Soviet Small Valor-Group

[Gerd Becker]

Ok, here is what i got so far from Sergey. I guess, he will provide the rest later. I didn?t edit it and will post it all together here and sort it later:

The name: Raevsky Vladimir Korneevich

Miliary rank: master sergeant

Hold a position: company commander of 353 pioneer battalion of 196 Gatchina Red Banner division.

recommend for a reward of Red Star orden.

Birthday:1910

Nationality: Ukrainian

In Red Army from 13/07/41

From july till october of 1942 he was at the Stalingrad front, from 01/01/1944 at Leningrad front.

Was decorated:

The medal of defense of Stalingrad

The medal of defense of Leningrad

Description of feat of arms:

During 16 and 17 of February master sergeant Raevsky at opened place (20-30m from enemy), defended river crossing over Lochkina river under heavy snipers and mortars enemy fire.

Gerd the second on is awarding document for bravery medal

The name: Raevsky Vladimir Korneevich

From 8/01/40 till 12/03/40 he fought in Finland

From 12/04/40 till 17/04/40 took part in liberation of Bessarabia.

From 10/06/42 till 18/10/42 he was at Stalingrad front

From 22/04/43 till 7/09/43 He was at Leningrad front

From 10/01/44 he was at Primorsky front

Description of the feat of arms:

From 13,14/01/44 after 50km march without sleeping and incessantly raised observation post at hill 105,7 "Bell tower" ( Kolokolnja by Russian) under heavy machine-gun, rifle and mortare enemy fire.

16/01/44 established a barrage mine near first line of defence. He always in time provide his company by rations.

11/03/44 he was awarded by orden of the Red Star

26/01/44 he was awarded by bravery medal

Gerd

Edited September 15, 2005 by Gerd Becker

[Gerd Becker]

Rick,

you said, your computer does not read alien languages, but i have to post this link, Sergey gave me:

http://lenobl.testing.spb.ru/victory/event/monument

Its a Monument of the Veterans of the Oranienbaum Bridgehead. This was at the front of the bridgehead, where he build up the observation posts. Thousands of soldiers lost their life in the defense of this bridgehead. Sergey said, he was there.

Gerd

[Alfred]

Here is a short history of the 196 Rifle Division from: The Order of Battle in the GPW

[Gerd Becker]

Thank you, Andreas

I was hoping, that you would post something about the 196. Rifles Div.

"RVGK", what does that mean?

Gerd

Edited September 16, 2005 by Gerd Becker

[Gerd Becker]

Guys,

i found this on the Net:

http://www.nordland-wwiionline.org/History.htm

Its about the 11. Panzergrenadier-Division "Nordland"

Here is a quote:

"After days of preparing primary and fall-back positions and watching obvious signs of an impending Soviet offensive, the storm finally broke in the early morning of January 14,1944. Facing the German forces in the area was the Soviet 2nd Baltic Front, composed of six full Armies that outnumbered the German forces four-to-one. On the Oranienbaum front the 2nd Shock Army with two Corps, nine Guards Divisions, three tanks Brigades and a Coastal Brigade, concentrated its attack on the eastern perimeter held by the weak 9th Luftwaffe Field Division. The Division was crushed under the weight and fury of the onslaught and a permanent breakthrough was achieved."

So it looks, like the "Nordland"-Division was the opponent in the fightings at Oranienbaum.

Gerd

[Alfred]

Thank you, Andreas 

I was hoping, that you would post something about the 196. Rifles Div.

"RVGK", what does that mean?

Gerd

←

Hi Gerd,

found it: RVGK - Reserve of the Supreme High Command or

rebuilding units destroyed in combat

[Gerd Becker]

Thanks, Andreas

[Gerd Becker]

Guys,

here are a few maps from stalingrad from the fantastic website:

http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/

I will post some closeups of the maps with the position of the 196. Rifles Division and the complete map.

This is the situation in June/July 1942. The 196th is in second line of defense, or at least, thats how i interprete it.

First is a closeup of the position of th 196th.

Edited September 18, 2005 by Gerd Becker

[Gerd Becker]

This is the complete map of the front with the position of the closeup

[Gerd Becker]

I found this text concerning the 196th Rifles Division on the net and thought, i post it here.

WARTIME OPERATIONS: THE 64TH ARMY IN BATTLE OF STALINGRAD

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 7, July 82 (signed to press 23 June 82) pp 32-38

[Article published under the heading "The 40th Anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad," by Docent and Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col P. Balashov: "The 64th Army in the Defensive Battle of Stalingrad"]

[Text] The victory at Stalingrad was achieved due to the heroic actions of the troops from all the fronts and armies participating in this historic battle. The valorous troops of the 64th Army made a worthy contribution, too. The given article examines the experience of organizing and conducting combat operations by its formations and units and shows the courage and heroism of the Soviet troops during the period of the defensive engagement for Stalingrad.

In the second half of July 1942, the Nazi Command of the Army Group "B" resolved by attacking from the areas of Perelazovskiy and Oblivskaya along converging axes toward Kalach, to encircle and destroy the troops of the 62nd Army and a

portion of the forces of the 64th Army and then to capture Stalingrad. For

this purpose, behind the LI Army Corps, it hurriedly moved up into the zone of advance the XXIV Tank Corps which had been transferred from the 4th Tank Army to the 6th Field Army (see the diagram).

In order to prevent the enemy from breaking through to Stalingrad, in accord with the directive from the commander of the Stalingrad Front1, the troops of the 64th Army by 19 July were to take up a strong defense along the line from Surovikino to Verkhne-Kurmoyarskaya up to 120 km long. The army included the 214th, 29th, 229th and 112th Rifle Divisions, the 66th and 154th Naval Infantry Brigades, the 40th and 137th Tank Brigades, the 76th Guards Mortar [Rocket Launcher] Regiment, four artillery regiments and two tank killing artillery regiments of the RVGK [supreme High Command Reserve], the 28th and 40th battalions of armored trains and four cadet regiments from the Zhitomir, the 1st and 3rd Ordzhonikidze infantry and the Krasnodar mortar-machine gun military schools.3

The army staff had worked out a plan of defense, in accord with which the basic efforts were to be concentrated on the right flank. The troops were deployed in two echelons and a reserve was organized. The army's first echelon was to include the 229th, 214th and 29th Rifle Divisions and the 154th Naval Infantry Brigade. The width of the defensive zone for the first echelon formations was

22-30 km. Some 20-30 km behind the forward edge of the first line, an army defensive line was prepared up to 30 km wide and this was to be occupied by the 112th Rifle Division as the army second echelon. In the army's reserve were the 66th Naval Infantry Brigade, two battalions of the 137th Tank Brigade and three cadet regiments. Temporarily, until the approach of the 229th and 214th Rifle Divisions, the 196th Rifle Division of the 62d Army was deployed on the indicated line under an order from the front's commander.

The troops of the 64th Army were deployed in an exceptionally difficult situation. The problem was that they had moved up from the interior under continuous enemy air actions. For this reason, only the 229th and 214th Rifle Divisions had reached the lines designated for the defense and this was achieved only on 22 July and not on 19 July, as had been planned. The 154th Naval Infantry Brigade arrived somewhat later in the area of the defensive line.

The troops of the 229th and 214th Rifle Divisions prepared for around 2 days for defense in the main zone. All the other formations were forced to occupy it in the course of the engagements. In organizing the fire plan, attention was paid first of all to the readiness of the antitank artillery for combat. For repelling the enemy tank offensive, in the battalion defensive areas antitank strongpoints were organized and antitank areas deep in the division's defenses. An important role in countering enemy tanks was assigned to the tank reserves.

The forward detachments of the formations were the first to encounter the approaching units of the LI Army Corps. Fierce battles broke out in the course of which the enemy, possessing superiority in forces, forced them to pull back to the main defensive zone.

The battles for the army's main defensive zone commenced on 25 July. The main thrust by the enemy LI Army and XXIV Tank Corps was made against the units of the 229th Rifle Division. Here the Nazis surpassed our troops by 4-5-fold in personnel and by 9-10-fold in tanks, guns and mortars. Nazi aviation was continuously in the air and attacked the battle orders of the army's formations in groups of 60-70 aircraft. After 2 days of heavy battles the enemy succeeded in breaking through the defenses of the 229th Rifle Division and reach the crossing over the Don in the area of Nizhne-Chirskaya. The units of the formation were forced to pull back to the eastern bank of the Chir River.

The troops of the 214th Rifle Division steadfastly defended their lines. In a day they drove off 8-10 enemy attacks. After 4 days of heavy battles, the 214th Rifle Division and the 154th Naval Infantry Brigade upon an order of the army commander pulled back to the left bank of the Don.

The driving in of the Nazi troops to the south of Surovikino created a threat of enveloping the left flank of the 62nd Army and breaking through into the rear of the 64th Army. A difficult situation also had developed on the right flank of the 62nd Army. To the north of Kalach, the Nazi troops had succeeded in breaking through to the Don. In such a situation the army commander, upon orders from the front commander, decided to prepare and conduct a counterstrike on 30 July (in the aim of eliminating the enemy breakthrough) in the area of Novomaksimovskiy. For this the 112th, 204th and 321st Rifle Divisions and the

XXIII Tank Corps were to be used. From the air the troops of the counterstrike grouping were to be supported by the 8th Air Army. Regardless of the fact that the time for preparing the counterstrike was limited, the Soviet troops succeeded in routing the enemy in the area of Novomaksimovskiy and the remnants of its units were thrown back to the western bank of the Chir River.4

The resistance of the troops in the Stalingrad Front was continuously growing. The plan of the Nazi Command to capture Stalingrad with just the forces of the 6th Army was upset. In a report to Hitler on 30 July, Gen Jodl stated that the fate of the Caucasus would be determined at Stalingrad. For this reason, it was essential to shift a portion of the forces from Army Group "A" to Group "B". On the following day, the 4th Tank Army was shifted from the Caucasus sector to the Stalingrad sector and this became the main one on the entire Soviet-German Front. From this time the situation in the area of the 64th Army became even more complicated.

Due to the deep driving in of the formations from the enemy 4th Tank Army into the defensive zone of the 51st Army in the area of Kotelnikovskiy, the front commander ordered that the troops of the 64th Army pull back to a line of Logovskiy and the northern bank of the Myshkova River. The retreating formations of the 51st Army and the reserve units of the 64th Army on 2 August began to take up the defensive on the eastern bank of the Don to the south of Nizhne-Chirskaya, and further along the Aksay River. For countering the enemy grouping which had broken through in the region of Kotelnikovskiy, an operations group was set up consisting of three rifle divisions and a naval rifle brigade under the command of the deputy commander of the 64th Army, Lt Gen V. I. Chuykov. The situation in which the group's combat operations developed was extremely complex. The enemy surpassed our troops in manpower and equipment. Enemy aviation was superior in the air. For this reason all troop movements were made at night and counterattacks were conducted at the end of the day or early in the morning. In the fierce battles the group's troops showed steadfastness and courage having supported a regrouping of the army's forces and the organizing of defenses on the new line.

In order to concentrate all the attention of the 64th Army's commander on repelling the enemy offensive in the Kotelnikovskiy sector, on 3 August the front's commander turned over to the 62nd Army a defensive sector from Surovikino to Nizhne-Chirskaya along with the 229th and 112th Rifle Divisions which were defending here. At the same time, the 64th Army was reinforced by the 208th Rifle Division and several units. However, regardless of the adopted measures, it was impossible to check the enemy offensive. The Nazis continued their drive toward Stalingrad. On 6 August the troops of the enemy 14th Tank and 29th Motorized Divisions reached the area of the 74-km siding. Behind them the 4th Romanian and 94th German Infantry Divisions began to move up from the rear.

Fierce battles broke out. The Nazi Command threw 150-200 tanks supported by infantry into the attack. At the same time, 200-300 enemy aircraft made air strikes. The growing enemy pressure was heroically repelled by the 126th and 38th Rifle Divisions under the command of Cols V. Ye. Sorokin and G. B. Safiulin as well as other formations and units.

In the developing situation, Gen M. S. Shumilov decided to continue to check the enemy advance on the right flank and in the center on the line of the Aksay River while simultaneously, on the left flank, preparing and carrying out a counterstrike against the enemy grouping which had broken in the area of siding 74. This decision was approved by the front's commander.

For carrying out the counterstrike, a troop grouping was organized consisting of three rifle divisions, two cadet regiments, a rocket artillery regiment, a heavy artillery battalion and an armored train. In a zone 9 km wide in which the counterstrike grouping was deployed, a density was achieved of one rifle division for every 3 km, up to 40 guns and mortars and around 8 tanks per km of front. For the first time since the start of the battle for Stalingrad (although in a narrow sector) superiority over the enemy was achieved: by 3-fold in terms of personnel, by 2-fold in artillery with an equality of tank forces. The thorough and careful preparations for the counterstrike under the army commander's leadership proved effective.

On the morning of 9 August after a 40-minute artillery softening-up, the as

sault grouping went over to the offensive. In the course of the counter

strike the Soviet troops threw back the enemy from siding 74. In the 2-day

battles, up to three regiments of enemy infantry were defeated and more than

100 tanks hit. The thrust was so strong that the enemy during the subsequent

10 days was unable to resume the offensive in this sector. In recalling these

battles, the author of the history of the Wehrmacht's 14th Tank Division,

Holf Grams, has written: "These were difficult days for the tank and artillery

regiments. The situation was exacerbated by a shortage of fuel and ammunition.

The exposed steppe expanses provided notable advantages for the enemy tanks

with their wider operating range."6 During the tank battles which occurred

here and lasted until 17 August, both sides suffered significant losses. Re

gardless of the successes in the area of siding 74, the situation in the zone

of the 64th Army continued to remain taut.

At the end of August, the enemy succeeded in putting up a permanent crossing over the Don and in a short period of time reinforced its assault grouping. Having regrouped its forces in the area to the west of Abganerovo, on the morning of 29 August, after an air and artillery softening-up, it attacked on the Zety axis. Having broken through the defenses of the 126th Rifle Division, the enemy tank formations began to exploit the success. This put the 29th and 138th Rifle Divisions in a difficult situation. A threat was also created against the rears of the 64th and 62nd Armies. Considering this, the Soviet Command resolved to pull back the troops of the 64th and 62nd Armies by the morning of 31 August to a middle defensive perimeter. By the beginning of September they were pulled back to the inner perimeter. Over a period of 10 days, starting on 3 September, the units of the 64th Army defended stubbornly in the occupied positions, checking the advance of the enemy infantry and tanks.

In the middle of September, the battles directly approached the western limits of Stalingrad. The defense of the city was entrusted to the troops of the 62nd and 64th Armies. By this time, the 64th Army included seven rifle divisions which had been weakened in the previous battles (the 126th, the 138th, the 157th, 29th, 204th, 38th and the 36th Guards), the 66th and 154th Naval Infantry Brigades, two cadet regiments (from the Krasnodar and Vinnitsa infantry

schools), the 118th Fortified Area, the XIII Tank Corps and 14 artillery and mortar regiments. The width of the field force's defensive zone was 25 km. Its operational configuration was single-echelon. The army commander had concentrated the basic efforts on the right flank. Here in the area to the northwest of Beketovka was located the reserve of the army commander (the 38th Rifle Division and the cadet regiment from the Vinnitsa Infantry School). Combat operations were supported by the artillery fire of a brigade of river vessels from the Volga Naval Flotilla.

The Nazi Command intended to capture the city by storm. Having regrouped its forces, it decided to make two simultaneous thrusts: one from the area to the northwest of Kalach to Mamayev Kurgan and the other from the region to the north of Verkhne-Tsaritsynskiy in the direction of the Central Station. This was to involve three infantry, two tank and one motorized division with around 250 tanks.

The offensive of the Nazi troops commenced in the morning of 13 September after heavy artillery and air softening-up. The thrust of great strength was made against the formations of the 62nd and 64th Armies which had been significantly weakened in previous battles and which were defending in the area of the settlement of Kuporosnoye. On the following day the Nazis broke through to the Volga. The right flank of the 64th Army was exposed. The threat arose of the enemy reaching the rear of the 64th, 57th and 51st Armies. In such an exceptionally difficult situation, Gen M. S. Shumilov capably and energetically directed the field force's troops. As the Nazis advanced along the Kuporosnoye Embankment toward the Volga, he increased the forces on the right flank and then made a strong counterthrust against the enemy. Regardless of this, the Nazis still succeeded in forcing back the right flank army formations and capturing the settlement of Kuporosnoye.

In order to weaken the enemy pressure on the troops of the 62nd Army, the commander of the front on 18 September ordered the commander of the 64th Army to prepare and carry out a new counterthrust on the axis of Kuporosnoye and Mamayev Kurgan, while the commander of the 62nd Army was to attack from the area of Mamayev Kurgan to the south. As a result of the counterthrust, the formations of the 64th Army caused the enemy great losses and distracted a portion of the enemy forces.

In the second half of October, the 62nd Army was fighting heavily in the area of the Tractor and Barricades plants. For helping its troops, the command of the Stalingrad Front decided to again make a counterthrust in a northerly direction using the forces of the right flank formations from the 64th Army. For this the VII Rifle Corps of Maj Gen S. G. Goryachev and the 40th Tank Brigade were transferred to the field force. In addition, the 422nd Rifle Division of Col I. K. Morozov was to be involved in the counterthrust; in September this division had been transferred from the 57th Army. The actions of the assault grouping were supported by an army artillery group consisting of three artillery cannon regiments, two floating batteries, the gunboats "Rudnev" and "Gromov," five rocket artillery regiments and two battalions.8

The offensive by the Soviet forces started at 1000 hours on 25 October with a rapid attack by units of the VII Rifle Corps and the 422nd Rifle Division.

Over a period of 3 days, they destroyed around 5,000 soldiers and officers, hit and set afire 8 tanks and destroyed 59 various-caliber guns, 58 machine guns and shot down 15 enemy aircraft.9

During these battles the 93rd Rifle Brigade of Lt Col N. Z. Galay, 96th Rifle Brigade of Col F. P. Berezhnyy and the 97th Rifle Brigade of Maj Gen V. V. Tikhomirov particularly distinguished themselves.

The corps commissar M. P. Bystrov showed courage and heroism. During a critical moment of the battle for elevation 146.0, he rose up and led the men into an attack. An enemy bullet cut down the hero. At present a street in Kirovskiy Rayon of Volgograd bears the name of the commissar M. P. Bystrov.

As a result of the active offensive operations by the right flank formations of the 64th Army, the enemy was forced to maintain significant forces in this sector, to move up reserves here and for several days halt the offensive in the industrial part of Stalingrad. Thus, the situation of the 62nd Army was somewhat improved. A critical moment in the defense of Stalingrad had been passed.

The Nazi Command, not counting the casualties, endeavored at any price to capture Stalingrad. Around 54 divisions of Wehrmacht troops and Nazi satellites were involved in the bloody, extended battles, but they were unable to capture Stalingrad. This main grouping of Nazi troops suffered so many casualties that in mid-November it was forced to break off the offensive and go over to the defensive.

The Soviet troops which defended Stalingrad carried out the mission entrusted to them. They bled the enemy assault grouping white, they gained time for preparing and moving up the strategic reserves and thereby created conditions for going over to a counteroffensive and defeating the entire enemy grouping which had broken through toward Stalingrad. In carrying out this very important task a major contribution was made by the troops and the command of the 64th Army which showed flexibility in troop control. All the decisions and orders of the army commander and the formation commanders were efficiently issued to the executors. The staffs of all levels always knew the needs and requests of the units and formations. Their workers, like the company and battalion commanders, during the difficult moments of combat were in the trenches with the men and took direct part in repelling the enemy attacks. The constant personal contact between all levels of commanders and the soldiers was a guarantee for steadfastness and confidence in victory and this inspired the Soviet troops to heroic feats.

An important condition for successful defense was the maneuvering of the army formations and units to those areas where the threat of an enemy breakthrough had arisen. Thus, only as a result of the prompt increasing of forces on the army's right flank during the second half of September was it possible to repel an offensive by the Nazi troops from the settlement of Kuporosnoye to the south, along the banks of the Volga. The prompt organizing of an operations group under the command of V. I. Chuykov also serves as an example of flexibility in troop control.

The army's troops conducted the defensive actively. Several counterthrusts

were prepared and carried out. The experience of conducting them showed that

the aims of the counterthrusts were achieved more completely in those in

stances when the necessary time was allocated to prepare for them.

The combat practice of defensive operations by the 64th Army at Stalingrad disclosed that with the gradual deployment of the troops it was essential to organize and send forward over significant distances strong forward detachments in the aim of occupying and holding advantageous lines ahead of the main defensive zone. This made it possible to gain time to reinforce the defenses, to cause the enemy losses and force it to deploy its main forces before approaching the main defensive line.

Also instructive is the fact that for countering enemy tanks, in addition to antitank artillery, use was also made of the regimental antiaircraft artillery, a significant portion of the divisional antiaircraft artillery, ground attack aviation, mixed minefields, antitank brigades and Molotov cocktails. However, the insufficient development of the tactical zone as well as the lack in certain instances of troops on the defensive lines located in depth impeded the consistent repelling of enemy infantry and tank attacks on each line. This, naturally, told negatively on the course of the defensive actions by the formations and units of the 64th Army.

As a whole, the formations and units of the 64th Army during the period of the defense of Stalingrad gained valuable experience in conducting defensive operations and this experience was successfully employed by the Soviet troops in the further course of the war.

FOOTNOTES

1 The Stalingrad Front was set up on 12 July 1942. The commanders of the

front were: Mar SU S. K. Timoshenko from 12 July, Lt Gen V. N. Gordov from

23 July and Col Gen A. I. Yeremenko from 13 August.

2 [Not in report.]

3 TsAMO [Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense], folio 341, inv. 6217,

file 145, sheet 21.

4 Ibid., folio 342, inv. 5312, file 9, sheets 62, 63.

5 "Velikaya pobeda na Volge" [The Great Victory on the Volga], Voyenizdat,

1965, p 85.

6 Quoted from the book by A. M. Samsonov, "Stalingradskaya bitva" [The Stalin

grad Battle], Moscow, Nauka, 1968, p 120.

7 [Not in report.]

8 TsAMO, folio 341, inv. 5312, file 45, sheet 5.

9 Ibid., sheet 14.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1982,

Edited September 20, 2005 by Gerd Becker