large donga in front of them. However, the surrounding kopjes were within rifle range and were speedily occupied by Monro’s men. A hot fight ensued with a large party of Boers in the donga and a smaller number in the farm buildings, but when the British charged the donga from both flanks, 53 burghers surrendered. The Boers in the farm buildings kept up their fire in spite of the capitulation of their comrades before their eyes. Monro, seeing Boers approaching on the horizon, decided to try negotiation to make a speedy end to the skirmish and he sent in Lt Shott of Bethunes Mtd Infy (who had earlier initiated the assault on the donga) unarmed and with only a white handkerchief to the farmhouses. Shott eventually persuaded the defenders to yield and Monro returned to Dewetsdorp with the Boer convoy and 83 prisoners. Official History, Vol IV, p162. (Dates of 9 and 11 April are attributed to the incident in contemporary sources).

Captain Bretherton, with 100 men (5th Lancers, Nesbitt’s Horse & 32nd Coy, IY) was ordered to Probart’s Farm (Nieuwelanden/Zeekoei River), 16 km north of Aberdeen, to block the mountain passes in the vicinity. “Reached farm at 5:20 pm on 6th, in pouring rain. Only an hour of daylight left, in which he built schanzes and occupied both sides of the dry riverbed, every officer and man being on duty that night. Attacked in early morning by force under Scheepers and Malan. The fire was heaviest against the Lancers’ position, and they, under Lieutenant Jones (who was wounded), were compelled to surrender at 8am Captain Bretherton retired with the Imperial Yeomanry to a sheep shed, upon which all the enemy’s fire was concentrated, and, after twice refusing to surrender, gave in at 11am on the third summons, as the enemy were preparing to use dynamite, and were firing in at the open door of the building. Lieutenant Fletcher escaped capture”. Boer War Surrenders, WO108-372. British losses were 1 man killed, 1 Officer and 5 men wounded and 2 Officers and 76 men surrendering. The Boers also took the waggons, supplies, 50 civilian coats and all the horses.

On 22 March 1901 General Babington, acting on observations of a sentry the previous evening, ordered Col Briggs and 3 squadrons of the ILH with a pom-pom to Kafferskraal, 25 km west of Hartbeestfontein, to find out whether De la Rey’s laager is in the vicinity. Reaching the farm Geduld at the halfway mark at 9.30 am, an advance troop under Lt Dryden was attacked by some 200 Boers. They took refuge in a kraal and vigorously returned the enemy fire. Shortly afterwards Col Briggs brought the pom- pom into action, causing the Boers to temporarily fall back. Having confirmed the presence of De la Rey’s commando, Briggs ordered the ILH to retire to Hartbeestfontein. De la Rey’s men attacked on horseback, firing from the saddle and a running battle developed with Smuts’ men joining in. The three ILH squadrons were subjected to heavy fire but fought their way back with the pom-pom working at maximum capacity. Individual troops and squadrons alternated as rear-guard and they reached base camp at about 2 pm. The British casualties were heavy: 2 officers and 4 men killed, and 3 officers and 15 men wounded. Years after the war General Smuts, who was shot through the leg at close quarters in an effort to capture the pom-pom, spoke at a banquet in honour of Col Briggs when he relinquished command of the Transvaal Volunteers. He said, inter alia: “The rear-guard action fought by the ILH, supported by a Maxim Nordenveldt, at Hartebeestfontein was the most brilliant one I had seen fought by either side during the entire campaign. Both General de la Rey and myself were determined to capture the pom-pom, as well as the ILH”.

Captains G.J. Scheepers and W.D. Fouche returned to the Midlands at the end of February, and on the 5th March attacked Aberdeen for the third time. The 14 martial law prisoners in the jail were released and promptly joined the commando. The available horses were commandeered, but before the situation could develop any further, the commando was driven from the town by a counterattack by its Town Guard. On the 6th a British column, guided by locals, went in pursuit of Scheepers and Fouche. It came under attack however and, according to the SAFF Casualty roll, 3 British soldiers were killed/died of wounds and 12 wounded.

The town of Lichtenburg and the district surrounding it furnished two Boer commandos, under Commandant H C W Vermaas and Commandant J G Celliers respectively. The town was occupied by the British for a few days in June 1900 and then on a permanent basis from late November 1900. It became an important supply depot and the British garrison of 620 men comprised infantry, artillery and Yeomanry, specifically the 10th Company, 3rd Battalion, IY, and two companies of Paget’s Horse, or the 19th Battalion, IY. On 3 March 1901, Lichtenburg was attacked in a three-pronged assault on the town by an estimated 300 Boers. From the west, Commandant Vermaas assailed the fortified British redoubt in the market square, while the second and third attacks from the east and west were directed against the British pickets on the edge of the town. After facing determined resistance for 24 hours, the Boers were forced to withdraw, General de la Rey coming to the assistance of Vermaas. An Imperial Yeomanry man recounts the action as the Boers rushed the British trenches: ‘How those pickets did fight! The picket trenches never contained more than 7 men, and in one trench only two were left, the others being killed or wounded. When relief arrived, a sergeant was just saying to one comrade “Fix bayonets, we’ll keep the ... back”. The defenders lost 21 men killed and died of wounds (two of them Yeomanry men), and 24 wounded. The Boers lost fourteen men killed and forty wounded.

The village of Pearston (45km north-west of Somerset East) was garrisoned by 25 men of Nesbitt’s Horse and a small Town Guard (white and coloured men). At dawn on 3 March Commandants Kritzinger and Lötter attacked and completely surprised the garrison. 22 men from Nesbitt’s Horse fled to Somerset East, leaving the Town Guard in badly positioned trenches and schanzes. They eventually surrendered and had to look on while the Boers helped themselves liberally to supplies (including liquor). Two stores, whose owners were connected to the military, were completely looted. Apart from prisoners, the Boers took 80 horses, 60 rifles and thousands of rounds of ammunition while 20 local men joined the Rebel commando.

General Christiaan de Wet with some 1500 burghers crossed the Orange River on 10 February 1901 and invaded the Cape Colony for the second time. His attempt to gather support from Cape sympathisers was not a success and he lost 200 burghers as PoWs as well as guns, ammunition and wagons. He had to get back into the Free State, but l the swollen Orange River was a big hindrance. Eventually, on 28 Feb 1901 he and his commando succeeded in crossing the river at Leliefontein, close to Colesberg (this was the fifteenth drift that they had tried). The next day, after their exhausting journey, some 35 of his men were taken prisoner

Captain Strong and some 70 men of Kitchener’s Fighting Scouts were on reconnaissance duty in the Richmond district and were caught in an ambush by a 200 strong Boer commando while passing through a defile on the farm Klipkraal. Eventually, with 4 of his party killed and 7 wounded, Captain Strong surrendered. The subsequent Court of Enquiry found that the party was captured owing to the absence of proper precautions on approaching the defile, the result of want of military training and knowledge. SA Surrenders WO 108/372.

At the beginning of February 1901 Lord Methuen’s column (5th and 10th Imperial Yeomanry, Royal North Lancashires as well as New South Wales and Victorian Imperial Bushmen) left Taung and advanced eastward towards Klerksdorp. On 17 February he obtained information that that a large Boer force made up from the Wolmaransstad, Lichtenburg and Potchefstroom Commandos had concentrated at Hartebeestfontein across the direct Klerksdorp road. When Methuen approached the Boer position on 18 February it turned out to be far stronger than anticipated from maps and intelligence. In addition, he found that General de la Rey had come down from the north and taken overall command of some 1300 men. However, Methuen with barely 900 men, decided to attack. The defile, through which the British had to advance, was dominated by numerous rocky ravines and ridges and the Boers were able to pour an enfilading fire on the column. The 5th IY attacked the Boers on the right in the morning while the 10th IY and the Victorians attacked the Boer left. The Royal North Lancashires were brought in mid-morning and their extra firepower, despite heavy losses, caused the Boers to retreat during the afternoon. The Boers left 18 dead on the field while the British losses amounted to 15 killed and 34 wounded. This spirited action opened the road to Klerksdorp which Lord Methuen entered the next day without further opposition.

Knox took his own troops towards Hout Kraal, where an armoured train and a small column composed of a company of the 3rd Grenadier Guards, two guns and 150 mounted troops under Colonel E. Crabbe had already arrived, expecting to be joined by another under Henniker, which was on the march from Philipstown. These bodies had been hastily formed at De Aar by Sir H. Settle for the express purpose of clinging to De Wet until the regular columns should arrive. At 4.30am on the 15th, before either Knox or Henniker appeared on the scene, Crabbe discovered the Boers in the act of crossing the railway four miles north of Hout Kraal. De Wet had destroyed the track on either side of the crossing, and the armoured train, which promptly steamed towards the spot, could only shell the rear portion of the convoy, whilst Crabbe was too weak to do more than follow in observation. About noon he was joined by Plumer, whose march in pursuit of the commandos would have been rendered intolerable by the morasses had not these exhausting obstacles held so many derelict Boer wagons as to cheer his men with evidence that the enemy’s case was worse than their own. More than twenty wagons, for the most part laden with flour and ammunition, lay embedded in the mud, to be joined soon by as many of Plumer’s. The night’s scurry from Wolve Kuil and Plumer had indeed reduced the Boers to an abject plight. It confirmed the suspicion which had already arisen in the minds of the majority of the burghers that their trusted leader’s sole triumph in Cape Colony was to be that over the floods of the Orange River, a victory which that uncertain stream might yet avenge. They were now without reserve ammunition or the certainty of supply; horses and men were failing as rapidly as their adversaries were increasing around them. “Official History”, Vol IV, p80-1.

Hi Megan, I will try to share those that I have Regards Archie

Plumer made contact with De Wet at 11 am on 12 Feb, a little to the north of Hamelfontein. This was a critical meeting, for all De Wet’s hopes of penetrating into the interior of Cape Colony depended on his being neither delayed nor deflected at this moment. Plumer’s, on the other side, had to keep the invaders from the vitals of the colony by turning them westward. The enemy’s left, in short, was the strategical flank, and Plumer, though he fully recognised this was fortunately served by subordinates able to anticipate his orders before they could be conveyed across the field. It happened that the enemy was first struck into by a reconnoitring squadron of the Imperial Light Horse., commanded by Captain G. T. M. Bridges, R.A. Had this party bungled in its tactics infinite harm might have resulted; but the situation was as clear to Bridges as to his chief. He instantly sprang towards the proper flank and, establishing himself in a defensive position, successfully clung to De Wet and warned him away from the east until Jeffreys’ column, coming up, finally barred the south and east, and bent the hostile fine of advance in the required direction. After a sharp skirmish, in which six of Plumer’s men were wounded, the Boers drew off towards Philipstown, whence another part of the Boer vanguard was beaten off by the small garrison, opportunely supported by Henniker’s Coldstream Guards, after eleven hours’ fighting. “Official History” Vol IV, p79. DCM (VR): Trpr Sopp, Imp.Yeo.; QSA, 4 clasps CC, Rhod, OFS, SA’01: 12040 Cpl. W. Sopp 65th Coy. 17th Impl. Yeo.; 1914-15 Trio: 777 Pte. W. Sopp. Bucks. Yeo.; Melton Mowbray Tribute Medal: Corporal W. Sopp 7th Com. IY (Last without suspender as presented – Hibbard A16) The award of Sopp’s DCM (Supplement to the LG, 25 March 1901, p2103) read “…for gallantry at Phillipstown, on same occasion as Captain Tivey”. Maj Gen Settle’s endorsement of Lt-Col Crabbe’s recommendation for the award of the DCM provides more detail: “Trooper Sopp displayed great courage in running the gauntlet under a very heavy fire, and getting his message through obviated the necessity of Captain Tivey leaving the town which he probably could not have done without heavy loss”. However, a vivid account of Sopp’s heroic effort, written in a style reminiscent of a Victorian novel, was given by Sharrad H Gilbert (who also served in the 65th Company, I Y) in the chapter headed “The Defence of the Jail” of his book “Rhodesia – and After”. “Those in the jail watch the hill eagerly. What will they do? What can they do? They are but sixty strong. But soon it is seen that some attempt is to be made from the hill. A party commence to make their way to the relief across the plain westward of the town. But this is madness. From the jail it can be seen that that side is seamed with dongas bristling with Boers, but evidently unknown to the Australian Captain. If they come that way they will be cut off to a man, but a short mile away, the men who have come to save them are riding to annihilation, all unwitting. And those upon the walls are forced to watch them, hand-tied, helpless. There seems no means. To ride through that zone of fire is suicide— is courting instant death; even was there the man to attempt it. But such a man is found. Trooper William Sopp volunteers to make the attempt, and the offer is accepted. No time is lost. Descending to the yard, Lieut. Munn’s own horse is saddled, with every ounce of useless weight discarded. Then — a cheery word or two, the gate flung wide, and urging his horse with voice and heel, Sopp takes Death by the hand, and makes his dash. For several moments the men above draw their breath, expecting instantly to see the fall of horse and rider. And the Boers themselves seem paralysed by his audacity, for twenty yards is gained before they fire. But not for long. Scores of rifles are swiftly emptied on horse and man. For many hundred yards they ride through showers of lead. The fire on the jail perceptibly slackens, for every rifle seems turned on that flying horseman, who moment by moment grows less as the distance widens. He leaves the road and striking across the veldt, shapes a beeline for the Bushmen’s hill. A horse with outstretched head and straining limbs, the rider sitting tight but still, riding to win. A horse and rider, faint seen through rising dust. A little dark patch scudding o’er an ocean of veldt. On, smaller, till a speck crawling up the far rise, and then – “Hurrah! He’s got through,” — broke from the men. And with a better heart, into the baffled Boers they pour their hail of lead, for they know the Bushmen are saved. And shortly from the hill a black speck comes, and reaching the plain, makes townwards. It is a horseman riding easily, for he has not yet been noticed by the Boers. What is it? — men ask. Surely no one man is so mad. Ah! The Boers have seen him and he is riding under fire, for there is now no lagging in his pace. Nearer, till through the glasses he takes shape, and one says with a gasp — “’Tis Sopp coming back!’ Nearer the flying horseman. This is a different task. To ride into the fire of a hundred rifles is not the same as flying from them. “Pour in your fire! Draw their attention! “shouts Lieut. Munn. And the men strive their best. Nearer the horseman. In the still moments ‘tween the firing the beat of the hoofs can be heard. “Keep up the fire into that donga. There’s where the mischief lies “And for the next few seconds the donga becomes a warm corner indeed for its sheltering occupants. 300 yards away, and the horse still on its feet. The crackle of shots is like fresh thorns on a fierce campfire.” “To the gate!” ‘Tis the last order given. Two hundred yards, —one hundred, and from the road fly little spurts of sand, thick as the first coming of big raindrops on still water. Back fly the gates. There is a sound of splintering glass, as every unbroken pane in the windows of the jail falls shivered by the storm of bullets. And with a clatter and a cheer from the men Trooper Sopp gallops into the yard — without a scratch on horse or man. ‘Trooper’ for that day only. For from that date henceforward he is ‘Corporal’ Sopp — promoted by the Commander- in-Chief for his deed. And, recommended by the Australian Captain, his name appears in ‘orders’. As mentioned by Gilbert Sopp was promoted to Corporal as additional reward for his gallantry. Sopp was in a group of almost 50 “north-country” soldiers whose DCM’s were presented in April 1902 by Maj Gen Thynne at the Cavalry Barracks in York. His address, as given in a newspaper report was ‘The Stables, Newport Lodge, Melton Mowbray’. He died from pneumonia in January 1928.

On the evening of 5 February Maj-Gen Smith – Dorrien’s column camped on the farm Bothwell on the northern edge of Lake Chrissie. Cmdt-Gen Louis Botha’s main aim at the time was to cripple the advance of Smith-Dorrien into the Eastern Transvaal and he decided on a night attack to achieve this and, at the same time, carry off welcome supplies of food, weapons and ammunition. The British camp was well situated but surprise reigned when some 2000 Boers attacked in pitch darkness just before 03h00 on 6 February. A tremendous fusillade broke out, followed by a rush of galloping hooves through the crowded camp. The horses of the 5th Lancers and ILH had stampeded, throwing the camp into turmoil. The burghers achieved initial success in the wake of the stampeding horses and cut up some of the West Yorks pickets but could not gain a foothold on the slopes and were not able to open direct fire on the main camp situated on a plateau. At 04h30, under cover of the thick morning mist, Botha ordered them to retreat. The Boer commando suffered about eighty casualties, including Field Cornet Spruyt of the Heidelberg Commando, and the British seventy-five. About 300 horses of the British force were killed or stampeded: this definitely delayed the British advance and gave the Boer commandos time to re-group.

De Wet was travelling at a great pace; but he was driving before him large flocks and herds, the food supplies for his intended campaign, and lingering to let these gain an offing, he allowed Knox to come up with his rear-guard on the Tabaksberg, forty miles north of Thabanchu, on January 29th. The position was immensely strong, and Knox, sending Pilcher against the front, and Crewe with only 600 rifles and three field guns around the Boer right flank, no less than ten miles distant to the eastward, found his divided forces, which would have been fully employed even if acting together, almost over-matched. Pilcher, attacking doggedly, made ground with difficulty all day against a delaying action, which was dangerous from the accuracy of the shrapnel burst by De Wet’s artillerymen. By the evening, with a loss of fifteen killed and wounded, including two officers, he had sent the Boer rear-guard after its main body, and occupied its ground. Crewe, isolated to the eastward, fared more hardly. His appearance on the flank endangered the enemy’s line of retreat, but he was too weak to push his advantage, and could barely withstand the resistance which his threatening position brought against him. Indeed, only the fine conduct of his troops, especially of the Kaffrarian Rifles, preserved him from destruction, for he was outnumbered by three to one, and it was vital to De Wet to disable him. In a fierce attack made in the afternoon the Boers got so nearly home that they actually surrounded and captured in his lines a Vickers-Maxim gun which had jammed. Crewe was then practically surrounded; but seizing commanding ground in the midst of the enemy he concealed his transport below it, and entrenched himself successfully, beating off another attack delivered during the night. Altogether his casualties numbered thirty-five, making fifty in both columns. The enemy lost about the same number, but they had Crewe’ gun, and had kept their southward road open. “Official History”, Vol IV p76-7.

Lt-Col G C Cunningham was ordered by French to leave a garrison at Rustenburg and to move south through Olifant’s Nek, there to take position in order to prevent De la Rey from moving eastward. Crossing the Nek on 23 January, Cunningham gained touch with the enemy (600 men under Commandant Potgieter) at Middelfontin, 7 miles from the summit of the pass. After some intense fighting the Boers were forced to retreat. Cunningham, unfortunately, chose a position for his camp in a valley dominated on every side by rocky hills. The next day De la Rey appeared on the scene with another 500 men and started an attack at 04h00 before dawn. This was kept up the whole of the day with the British subjected to rifle fire from all sides till darkness fell. Cunningham lost 54 killed and wounded during the 2 days’ fighting and could only extricate his force on 25 January with a further loss of 2 killed and 7 wounded when a relief column was sent by Babington from Ventersdorp. Times History, Vol V, p112.

Captain Wilson, with 50 men, was sent out to try to recover a mail cart taken by the enemy. Major Paget obtained permission to leave Lichtenburg to visit a farm where he had a squadron, and overtook Captain Wilson’s party. As no trace of the mail cart could be found, Captain Wilson decided to return, but Major Paget said that he wanted to surround a farm. He took 12 men, and Captain Wilson followed in support. The enemy attacked in force, and, in retiring, Major Paget and several others were captured. In addition, 3 men were killed and 2 were wounded. SA Surrenders (WO108-372).

Some 300 Boers attacked a supply convoy moving from Vlakfontein to their camp at Rhenosterkop, east of Pretoria. The escort under Captain F Thomas consisted of 20 of his own men (NSW Citizen’s Bushmen) and 53 men from the West Riding Mounted Infantry. After a four-hour engagement, in which the Bushmen lost one man with another mortally wounded and the West Ridings one man killed, the party surrendered. At the Court of Enquiry, it emerged that most of the West Ridings had just been discharged from hospital, had been drinking and had few rifles and little ammunition. The defence of the convoy fell on the Bushmen and the West Ridings surrendered of their own volition once they ran out of bullets. The Boers overran the West Riding positions and the Bushmen had to surrender also. “Shoot Straight, you Bastards” by Bleszynski, p223. Pte Jackson was severely wounded in the Vlakfontein debacle. In “Australia’s Boer War” by Craig Wilcox (p162) a different version of the incident is given in which Captain Thomas is blamed for the surrender: “The first drive to be conducted, as Kitchener intended, burned its way across the eastern Transvaal from the end of January 1901 to the middle of April. It was a response to a month of raids by Botha and Viljoen on railway stations, outposts, and convoys, including the seizure near Bronkhorstspruit station of thirteen wagons, a thousand sheep, and £1000 in soldiers’ pay after the leader of the convoy’s escort, Captain James Francis Thomas of the New South Wales Citizen Bushmen, had surrendered without good reason to a smaller number of Boers.”

Early in January Lieut Gen French’s columns (Babington, Paget, Plumer and Clements) were patrolling the Magaliesberg and Hekpoort Valley. Brig Gen Gordon’s column patrol area was south of Breedts Nek (the Boers chief passage through the mountains). On the 8th Beyers fell in with a convoy for Gordon coming from Krugersdorp. The Boers were repulsed with loss. Official History, Vol IV p129. In a 1903 publication of Beyers and Kemp, it is noted that the incident took place at a plantation on the farm Rietfontein and because “the British took position in the trees” Beyers was unsuccessful.

The night of January 7th exhibited every circumstance of vileness which is prejudicial to defence. It was intensely dark; a fine cold rain fell persistently, and a piercing easterly gale, which deadened the ears of sentries, did nothing to dissipate the driving mist which blinded their eyes. With everything in their favour, the various Boer detachments gathered, and at midnight each hurled itself upon its appointed victim. Machadodorp, the headquarters of Reeves’s section of the line, was attacked by Viljoen’s Lydenburgers from the north, and on the other side by the Ermelo men, under Smuts. The garrison consisted of the 2nd Royal Irish Fusiliers, with guns and cavalry, disposed on three heights, Rocky Hill, Natal Hill, and Signal Hill, all of which were separately engaged by the enemy and stoutly defended. On the first-named where a remarkable combat in which ninety-three men of the Fusiliers and six artillerymen withstood and finally repulsed the onset of nearly seven times as many burghers. Natal Hill and Signal Hill though closely beset, were in little danger from smaller commandos, and by 3am on the 8th the whole attack, decisively defeated, was withdrawn. Belfast, the key of the line, and Smith-Dorrien’s Headquarters had a far more severe trial. Monument Hill, to the north-east of Belfast, and about one and a half miles from it, was crowned by a fort containing a company of the Royal Irish Regiment. The first and heaviest stroke fell upon Monument Hill. Nowhere were the fog and drizzle thicker than here, so dense, indeed, that not only did the sentries fail to detect the approach of an enemy, but the Boers themselves, about 500 Johannesburgers and Boksburgers under Muller, saw nothing until they were through the outlying posts, which, in consequence, fell into their hands. They then broke through the entanglement and rushed upon the fort calling upon the garrison to surrender. The soldiers, unable to stop them with their rifles, answered with defiant shouts as they met them at the parapet, and a fierce melee ensued in which bayonets and butts of rifles were freely used, some even fighting with their fists, whilst others wrestled upon the ground… Amongst so much valour as was displayed the most conspicuous was shown by Private J. Barry (No. 3733). Seeing the regimental Maxim gun surrounded by the enemy, this brave soldier burst into the group and proceeded to smash the lock in order to render the trophy useless; and this, in spite of threats, he persisted in doing, until one of the Boers, less chivalrous than the rest, shot him dead. For half an hour the struggle continued before the garrison, having lost 38 of its number, was overpowered. Official History, Vol IV, p35-8