The Monkey God

Glad to hear thats okey. I came across I-52 whilst researching the U862, which has two crewman buried in a local cemetery. I was side tracked slightly as one sometimes is whilst researching. !! I`d never heard of it before, so was most interested to learn its tale. I assume the gold must have been part of the `Golden Lily` horde?

Hope its okey to just cut & paste stuff? As Paul R points out the links don`t seem to work. Hope this is okey.....

German submarine U-180 From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search CareerName:U-180Ordered:28 May 1940Builder:AG Weser, BremenYard number:1020Laid down:25 February 1941Launched:10 December 1941Commissioned:16 May 1942Fate:Sank, 23 August 1944General characteristicsType:Type IXD1 submarineDisplacement:1,610 t (1,580 long tons) surfaced 1,799 t (1,771 long tons) submergedLength:87.6 m (287 ft 5 in) overall 68.5 m (224 ft 9 in) pressure hullBeam:7.5 m (24 ft 7 in) overall 4.4 m (14 ft 5 in) pressure hullHeight:10.2 m (33 ft 6 in)Draft:5.4 m (17 ft 9 in)Propulsion:2 × MAN M9V40/46 supercharged 9-cylinder diesel engines, 4,400 hp (3,281 kW) 2 × SSW GU345/34 double-acting electric motors, 1,000 hp (746 kW)Speed:20.8 knots (38.5 km/h) surfaced 6.9 knots (12.8 km/h) submergedRange:12,750 nmi (23,610 km) at 10 knots (19 km/h) surfaced 213 nmi (394 km) at 4 kn (7.4 km/h) submergedTest depth:230 m (750 ft)Complement:55 to 63Armament:Anti-aircraft gunsService record[1]Part of:4th U-boat Flotilla (16 May 1942–31 January 1943) 12th U-boat Flotilla (1 February–1 November 1943, and 1 April–23 August 1944)Commanders:Fregkpt. Werner Musenberg (16 May 1942–4 January 1944) Oblt. Harald Lange (October–7 November 1943) Oblt. Rolf Riesen (2 April–23 August 1944)Operations:1st patrol: 9 February–3 July 1943 2nd patrol: 20–23 August 1944Victories:2 commercial ships sunk (13,298 GRT)German submarine U-180 was a Type IXD1 transport U-boat of the German Kriegsmarine which served in World War II. Her keel was laid down on 25 February 1941 at AG Weser yard in Bremen, and was launched on 10 December 1941. Stripped of torpedo armament the Type IXD1's were designated as transport submarines, and could carry up to 252 tonnes of freight.[2] U-180 was used primarily in clandestine operations. Contents [hide] <LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-1" sizcache="0" sizset="1">1 Service history [edit] Service history [edit] 1st patrol U-180, under the command of Fregattenkapitän Werner Musenberg, sailed from Kiel on 9 February 1943 , with the leader of the Indian National Army Subhas Chandra Bose and his aide Abid Hasan aboard. On 18 April U-180 sank the British 8,132 ton tanker Corbis about 500 miles east-southeast of Port Elizabeth, South Africa.[3] Three days later, on 21 April, U-180 made her rendezvous with the Japanese submarine I-29, just east of Madagascar in the Indian Ocean, and exchanged the two Indians for two Japanese Navy officers who were to study U-boat building techniques, and two tonnes of gold ingots as payment from Japan for weapons technology. On the return voyage, on 3 June 1943, U-180 sank the Greek freighter Boris west of Ascension Island.[4] During this voyage, U-180 was supplied by the U-462 on the way to the exchange. She was supposed to be refueled by the U-463 on the way back, but U-463 was sunk by the British on 16 May 1943. On 19 June, she was refueled by the U-530. [edit] 2nd patrol and loss Under the command of Oberleutnant Rolf Riesen, U-180 sailed from Bordeaux on 20 August 1944 bound for Japan. She was reported sunk off the Bay of Biscay on 23 August 1944, with the loss of all of her 56 crew. The official verdict is "sunk by a mine", however some experts speculate that schnorkel trouble may have been the cause. [edit] Media The U-180 is the submarine carrying Nazi leader, Martin Bormann to South America in the Jack Higgins thriller, Thunder Point. [edit] References <LI id=cite_note-0>^ "The Type IXD1 boat U-180 - German U-boats of WWII - uboat.net". www.uboat.net. http://www.uboat.net/boats/u180.htm. Retrieved 2009-12-04. <LI id=cite_note-1>^ "German Transport Boats to the Far East". www.uboataces.com. http://www.uboataces.com/articles-fareast-boats5.shtml. Retrieved 2009-12-04. <LI id=cite_note-2>^ "Corbis (Motor tanker) - Ships hit by U-boats - uboat.net". www.uboat.net. http://www.uboat.net/allies/merchants/ships/2872.html. Retrieved 2009-12-04. ^ "Boris (Steam merchant) - Ships hit by U-boats - uboat.net". www.uboat.net. http://www.uboat.net/allies/merchants/ships/2945.html. Retrieved 2009-12-04. [edit] External links U-180 and the Secret Operation (German) trans. (English) [hide] v • d • eGerman Type IXD submarineType IXD1U-180 · U-195 Type IXD2U-177 · U-178 · U-179 · U-181 · U-182 · U-196 · U-197 · U-198 · U-199 · U-200 · U-847 · U-848 · U-849 · U-850 · U-851 · U-852 · U-859 · U-860 · U-861 · U-862 · U-863 · U-864 · U-871 · U-872 · U-873 · U-874 · U-875 · U-876 IXD/42U-883 · U-884 Preceded by: Type IXC · Followed by: Type X List of German U-boatsCoordinates: 44°00′00″N 2°00′00″W / 44.000°N 2.000°W / 44.000; -2.000 Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_submarine_U-180"Categories: Type IX U-boats | U-boats commissioned in 1942 | U-boats sunk in 1944 | World War II submarines of Germany | Shipwrecks of the Biscay coast | World War II shipwrecks in the Atlantic Ocean | Subhas Chandra Bose | 1941 ships | Ships damaged by naval minesHidden categories: Ship infoboxes without an image <LI class="toclevel-2 tocsection-2">1.1 1st patrol1.2 2nd patrol and loss<LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-4">2 Media <LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-5">3 References 4 External links//

Japanese submarine I-52 (1943) From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search C3 type submarine I-52Career (Japan)Name:I-52, code-named Momi (樅, Japanese for "evergreen" or "fir tree")Laid down:18 March 1942Commissioned:28 December 1943Struck:10 December 1944Fate:Sunk on 24 June 1944General characteristicsClass and type:Type C-3 cargo submarineDisplacement:2,095 metric tons standard, 2,564 t surface, 3,644 t submergedLength:108.5 m (356 ft)Beam:9.3 m (31 ft)Draught:5.12 m (17 ft)Propulsion:2-shaft diesel and electric motor, 4,700 bhp (3,500 kW) surface, 1,200 shp (890 kW) submergedSpeed:17.7 knots (33 km/h) surface, 6.5 knots (12 km/h) submergedRange:21,000 nautical miles (39,000 km) at 16 knots (30 km/h)Test depth:100 m (328 ft)Complement:94 officers and men, 18 civiliansArmament:6 x 53 cm torpedo tubes, 2 x 14 cm/40 cal. gun, 2 x 25 mm anti-aircraft gunsNotes:Cargo: 300 metric tonsI-52, code-named Momi (樅, Japanese for "evergreen" or "fir tree") was a Type C-3 cargo submarine of the Imperial Japanese Navy used during World War II for a secret mission to Lorient, France, then occupied by Germany, during which she was sunk. Contents [hide] <LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-1">1 Valuable cargo <LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-2">2 Type C-3 submarines <LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-3">3 Yanagi missions <LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-4">4 Fatal voyage <LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-5">5 US Task Force <LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-6">6 Aftermath <LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-7">7 Recent salvage operations <LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-8">8 Media coverage <LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-9">9 References <LI class="toclevel-1 tocsection-10">10 Additional reading11 External links// [edit] Valuable cargo She is also known as Japan's "Golden Submarine", because she was carrying a cargo of gold to Germany as payment for war matériel and technology. There has been speculation that a peace proposal to the allies was contained onboard the I-52 as well, but this is highly unlikely on two counts: there is no evidence of the Japanese government being interested in peace proposals or negotiated settlements at this early stage in the war, prior to the summer of 1945, and the Japanese kept an open dialogue with their diplomatic attachés via radio and diplomatic voucher through Russia, and had no need for long and uncertain transfer via submarine. Also interesting is that 800 kg of uranium oxide awaited I-52 for her return voyage at Lorient according to Ultra decrypts. It has been speculated that this was for the Japanese to develop a radiological weapon (a so-called "dirty bomb") for use against the United States (the amount of unenriched uranium oxide would not have been enough to create an atomic bomb, though if used in a nuclear reactor it could have created poisonous fission products).[1] She was also to be fitted with a snorkel device at Lorient. [edit] Type C-3 submarines This class of submarines was designed and built by Mitsubishi Corporation, between 1943 and 1944, as cargo carriers. They were quite long and carried a crew of up to 94. They also had a long cruising range at a speed of 12 knots (22 km/h). The Japanese constructed only three of these submarines during World War II (I-52, I-53 and I-55), although twenty were planned [1]. They were the largest submarines ever built at that time, and were known as the most advanced Japanese submarines of their time. The keel of I-52 was laid on 18 March 1942, and she was commissioned on 28 December 1943 into the 11th submarine squadron. After training in Japan she was selected for a Yanagi (exchange) mission to Germany. [edit] Yanagi missions These were missions enabled under the Axis Powers' Tripartite Pact to provide for an exchange of strategic materials and manufactured goods between Germany, Italy and Japan. Initially, cargo ships made the exchanges, but when that was no longer possible submarines were used. Only five other submarines had attempted this trans-continental voyage during World War II: I-30 (April 1942), I-8 (June 1943), I-34 (October 1943), I-29 (November 1943), and German submarine U-511 (August 1943). Of these, I-30 was sunk by a mine, I-34 by the British submarine Taurus, and I-29 by the United States submarine Sawfish (assisted by Ultra intelligence). [edit] Fatal voyage On 10 March 1944, on her maiden voyage, I-52 (Commander Uno Kameo) departed Kure via Sasebo for Singapore. Her cargo from Japan included 9.8 tons of molybdenum, 11 tons of tungsten, 2.2 tons of gold in 146 bars packed in 49 metal boxes, 3 tons of opium and 54 kg of caffeine [2]. The gold was payment for German optical technology. She also carried 14 passengers, primarily Japanese technicians, who were to study German technology in anti-aircraft guns, and engines for torpedo boats. In Singapore she picked up a further 120 tons of tin in ingots, 59.8 tons of caoutchouc (raw rubber) in bales and 3.3 tons of quinine, and headed through the Indian Ocean, to the Atlantic Ocean. On 6 June 1944, the Japanese naval attaché in Berlin, Rear Admiral Kojima Hideo, signaled the submarine that the Allies had landed in Normandy, thus threatening her eventual destination of Lorient on the coast of France. She was advised to prepare for Norway instead. She was also instructed to rendezvous with a German submarine on 22 June 1944 at 21:15 (GMT) at the co-ordinates 15°N 40°W / 15°N 40°W / 15; -40. I-52 responded with her position, being 35°N 23°W / 35°N 23°W / 35; -23. The message was intercepted and decoded by US intelligence; I-52 had been closely watched all the way from Singapore. Guided by the F-21 Submarine Tracking Room and F-211 "Secret Room" of the Tenth Fleet which was in charge of the Atlantic section, a hunter-killer task force was targeted towards her [3]. On the night of 22 June 1944 about 850 nautical miles (1,574 km) west of the Cape Verde Islands off the coast of Africa, I-52 rendezvoused with U-530, a Type IXC/40 U-boat commanded by Kapitänleutnant Kurt Lange.[2] U-530 provided her with fuel, and also transferred a Naxos FuMB 7 radar detector, and an Enigma coding machine, along with two radar operators, Petty Officers Schulze and Behrendt, and German liaison officer for the trip through the Bay of Biscay. [edit] US Task Force A US task force assembled as a submarine hunter-killer group, consisting of the escort carrier USS Bogue and five destroyers, en route to the United States from Europe, was ordered to find and destroy the Japanese submarine. This task force departed from Casablanca on 15 June 1944, and was commanded by Captain Aurelius B. Vosseller. It also had 9 FM-2 Wildcats and 12 TBF-1C Avenger of VC-69 on board. The task force, on its way from Hampton Roads to Casablanca, had sunk another Japanese submarine, the Type IX RO-501 (formerly U-1224) on 13 May 1944. This was a very effective force, sinking 13 German and Japanese submarines between February 1943 and July 1945. The five destroyers were: USS Francis M. Robinson, Lieutenant J. E. Johansen.USS Haverfield, Commander T. S. Lank, TF 51 commander.USS Swenning, Lieutenant R. E. Peek.USS Willis, Lieutenant Commander G. R. Atterbury.USS Janssen, Lieutenant Commander H. E. Cross.Arriving in the area of the meeting, the carrier began launching flights of Avengers at around 23:00 GMT to search for the submarines. U-530 escaped undetected. At approximately 23:40 on 23 June, Ed Whitlock, the radar operator in Lieutenant Commander Jesse D. Taylor's Avenger, detected a surface contact on his malfunctioning radar (only the right half of its sweep was working). Taylor immediately dropped flares, illuminating the area, and attacked. After his first pass, he saw the depth charge explosions just to starboard of the submarine — a near miss — and the submarine diving. Taylor dropped a purple sonobuoy, a newly-developed device that floated, picked up underwater noise, and transmitted it back. A searching aircraft usually dropped these in packs of five, named purple, orange, blue, red and yellow (POBRY); the operator was able to monitor each buoy in turn to listen for sounds emitted by its target. Taylor then began a torpedo attack, dropping a Mark 24 "mine" torpedo. That term was used for what was code-named "Fido": the first Allied acoustic torpedo, developed by the Harvard Underwater Sound Lab, which homed in on the sounds of the submarine. Fido was designed to be a "mission kill" weapon — it would damage the submarine so badly it would have to surface, rather than destroying it completely. Within minutes, the sonobuoys transmitted the sounds of an explosion and mechanical break-up noises. As Commander Taylor's watch ended, the operators on Bogue and Taylor all thought he had sunk the sub. However, as Taylor's patrol ended, he was relieved by Lieutenant (junior grade) William "Flash" Gordon, accompanied by civilian underwater sound expert Price Fish. They arrived on the scene just after midnight, and circled with Taylor for some time. At about 01:00 on 24 June 1944, Fish reported hearing some faint propeller noise in the area. Captain Vosseller ordered a second attack; Gordon checked with Taylor about the exact position of the sonobuoy, and dropped another "Fido" torpedo where he believed the submarine to be. Taylor departed from the area at 01:15, but Gordon stayed to circle the area and listen for any sign of activity. He heard nothing, and was relieved by Lieutenant (junior grade) Brady, who continued to watch and listen, but no further activity was reported. Next morning, Janssen reached the site (15°16′N 39°55′W / 15.267°N 39.917°W / 15.267; -39.917) and found flotsam: a ton of raw rubber, a piece of silk, and even human flesh. The sonobuoy recording of the last few moments of I-52's sound still survives in the US National Archives in Washington D.C. in the form of two thin film canisters marked "Gordon wire No. 1" and "Gordon wire No. 2" dated 24 June 1944. The wire from Taylor's attack has not been found; however, a set of 78 rpm vinyl recordings that include segments of Taylor's wire recordings has been located. These records were produced during the war for training pilots. On the wire and vinyl recordings Lieutenant Gordon can be heard talking to his crew, along with the sound of a torpedo exploding, and metal twisting. [4] Subsequent to the discovery of the wreck (see below), analysts at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, experts in analyzing modern submarine sounds, studied these recordings and concluded that the I-52 was sunk by Taylor. The propeller sounds heard by Gordon were actually from the U-Boat, nearly 20 miles (32 km) away, reaching Gordon's sonobuoys through a "surface duct". This quirk of underwater sound propagation traps sounds in a channel near the surface and can transmit them for many miles. At the time, the Navy credited the sinking of the I-52 to both Gordon and Taylor, as it was uncertain whether the ship was sunk on the first attack. [edit] Aftermath On 30 August 1944, the Kriegsmarine officially declared I-52 sunk in the Bay of Biscay as of 25 July 1944, with all crew.The Imperial Japanese Navy declared I-52 missing on 2 August 1944, and struck her from service on 10 December 1944 as sunk. [edit] Recent salvage operations In late 1994, a salvage operation named Project Orca was launched to try and locate the I-52 and retrieve her valuable cargo of gold. Despite the commissioning of the Russian research ship Akademik Keldysh for the project, and an extensive search, by March 1995 the search had proved to be a failure (Hamilton-Paterson 1998). Very shortly afterwards, however, in the spring of 1995 Paul Tidwell, working with the ocean exploration company Meridian Sciences, Inc. (later renamed Nauticos Corp.) located the wreck 5,240 meters deep, mostly upright. The vessel was found nearly 20 miles (32 km) from the datum quoted by the U.S. Navy at the time of the sinking, but within 1/2 mile of the coordinates computed by Meridian. Meridian's analysts used historical ship logs from the U.S. task force as well as from the German U-Boat to reconstruct the events of the battle, and correct navigation errors using a process called "re-navigation," or RENAV. Her conning tower is intact and her hull number is still visible. The bow is broken up, probably due to impact on the bottom, and a large hole, undoubtedly caused by one of the torpedoes, is aft of the conning tower. Debris was scattered over a large area. Plans were made to raise the sub and recover the gold. The Japanese government objected, indicating that they considered the wreck site a grave. Tidwell worked on the proper procedures with the Japanese government and received the approval of the war graves authorities in Japan. Tidwell's team took down a Japanese naval ensign and affixed it to the wrecked submarine. A metal box from the debris field was brought to the surface in the hope that it would contain some of the sunken gold (then worth US$25 million), but when opened, the salvagers were disappointed to find not gold, but opium. It was dumped overboard. The plan was to recover the entire conning tower, diplomatic pouches, gold, coding equipment, (Japanese and German) and more. The recovered items would be taken to New Orleans for cleaning, conservation, and corrosion treatment to prepare for an exhibition. Mandalay Bay Casino had offered $20 million for the exhibition. After three years in Las Vegas everything except the gold would be returned to Japan to be placed at the city of Kure in a permanent exhibition. [5] There are no full-size Japanese WWII submarines on display anywhere in the world; however, captured Japanese midget submarines are on display at the Admiral Nimitz Museum in Fredericksburg, Texas, at the USS Bowfin Museum Submarine Museum and Park, close to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and at the Australian War Memorial, Canberra. The Japan Times, in an article dated 19 April 2005, reported that Tidwell intended to return to the site and raise the submarine in November 2005 or May 2006. However, as of 2008, Tidwell's plans have not been fulfilled. [edit] Media coverage In 2000 the National Geographic Society commissioned and produced a documentary called, Submarine I-52: Search for WWII Gold, on the I-52 and Tidwell's salvage effort.The October 1999 issue of the National Geographic featured an article on the I-52 sinking and salvage.Short video clip of the I-52 from the National Geographic Special. Mid way down the page - http://www.floridafilmvideo.com/ [edit] References <LI id=cite_note-0>^ Billings, Battleground Atlantic. ^ "When treasure and technology meet, who gets the gold?". Associated Press. November 29, 1998. http://www.post-gazette.com/healthscience/19981129wrecks2.asp. Retrieved 2009-07-07.Boyd, Carl. U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence During the Second World War and the Sinking of the Japanese Submarine I-52, Journal of Military History 63 (2): 339-354, April 1999.Hamilton-Paterson, James. (1998) Three Miles (5 km) Down: A Hunt for Sunken Treasure, New York: Lyons Press.Listen to the training records [6]Listen to the wire recording from the aircraft [7] [edit] Additional reading Billings, Richard N. Battleground Atlantic: How The Sinking of a Single Japanese Submarine Assured the Outcome of World War II, NAL Hardcover, 2006, 311pp, ISBN 0451217667 [edit] External links

Got your thirst up I see ha,ha,ha. Try.. http://www.subart.net/i52.htm

Hi Guys, I have more than a passing interest in WW2 Axis submarines. I`ve read the threads on here about Nazi gold, Stalins silver, Uboats, HMS Edinburgh etc,etc. So I thought you might be interested in the story of the I-52 an IJN submarine sunk en route to France from Japan with 2.2 tonnes of gold on board, in order to pay Nazi German. I suppose along the sames lines as the U180, except the I-52 never made it.... http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_submarine_I-52_(1943) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_submarine_U-180 & Lets no forget the fabled U977 & U534, both believed to have carried gold, but as far as I`m aware never did. Does anyone else know of any submarines that carried gold during the war? The Monkey God.

I am by no means an expert, but I strongly suggest that it will be the naming on the medal thats in Welsh (example being Sergeant in Welsh is Rhingyll) as apposed to the medal having been re struck, but I maybe wrong......

Many thanks!!!

Guys, Can anyone tell me anything about this badge?

Guys, Can anyone tell me anything about these? Especially the one on the left.

HMS Splendid The British government signed a Memorandum of Understanding to buy 67 Block III Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM) from the United States for installation in Royal Navy submarines in October 1995. This provided sufficient TLAMs to arm two Swiftsure class and five Trafalgar class SSNs. HMS Splendid was the first British submarine to receive the Tomahawk missiles. Splendid was a Swiftsure Class, nuclear powered, attack submarine built by VSEL at Barrow. Construction began on 24 November 1977, with the submarine launching on 5 October 1979 and commissioned on 21 March 1981. The submarine had an armament of five torpedo tubes, carrying Mk 24 torpedoes and Sub Harpoon anti-ship missiles. The boat then converted to carry Tomahawks in 1998. The missiles first successfully fired from Splendid during trials off the coast of California in November of the same year. 　A few months later, Splendid used Tomahawks in a real war situation during the Kosovo crisis. Splendid, under the command of Commander Richard Baker, took part along with American submarines in NATO bombing operations against Yugoslavia in March 1999. Splendid's Tomahawk attacks were among the most controversial of the bombing campaign against Yugoslavia. The missiles assisted in a strike against the building that housed the Serbian Television station and the Party Headquarters of President Milosevic in Belgrade. American officials targeted the property specifically to ‘maximise the domestic and international propaganda value of seeing such a high profile building in the Belgrade skyline under fire'. The missiles directly targeted the building's sixth floor and roof in order to increase the chance of fire spreading. The attack resulted in the deaths of 16 civilians, with another 20 injured. It was strongly criticised by human rights groups such as Amnesty International, even though NATO's supreme commander (General Wesley Clark) and his British counterparts insisted that the building was a legitimate military target used to pass information to Serbian military units in Kosovo and to promote Serbian propaganda. 　　HMS Splendid was the first British submarine to receive the Tomahawk missiles. Splendid was a Swiftsure Class, nuclear powered, attack submarine built by VSEL at Barrow. Construction began on 24 November 1977, with the submarine launching on 5 October 1979 and commissioned on 21 March 1981. The submarine had an armament of five torpedo tubes, carrying Mk 24 torpedoes and Sub Harpoon anti-ship missiles. The boat then converted to carry Tomahawks in 1998. The missiles first successfully fired from Splendid during trials off the coast of California in November of the same year. 　Splendid fired 20 Tomahawk missiles in total during the war, with 17 of those successfully hitting their targets. The use of Splendid in the bombing campaign was a significant departure from established pattern of patrols and surveillance. It indicated future situations in which the Royal Navy's submarine service might be engaged in its more global approach. Splendid then deployed to the Arabian Gulf and Arabian Sea to support coalition operations in the area, conducting TLAM attacks in support of Operation Telic in Iraq during 2003. HMS Splendid fired more Tomahawk missiles than any other SSN submarine, British or American, during her career. She decommissioned on 14th August 2003. HMS Splendid was a Royal Navy nuclear powered fleet submarine of the Swiftsure class. HMS Splendid was launched at Barrow on 5 October 1979, by Lady Ann Eberle, wife of Admiral Sir James Eberle, then Commander-in-Chief Fleet. The boat was built by Vickers Shipbuilding Groups and was under the command of Commander R C Lane-Nott.Since her launch in 1979, she has taken part in many conflicts involving British forces around the globe.Her first major conflict came in 1982 when Argentine forces invaded the British held Falkland Islands. Splendid was one of the first submarines to reach the islands, arriving mid April, after sailing from Faslane. Unlike HMS Conqueror, Splendid did not fire in anger, she did however provide valuable reconnaissance to the British Task Force on Argentine aircraft movements. Splendid's presence also ensured that the Argentine Navy would not dare leave its port.In the late 1990s, HMS Splendid became the first British ship to be armed with American-built Tomahawk cruise missiles. In 1997 the BBC were allowed on board HMS Splendid to record one of the most important missions of her career. Splendid fired Tomahawks in battle against Yugoslav targets in Belgrade during the Kosovo War. She again fired these weapons against Iraqi targets in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.In July 2003, HMS Splendid returned to her home at Faslane Naval Base on the River Clyde in Scotland. She was decommissioned in HMNB Devonport, Plymouth in 2004 due to defence cuts. Commander Burke was later awarded the OBE for his leadership of HMS Splendid in the Gulf.　Involvement with the sinking of the KurskHMS Splendid was present, along with the US Navy submarines the USS Memphis and the USS Toledo[1] at the Russian war games during which the Russian submarine Kursk exploded and sank, resulting in the loss of that submarine and all 118 sailors and officers on board. Despite the conclusions of independent forensic inquiries and the eventual corroborating admission by the Russian Navy that the explosion was triggered by a faulty torpedo onboard the Kursk, various conspiracy theories posit that Kursk was actually sunk by one of the US or British submarines. This may partly stem from the Russian Navy's initial attempts to shunt away criticism of its failed efforts to rescue the surviving crew members from the ocean floor and of the generally poor condition of its own equipment, which was eventually found to be the cause of both the sinking and the failure of the Russian rescue attempts.[2] In the days immediately after the explosion, Russia suggested that the cause of the disaster was a collision with one of the US or British submarines present.[3] Though the accusation proved to be unfounded, conspiracy theorists have inevitably picked up on and elaborated it in various directions over time.

The above although a bit long winded is worth a read, if your at all interested in the subject.

The Spanish Gold and Financing Soviet Military Aid At this juncture we must retreat several steps and delve into one of the most sensational episodes not only of the Spanish Civil War, but indeed all of twentieth-century international history: the transfer to Moscow's Gosbank of a large portion of the gold amassed over the centuries by the Spanish crown, including Inca and Aztec treasure from the time of the conquistadors. 1 Quite apart from its undeniable value as an enthralling yarn, the tale of the Spanish gold helps illuminate a nagging question: How did the Republicans pay the Soviets for the military aid they received? As we shall see, it was not a magnanimous gesture from one benevolent state towards the besieged folk of another, even if Republican and pro-Soviet propagandists went to extreme lengths to suggest this. 2 The Republic paid dearly for Soviet help, and it did so with a large portion of their gold stock. The Republican government never expected, of course, to receive military assistance at anything less than the market price. Indeed, throughout the war, Soviet aid to Spain remained squarely within the parameters of normal commercial exchange. 1 The gold transfer is the best-documented aspect of Soviet-Spanish relations during the civil war, and thus need only be rapidly summarized here. According to the meticulous research of Angel Viñas, 3 and confirmed in further investigations by Francisco Olaya Morales, 4 the initial decision to use the Bank of Spain's gold reserves as a means of financing the Republic's war effort came just days after the initial Nationalist uprising. On 24 July 1936, Prime Minister Giral authorized the first dispatch of gold to Paris, where the Blum government accepted it in exchange for weapons. Through much of August, the Bank of Spain continued to lend its bullion to the Republic's government for the purchase of armaments. By 8 August, France's adherence to the nascent policy of non-intervention prevented Blum from making further direct weapons sales to Spain, though not from accepting gold in exchange for hard currency, which could then be theoretically used to purchase weapons on the world market, provided the Spaniards could find willing parties—not an easy task once all European states save Switzerland (and the Spanish Republic) signed on to the Non-Intervention Agreement. Sales of gold to France continued until March 1937, by which time 26.5 percent of all Spanish gold reserves had been transferred to the Bank of France. 5 On 13 September 1936, the new prime minister, Largo Caballero, authorized finance minister Juan Negrín to move the gold and silver held in the Bank of Spain to a safer location. The decision was made at a moment of considerable unease: Franco's troops were advancing on the capital, and rumors circulated of an anarchist plot to raid the bank itself. Two days later, on 15 September, the entire contents (or, depending on the version, almost entire) 6 of the bank's vaults were evacuated to Cartagena, the seat of the Republic's navy and the most secure city in Loyalist territory. 7 In all, 10,000 cases of gold and silver were sent to the port. From Cartagena, approximately one-fifth of these reserves were immediately shipped to Marseilles, to be converted in France to hard currency. 8 On 25 October, the remaining four-fifths, some 7,800 crates, were shipped to Odessa and then moved by rail to Moscow. The gold was received in the Russian capital by representatives of the Spanish government, the Bank of Spain, and senior Soviet officials. The amount sent to Moscow was just over 510 tons, with a value in 1936 prices of $518,000,000. 9 This monetary figure, however, ignores the numismatic value of a large number of the gold coins shipped. For example, over 318 kilograms of the trove consisted of rare Portuguese coins, worth far more as collector's items or museum pieces than as melted fine gold. 10 Had this value been factored into the assessed amount, the Republic no doubt would have established a larger credit line with the Soviets. The transfer of the world's fourth-largest gold stock to the world's most demonized state certainly demands a full investigation. Stalin did not, of course, steal the gold, even if during the Cold War renegade Soviet exiles, embittered ex-Republicans, victorious Nationalists, and even the United States Congress made frequent charges to that effect. 11 On the contrary, shipping the gold to Moscow may have been the Republic's only hope of survival. First, the gold would be required to pay for the Soviet weaponry that, by late-September, Spanish officials were assured of receiving. Second, as noted above, the gold could be converted into hard currency through Moscow's financial front organization in Paris, the Banque Commerciale pour l'Europe du Nord (Eurobank). The Republic's account at Eurobank would permit the Loyalists to finance the war effort, including not only the purchase of arms but also foodstuffs and raw materials. 12 That the gold was sent to Moscow simply for safe-keeping—a claim maintained for years by some Republican leaders—makes little sense. The besieged Republic had no need for a large, safeguarded gold deposit; it required the rapid mobilization and conversion of all possible resources. The gold was sent to Moscow because, given the international climate, only from Russia could it be best deployed to the Republic's advantage. 13 Once in Moscow, the gold's conversion to hard currency proceeded apace. The first Spanish orders to sell erased the large debt ($51,160,168) 14 that the Republic had incurred for Soviet arms already delivered. In the course of 1937, Largo Caballero and Negrín issued fourteen more orders to liquidate gold in exchange for cash. These decrees generated $256 million for transfer to the Paris account, and an additional $131,500,000 to pay the Soviets for military supplies. 15 Through additional conversions, the Spaniards exhausted their resources by early 1938. Even before the gold was used up, Negrín had instructed Pascua to prepare for this eventuality by establishing a credit line with the Soviets. According to documents in Pascua's personal archive at the Archivo Histórico Nacional, the ambassador met with Molotov on 14 February 1938 to discuss the credit problem. 16 Viñas' research reveals that in March 1938 the Soviets agreed to grant the Republic a credit line of $70 million. Documents in RGVA confirm this amount, 17 as do Pascua's own papers. 18 The ultimate sum of $70 million was a considerable coup for the Loyalists, who only several months before were contemplating a maximum Soviet offer of $20 million. Loyalist officials snubbed that figure in hopes of holding out for more. 19 The later offer, entirely the result of negotiations overseen by Pascua (then ambassador to France), justified the earlier gamble. Pascua's last telegram on the matter was jubilant: "You [Negrín] have achieved a formidable victory." 20 5 The Republicans sought a second credit in December of the same year when Hidalgo de Cisneros traveled to Moscow to plead the Republic's case for more arms. Cisneros's claim that he was able to single-handedly wrest from the Soviets a credit of over $100 million has long been doubted. 21 Indeed, the leading Western historian of the topic questions both that a new credit was issued and that arms were dispatched at all. 22 Yet it has been established above that weapons valued at $55,359,660 were indeed sent. Documents in Moscow's Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation also confirm that in December 1938 the Spaniards received a credit of $85 million. 23 It should further be pointed out that there is no documentary evidence of a credit being issued in July 1938, as Pascua has claimed. 24 The subject of Soviet credit extended at an earlier stage of the war still requires some clarification. Like many of the foggier aspects of Soviet-Spanish relations during the civil war, this issue has attracted a great deal of attention. Anti-communist writers have frequently drawn unfavorable contrasts between the credit extended by Hitler and Mussolini to Franco and that which Stalin offered the Republic. According to this line of reasoning, the fascist dictators are often portrayed as extremely generous when compared to Stalin, who allegedly would not sell weapons to the Republic on credit, and as a result succeeded in obtaining most of the Spanish gold stocks. It is now possible to dismiss some, though not all, of these allegations as exaggerations. A comparison of weapons transfers with the timeline of the dispatch and reception of the gold leaves no question that a large cache of Soviet weapons were sold to Spain on credit, though it appears clear that Stalin's principal motivation for issuing the credit was the promise of an eventual transfer of the Republic's gold. 25 To quickly review, Stalin decided to aid Spain in early September 1936. The blueprint for Operation X was presented by the NKVD on 14 September, and approved by the Politburo on 29 September. The first ship carrying Soviet arms arrived in Cartagena on 4 October, the second, the Komsomol, eight days later, on 12 October. The gold, meanwhile, was first mobilized on 15 September, one day after the plans for Operation X were presented to Stalin, and a week to two weeks after the Soviet leader (in all likelihood) decided to aid the Republic. Furthermore, 15 September marks only the date the gold left Madrid's Atocha station for Cartagena, where it arrived in the early hours of 17 September. For the next five and a half weeks, the gold remained in a bunker in a hillside above the port. It was not until 25 October that the gold left Cartagena. Even then, the gold was not safely in Russian hands until 6 November, and all 7800 cases were not locked in the vault at Gosbank until 9 November. Let us recall from Table IV-4 in Chapter Eleven that, by 5 November—one day before the first shipment of Spanish gold arrived in Moscow—Section X had already overseen a massive mobilization of Soviet weaponry for sale to the Republic. This material included 187 aircraft, 147 tanks and armored vehicles, 114 artillery guns, 3,703 machine-guns, 60,183 rifles, 95,528,860 rounds of ammunition, and 150 tons of gunpowder—most of which was either en route or already in action near Madrid. It was not until 16 February 1937 that Largo Caballero issued the first order to convert over $51 million worth of gold to pay off the Spanish debt to the Soviets for military supplies. Thus the USSR did indeed extend credit to the Republic, more than once and in massive quantities, and not only at the very end, but in the first months of the Spanish Civil War. Nevertheless, given that the gold was mobilized on 15 September—the day following Stalin's approval of Operation X—it is difficult not to conclude that the two events were linked. Stalin's decision to aid the Republic seems almost certainly to have depended on the promise of Republican officials to immediately begin transporting the gold out of Madrid. Once the matter was resolved and made official in Moscow on the 15th, the way was cleared for the gold to be shipped out. That Stalin did not demand the gold in hand prior to initiating military assistance may do little to augment his reputation in the broad scope of Soviet involvement in Spain. Still, a judicious assessment of Soviet-Republican relations requires that this not inconsequential fact be truthfully presented. The total cost of the arms sold by the Soviets to the Republic, much like the question of the total amount of weapons sold, remains somewhat elusive. Determining the value of the weapons is made difficult by the various indirect expenses related to the complicated transfer of arms, costs which included loading and unloading at port, shipping, rail passage, and pay for the officers and crew of each participating vessel. 26 The Soviets added such costs to the initial price of the weapons. Due to the near impossibility of exchanging Soviet currency in Western Europe, Russian personnel headed for Spain received their advance in both rubles and dollars. According to Ribalkin, the captain of each ship bound for Spain was allotted 100,000 rubles and $5,000. 27 Defense Commissariat records show that the support expenses for each igrek were approved and allocated by the Politburo. At its session of 15 November 1936, the Politburo approved the release of 2,300,000 rubles and $190,000 to fund the dispatch of 455 men and nine ships to Spain. Just a week later, on 22 November, the Politburo authorized an additional 3,468,500 rubles and $48,500 to finance another 270 men and five ships. 28 These expenses, ultimately added to the Spaniards' bill, were clearly not insignificant. Multiplied by dozens of voyages, they constituted a sizable drain on the Republic's limited resources. 10 Another expense added to the Republic's bill was the cost of training Spanish pilots in the Soviet Union. Here again, a comprehensive tally of total expenses incurred would be difficult to estimate. Pascua's papers indicate, however, that in the first year of the war alone, the Republic paid Moscow the sum of $1,156,356 for the pilot training program. 29 Charges included hours of instruction, use of equipment, the cost of room and board in the Soviet Union, and transportation within the USSR. Table IV-7Value of Soviet Military Aid to the Spanish Republic, according to official Soviet estimates 30Period Sum (in millions)October-December 1936 $37.9January-September 1937 $118.7December 1937-August 1938 $44.3December 1938-February 1939 $1.5Total $202.4 In light of these added expenses to material costs, it is not surprising that no satisfactory total cost sheet exists. An attempt to calculate the total value of Soviet weapons sent in Operation X appears in Istoriia vtoroi mirovoi voiny [see Chapter Eleven, Table IV-6]. The statistics are most suspect in their reckoning of the value of the final shipments sent from December 1938-January 1939 ($1.5 million). According to this total, it would appear that they have completely omitted the last seven igreks. Moreover, this amount—$202,400,000—is significantly less than that which one arrives at by simply adding the known values of arms quoted above. It was observed that the first Spanish debt incurred for Soviet arms, settled in February 1937, was on the order of $51 million, while later payments for arms in 1937 totaled over $131 million. Assuming there were no other payments made towards weapons until the March 1938 credit of $70 million, and adding the final seven shipments valued at $55 million, we arrive at a figure of approximately $307 million. Of course, this amount would be considerably less if either: 1) most of the contents of the last seven deliveries were returned to Russia, and/or; 2) the $70 million credit issued in March 1938 was exhausted on expenses other than arms. Certain Defense Commissariat documents complicate the matter, though only slightly. For the period from September 1936 to June 1938, the value of the material portion of Soviet military assistance alone was $166,835,023, while other documents state that, from October 1936 to August 1938, the value of this assistance was was $171,236,088.It may be reasonable to assume that the Istoriia vtoroi mirovoi voiny numbers, like those from the Defense Commissariat, do not reflect the indirect expenses, while the separate calculation of $307 million does. In any case, a total weapons bill cautiously estimated at $250-300 million is not unreasonable. The total weapons bill is quite important in assessing whether or not the Spaniards received fair exchange for their gold. The value of the gold sent to Moscow was approximately $518 million. As we have seen, the gold was converted into hard currency and applied toward the purchase of weapons in Russia and other wartime financing in Paris. In 1937 alone, $256 million was transferred from Moscow to the Republic's Eurobank account. 31 Per our estimate above, at least an additional $250 million or more was spent on Soviet arms over the course of the war. If to that $506 million we add at least $70 million and possibly as much as $155 million in loans which were never repaid, it would appear that Moscow could not have turned a monetary profit on the Spanish Civil War. 32 But the matter cannot be dismissed so easily. The Kremlin could not have profited from the war if the prices the Soviets charged the Republic were fair ones, prices that reflected market values. Howson's research reveals in incontrovertible fashion that, throughout the entire period of Soviet military assistance, Moscow was overcharging the Spanish Republic for nearly all the weapons sold. 33 The Soviet authorities succeeded in gouging the Spaniards by manipulating exchange rates between rubles to dollars and dollars to pesetas. Thus, while the ruble remained steady against the dollar throughout the late 1930s at approximately 5.3:1, the Soviets were converting the ruble at anywhere from 3.95 to 2.0 to the dollar, then converting the higher dollar value to pesetas for final billing to the Republic. The Spaniards never saw the original ruble price, and were thus never aware that the prices they were being charged were, on average (per Howson's estimate), over 25 percent higher than they should have been. 34 Howson believes that this price-jiggering resulted in overcharges of not less than $51 million. Howson's research and conclusions on this question cannot reasonably be doubted, and he is not exaggerating when he asserts that: 15 ...of all the swindles, cheatings, robberies and betrayals that the Republicans had to put up with from governments, officials and arms traffickers all over the world, this barrow-boy behavior by Stalin and the high officials of the Soviet nomenklatura is surely the most squalid, the most treacherous and the most indefensible. 35 Nor was this the only form of swindle the Soviets were capable of in their sale of arms to the Republic. Recently declassified documents from the Military Archive indicate that, on at least one occasion, Moscow used hardware earmarked for Spain to pursue military objectives elsewhere. In April 1938, the Red Air Force purchased ten American-made DC-3s directly from the Douglas corporation. The purchase, evidently the sole occasion on which the Soviets bought American aircraft for delivery to Spain, was requested by Republican officials and approved by Stalin. All of these planes were not, however, immediately deployed to Spain. Three of the DC-3s were expropriated for use in Moscow's on-going activities in support of the Chinese Communists, an intervention code-named Operation Z. In a letter to Voroshilov, the chief of Red Army intelligence matter-of-factly revealed the deceit: With the purchase of three DC-3s for the "Z" operation we will be able to present a demand to the "friends" [Republican government] about the immediate repayment of the cost of these aircraft to us. 36 Moscow would thus be charging the Spaniards for planes that the Spanish would never receive, and that the Soviets in fact would use in another military venture on the other side of the world. The only mitigating factor worth mentioning in this regard is that after March 1938, all Soviet weapons bound for the Republic were sold on credit; Moscow may have paid for the three China-bound DC-3s after all. How do these adjustments alter the final tally? Even if we subtract Howson's $51 million in overcharges, acknowledge only the unpaid loan of $70 million, (rather than the potential $155 million), and subtract the cost of three DC-3s (roughly $360,000), the total value of the Soviet assistance provided to the Republic comes to approximately $525 million, or $7 million more than their gold should have bought. Of course, the question of the gold's numismatic value effectively throws into doubt the estimated value of $518 million. In any case, the debate over the financing of the Republican war effort is likely to rage on for years to come. Tentatively, however, we may conclude this section with a qualified assertion that, even if an allowance is made for Russian overcharging for weaponry and the initial undervaluing of the gold, it does not appear that the Republic received an exceptionally unfair financial arrangement from the USSR. <A href="http://www.gutenberg-e.org/kod01/kod16.html#note37" target=_blank>37 20 Notes: Note 1: The gold question is also perhaps the longest on-going disputed problem in the historiography of the civil war. Rarely a year goes by without some new allegation or the discovery of a new piece of evidence. The gold was also the subject of major diplomatic disputes between the USSR and the Franco regime through most of the latter's four decades of rule. On 20 Mar. 1970, the Times of London asserted that: "The gold sent to Russia by the Republican government has caused more rifts in Spanish-Soviet relations in the last three decades than any ideological differences." Back. Note 2: In retrospect, the pronouncement of Mundo Obrero on 16 Oct. 1936 has an almost Orwellian sense of irony: "La solidaridad de la URSS con nuestro pueblo en armas no puede pagarse con oro" ("The solidarity of the USSR with our people in arms cannot be compensated with gold"). In fact, it could, and it was. Back. Note 3: Angel Viñas, "Gold, the Soviet Union and the Spanish Civil War," in Spain in Conflict, ed. Martin Blinkhorn (London: Sage, 1986), 224-43. Back. Note 4: Francisco Olaya Morales, El Oro de Negrín, 2nd ed. (Madrid: Nossa y Jara, 1998). Back. Note 5: Angel Viñas, "The Gold, the Soviet Union," 226. Back. Note 6: Del Vayo, for example, maintains that even at the end of the war, in March 1939, some gold remained in the Madrid vaults. See Julio Alvarez del Vayo, The Last Optimist (New York: Viking, 1950), 280. Back. Note 7: Unpublished evidence of the activity of Republican officials in transferring the gold to Cartagena is available in the Pascua archive at the AHN-Madrid. Hotel receipts from the week of 10 Sept.-17 Sept. and other documents may be found in: AHN-Madrid. Diversos. M. Pascua, leg. 8, exp. 9. Back. Note 8: Angel Viñas, "The Gold, the Soviet Union," 228. It appears that the cases sent to Marseilles contained only the Spanish silver. A primary and at this date unpublished document concerning this exchange may be found in Pascua's archive at AHN-Madrid. A receipt dated 16 September 1936, issued in Marseilles by the Bank of France to the Bank of Spain declares that: "Reçu de MM. Abelardo-Padin et José Gonzalez, representent la Banque d'Espagne: Deux cent-cinquante caisses declarées contenant chacune Huit Mille Livres Sterling." AHN-Madrid. Diversos. M. Pascua, leg. 8, exp. 3, 1. Thus on this occasion alone, the French acquired 2,000,000 pounds sterling, or $10,000,000. Back. Note 9: Angel Viñas, "The Gold, the Soviet Union," 233. A copy of the receipt for the gold, signed by Soviet and Republican officials, is available in the papers of Marcelino Pascua: AHN-Madrid. Diversos. M. Pascua, leg. 8, exp. 5. Back. Note 10: The dispute over the gold's real value is too lengthy to address fully here. Bolloten has taken up the issue in some detail; see Burnett Bolloten, The Spanish Civil War: Revolution and Counterrevolution in Spain, 1936-1939 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 149-52. Back. Note 11: The leading proponents of the theft thesis are Walter Krivitsky, In Stalin's Secret Service, (New York: Harper, 1939), 113-14, and Aleksandr Orlov, "How Stalin Relieved Spain of $600,000,000," Reader's Digest, Nov. 1966. The more recent John Costello and Oleg Tsarev, Deadly Illusions (New York: Crown, 1993), discussed in Chapter One above, uncritically incorporates both of these accounts. The fabulous conclusions of the unsubstantiated Reader's Digest piece, for which the periodical paid Orlov handsomely, found their way into countless Cold War histories of the civil war. It may be the lone example of that publication's role in filling critical gaps in historical debate. The U.S. Senate, meanwhile, concluded in 1973 that the shipment of gold to Moscow was illegal—in effect, a theft. See the published testimony entitled The Legacy of Alexander Orlov, issued by the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1973), 7 and 42. Back. Note 12: The conversion process through Paris is clearly described in most of the sources consulted for this study. Succinct summaries may be found in del Vayo, The Last Optimist, 284-87, or Louis Fischer, Men and Politics (London: Cape, 1941), 364-65. Back. Note 13: In Viñas' view, if the Republic wished to send the gold abroad for conversion, its options were few. The paramount concern was that Nationalist juridical and political pressure could freeze any transfer of funds converted abroad. Indeed, this is precisely what happened to a large stock of Republican gold which been on deposit since 1931 at Mont-de-Marsan (France). The list for potential recipients of the gold was thus short. Non-intervention ruled out England, and the same policy, in addition to an unstable political climate, made France ill-suited to receive more gold than it already had. The Swiss, ever neutral, would not have performed the conversion. The United States government was sufficiently anti-Republican to make a transfer there extremely risky. The only options were Mexico and the USSR; as Mexico was not equipped to provide large-scale military assistance, the USSR was chosen. Back. Note 14: Viñas, "The Gold, the Soviet Union," 235. Back. Note 15: Ibid. Back. Note 16: Details of this meeting are reviewed in Pascua's letter to Molotov of 4 March 1938. AHN. Diversos. M. Pascua, Leg. 2. Exp. 8. Back. Note 17: RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, del. 1149, l. 68. The document is cited by both Iurii E. Ribalkin, "Voennaia pomoshch' Sovetskogo Soiuza ispanskomu narodu v natsional'no-revoliutsionnoi voine 1936-1939," Ph.D. diss. (Institute of Military History, Moscow, 1992), 94, and M. V. Novikov, SSSR, Komintern i grazhdanskaia voia v Ispanii 1936-1939, 2 vols. (Iaroslav: Iaroslavskii gos. pedagogicheskii universitet, 1995), vol. II: 46. Back. Note 18: Pascua to Molotov, March 4, 1938. AHN. Diversos. M. Pascua, Leg. 2. Exp. 8. Back. Note 19: Pascua to Negrín, October 31, 1937. AHN. Diversos. M. Pascua, Leg. 2. Exp. 2. 25. Back. Note 20: Pascua to Negrín, March 6, 1938. AHN. Diversos. M. Pascua, Leg. 2. Exp. 2. 56. Back. Note 21: Bolloten conclusively rejects Cisneros' claim of extracting so large a credit, in part because he found no Soviet record of this, in part because hitherto in Spanish-Soviet relations there was no precedent for the extension of so large a credit (Spanish Civil War, 990-92). It need hardly be noted that any evidence of a large credit being offered at so late a date would poke a major hole in the abandonment thesis that Bolloten indefatigably promotes. Other contemporary observers, however, found no reason to doubt that credit had been extended. See, for example, Louis Fischer, Men and Politics, 365: "When the war came to a close in 1939, the Loyalists owed the Soviet government $120,000,000, which was never paid. Of this debt, $20,000,000, approximately, represented Loyalist imports of food and raw materials from Russia, and $100,000,000 imports of arms." Back. Note 22: Bolloten, Spanish Civil War, 993. Back. Note 23: Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (AVP RF), f. 097, 103, del. 37, l. 38. This document is cited by both Ribalkin, "Voennaia Pomoshch'," 94, and Novikov, SSSR, Komintern i grazhdanskaia, vol. II, 46. Back. Note 24: Viñas, "The Gold, the Soviet Union," 238. Back. Note 25: This chronology uses dates established in RGVA documents cited above and those presented in Angel Viñas, "The Gold, the Soviet Union." Back. Note 26: TsAMO, f. 16, op. 3148, del. 5, l. 26. Cited in Novikov, SSSR, Komintern i grazhdanskaia, vol. II, 45; and Iurii E. Ribalkin, Operatsiia "X" Sovetskaia voennaia pomoshch' respublikanskoi Ispanii (1936-1939) (Moscow: "AIRO-XX", 2000), 83. Back. Note 27: TsAMO, f. 132, op. 2642, del. 77, l. 39. Cited in Ribalkin, "Voennaia pomoshch'," 95-96. Back. Note 28: TsAMO, f. 132, op. 2642, del. 77, l. 38. Cited in Ribalkin, "Voennaia pomoshch'," 96. Back. Note 29: Itemized bill dated 2 Nov. 1937. AHN-Madrid. Diversos. M. Pascua, Leg. 12, exp. 2-9. Back. Note 30: Istoriia vtoroi mirovoi voiny (Moscow: Voennoe izdat. Ministerstva Oborony SSSR, 1974), vol. II, 137. Back. Note 31: Viñas, "The Gold, the Soviet Union," 235. Back. Note 32: Largo Caballero, no loyal friend of the Soviets, insisted that the Republic had received fair compensation for its gold. It should be recalled, however, that he himself had made the decision to transfer the stocks. Thus the former prime minister always had a personal stake in maintaining that his side had not been bilked. See Mis Recuerdos: Cartas a un amigo (Mexico City: Alianza, 1954), 203-4. Louis Fischer concurred, estimating that the Republic received $720 million worth of arms, foodstuffs, and raw material from the Soviet Union: (Men and Politics, 364-65). Back. Note 33: See Gerald Howson, Arms for Spain: The Untold Story of the Spanish Civil War (New York: Murray, 1998), 146-52. Back. Note 34: Ibid., 151. Back. Note 35: Ibid. Back. Note 36: RKKA Chief of Intelligence Gendin to Voroshilov, 10 Apr. 1938. RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, del. 1104, ll. 76-77. Back. Note 37: Though in part refuting Howson's basic thesis, the conclusion presented here is not necessarily new. A similar inference, using different calculations over a finite period of the war, is drawn by Michael Alpert in El ejército republicana en la guerra civil (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno, 1989), 251-52. Back. Stalin and the Spanish Civil War.AOLWebSuite .AOLPicturesFullSizeLink { height: 1px; width: 1px; overflow: hidden; } .AOLWebSuite a {color:blue; text-decoration: underline; cursor: pointer} .AOLWebSuite a.hsSig {cursor: default}

Between midnight and 2 a.m. one October day in 1936, a line of trucks two blocks long stood outside the ornate portals of the Bank of Spain, in Madrid's Calle Alcalá. Bank employees, under the guard of picked Communist militiamen, loaded the trucks with 510 tons of gold, in bullion and coins—the bulk of the Loyalist gold hoard—worth 1.734,000,000 gold pesetas ($566 million). Although Spain's civil war was only three months old, Nazi intervention had made the Soviet-backed Loyalist position shaky.On the outskirts of Madrid, the truck drivers were changed. The new drivers were told that the cargo was high explosives. The convoy reached Cartagena, where the heavy gold-filled cases were put aboard a Russian ship.Appointment in Odessa. The move was so secret that not even Defense Minister Indalecio Prieto was informed of this destination. Prieto found out about it only because he happened to be in Cartagena on business. The maneuver had been worked out by Juan Negrin, the pro-Communist Foreign Minister of the Largo Caballero government, in cahoots with Marcel Rosenberg, the Soviet ambassador, and Arthur Stakheevsky, Soviet economic adviser in Madrid (both of whom were later purged by Stalin).The four Spanish guards on the Russian ship assumed that the gold would be taken to some southern French port, near but safe. Instead, the ship dropped anchor at Odessa, on the Black Sea. The Loyalist government in exile made several demands on Moscow for the return of the gold. So did the victorious Franco government in Madrid. Moscow spurned both claimants. Shortly after receiving the treasure, the Russians announced "a sharp increase in the Soviet Union's goldmining production," and Russia became an exporter of gold.For Russian Help. This month, in one of those outbursts of recriminations that occur in Mexico City's colony of Spanish ex-Loyalists, Indalecio Prieto stirred up the long-buried story of the gold hoard, accused his fellow exile, Juan Negrín, of complicity. This time, Franco's Spain picked up Prieto's accusations. In formal notes to the U.S., Britain and France, Franco's Foreign Minister protested against Russian use of the Spanish gold in European trade. Since the Russians have undoubtedly melted down the coins and removed the Spanish mint marks from the bullion, it was hard to see how Madrid could identify the gold in question with Spain's lost treasure of the civil war. By extorting this secret kickback from the Loyalists, the Communists, though on the losing side, came out of the war with a clear profit. .AOLWebSuite .AOLPicturesFullSizeLink { height: 1px; width: 1px; overflow: hidden; } .AOLWebSuite a {color:blue; text-decoration: underline; cursor: pointer} .AOLWebSuite a.hsSig {cursor: default}

Didn`t they call these blood chits or something like that?

Hello, Can anyone tell me whether these are genuine or not?

However have found this.. "HMS Splendid from her base in Faslane on a 3 month undersea mission via the Panama Canal to San Diego where the submarine is charged with the vital task of firing the Royal Navy's first ever Tomahawk Missile." If they went via the Panama Canal, I suppose they could have gone via the Suez Canal to?

I would assume that they`d have sailed round Africa, into order to remain `secret`? But I maybe wrong.

Hi Guys, Can anyone in the know tell me whether it is possible for one submariner to have served during the following........ Air Operations Iraq 1997 on HMS Spartan Kosovo 1999 on HMS Splendid Afghanistan 2001 on HMS Trafalgar Gulf War Two 2003 on HMS Splendid or HMS Turbulent Is that feasable achievement? Thus being entitled to 4 medals?

Cool, any idea which ones?

What about the gulf war of 1991, where any submarines deployed then?

DOH!!!!!!

Theres another SA medal up for auction on ebay... GENUINE & ORIGINAL Falklands Medal with Correctly Impressed naming to :- A.B. (S). R. McLEARY D157201F. H.M.S. BRISTOL.

How interesting, but sorry to hear about the other bit.