WW1 Sturmtruppen...

[Chris Boonzaier]

In other posts I have detailed how the CO of a flame unit sent to support an attack by an infantry unit, who may have only been a senior NCO, had, based on an order from the OHL, to right to veto a plan of attack, which may have been drawn up by or for a Generalleutnant, if the junior officer or NCO felt that the plan did not reflect the unique characteristics of the flame weapon. I do not know the analogous situation for the "ordinary" storm battalions, who were often doled out piecemeal to stiffen larger units.

This is great in theory, but meaningless without practice examples. It would also be great to see this black on white and not as hearsay.

Best

Chris

[bob lembke]

"First of all, Bruce's book is an extraordinary work, and I for one would not call it dated. I got a copy at the very onset of my serious WW I study, and it was really formative. I generally avoid working with secondary sources, unless perhaps to orient myself when taking up a new topic within the field, but I place the book in the small set of nominally secondary sources that I regard as a primary source, or even have a higher regard for, as a fine military mind has already filtered through the many primary sources used in its creation."

Admittedly I read Bruce's book about 7 years ago, and have not re-read it, so if I did I might have a somewhat altered opinion, but I consider it an outstanding example of modern military scholarship, whatever modest noises Bruce might wish to make. I generally do not re-read sources, as when I read something I take extensive notes on 4 x 6" index cards (I have thousands and thousands), sometimes more than 50 closely written cards, and then I enter what seems of interest in an elaborate set of computer-based time-lines, about 800 pages worth at present, with about 30 topics and sub-topics. I have a writing plan of 9 books, two are in large part done, but I will not survive to complete it.

It is amazing that you know what I read better than I do. For example, in the last 18 months I have read one French secondary source (which I have since discovered has been in large part cribbed from a primary source memoire of an infantry officer, which I recently read), while in the same period of time I have read 268 French unit histories, which thankfully tend to be very short. I know exactly as I have a detailed spreadsheet tracking which French unit histories I have read so that I do not read a given history two or three times. I have also read some other French primary sources, so that at least in my French readings over the last 18 months secondary sources make up 0.3% of my sources read. That is the only category where I can give you precise statistics for my consumption of secondary sources vs primary sources; the French unit histories seem to be universally written by unit veterans.

I am using a broad definition of "primary sources", including personal memoires, unit histories, "official" histories (read very cautiously), war-time documents, Militaer=Paesse (the study of which, for example, has lead to my finding out critical info on storm units, most of which is kept close to my chest), cables from the archives of the German Foreign Ministry, extensive family correspondence and oral history, etc. Secondary sources of course is stuff like Horne's The Price of Glory; one of my copies cost $3 and included a long autograph letter from Horne to a previous owner of the book. (I would characterise that letter as a secondary source; it in part discussed my mania, Flammenwerfer, about which Horne was massively ignorant. Emboldened by that letter, I wrote Horne myself, as politely as possible, I did not get a response.)

I actually am currently reading a German secondary source, amazingly, on the Battle of Gallipoli, as there is so little primary material available on the German side, and comprehensible on the Turkish side. I have gotten very little from it, and probably cannot trust what there was, unless I can corroborate it from other sources.

In summary, I doubt that 2% of the sources I read are secondary sources, although admittedly the typical secondary source that I read is much longer than the typical "primary" source that I read. (This division into "primary" and "secondary" sources is simplistic; my files divide sources into five broad categories, not two.)

Noble defense Bob, but Bruce himself agrees that the book could use a major update. Much has been discovered over the last 20 years. I get the impression that you use mainly secondary source and not THAT much primary source? See above.

I cannot address your four other "comments" at the moment; perhaps tonight.

Bob

[Chris Boonzaier]

My issue is.... are unit histories not secondary source?

Another issue... you mention French Unit histories... "I have read 268 French unit histories, which thankfully tend to be very short."

Which ones are you referring to? Post WW1 histories or the Original war diaries in the archives (These original diaries are fantastic sources)

[Les]

"It has been pointed out that the initial batch of men that formed a storm battalion may have been really picked men, but that the following Ersatz may have been hit or miss. This may have been true, and "good" men were more and more scarce as the war went on, but I am sure that generally a fairly high standard was usually applied to Ersatz for the storm units."

A "High standard" was probably limited to "Young and fit".

Even when SB Rohr was increased from 2 to 4 Komp. no selection was made from front line units to do this. The Ersatz Battalion of P.B. 35 seems to have gathered infantrymen from the E.B. of different Infantry regiments in their area, the whole process taking less than 2 weeks... and whammo... 2 Kompagnies soon to be elite assault troopers were formed....

No Navy SEAL or SAS selection course needed....

Bruce, welcome to the forum. I bought your book shortly after it was published and read it. Your comment about writing it differently if done today, (and two kids at University) is a good reason to think about a second edition. (Hint, hint, hint).

Chris, as you're obviously aware, the high casualty rates, effects of a long blockade aimed at Germany and Austria-Hungary, food shortages, calling up age classes ahead of their scheduled time periods, and a long list of other factors all played an important part in lowered "k.v." standards not only among the Germans, but the Allied powers as well.

"Young and fit" has some advantages that are sometimes overlooked. "Young and dumb" has a special place in the hierarchy of that might be a notch or two higher than fitness alone. Older, married men are sometimes prone to think first and be a little slower to do something rash that could leave a widow and orphan at home. Remember being 18 or maybe 20, wearing a uniform and thinking you'd live forever, and it would be someone else that would get killed? After a while, that way of thinking can change.

"Older" men (even those who are still in the early or mid-20's) who have been trained in one way of doing things, and spent a year, two, or longer develop habits in a combat zone (such as automatic reflexes such as ducking or dropping to the ground when hearing specific sounds) or ways of doing things that have to be "unlearned."

Recruits (particularly young ones) undergo basic training that all armies use to convert civilians into soldiers that will follow orders, and form part of a team/unit. A new recruit, is much easier to train for "special duties" than one that's been in the army a while. He doesn't have ingrained habits or reflexes that have to be unlearned, and instead is much easier to mold into a candidate for specialized tasks that older, longer service enlisted men. That doesn't mean your cadre isn't made up of experienced men who can and will handle men within a squad or Zug sized formation.

Your comment that no special forces type selection course is necessary, is a sound point, and very common sense when you think about how military organizations (even police and similar organizations) "select" and train people.

Les

[Chris Boonzaier]

Your comment that no special forces type selection course is necessary, is a sound point, and very common sense when you think about how military organizations (even police and similar organizations) "select" and train people.

Les

Hi,

the point I was trying to make is.... if the E.B. of Inf Regt XXX had 200 front ready men, and Inf Regt XXX needed 150 and Sturmbataillon TT needed 50.... maybe they did put a slightly higher quality soldier in the SB TT, but this would not drain the German Armies of the best men.... It would just mean that some of the better men of the March 1917 batch for IR XXX actually went to the SB instead. As there was only one SB in that Armee, the other maybe 20 regiments in the Armee got their regular replacements as usual.... so no real drain of "the cream"... just one regt suffers a tiny bit...

Most of the men from the EB were young men recently trained. Of course, also men returning with wounds, but it is NOT that the SB were stocked with the best men with the highest awards and most experience from every unit.

If the SB attacked to the 2. Armee had 2 combat companies, this was a drop in the ocean of the men available. If 80% of these were young men, fit and eager, but just finished their basic training... then they were not really stealing the best men from other units.... add to this, the SB were there to train men in the new form of warfare, so they could barely be taking skilled men from other units... as it was the lethargy of "other units" that they were to overcome...

So... to bring this the full circle and back to what I said in post one..... I believe that the argument that "Other units did not like the SB because they took the best men from these other units" to be dead wrong.....

But it is a theory and I would like to generate some discussion....

[bob lembke]

"I know that this seems counter-intuitive, and is counter to the common literary device (a la Alistair Horne) of the "exploding flamethrower", or the "flamethrower operator enveloped in flame", "

Bob, I have on a number of occasions pointed out to you of period documented incidents of FW catching fire, on one occasion the same incident described by the Germans, AND the opposing French (I pointed this out to you 3-4 years ago, an incident on 304 or Mort Homme... you seen determined to ignore this as it does not fit your argument :-(

I received your information gratefully and entered it carefully into my timelines at the correct places. I did not ignore it. I welcomed it. The fact remains that, with your information, I have only found 3-4 examples in many thousands of hours of reading and study where I found a well-documented instance of a German FW "exploding" or more correctly catching fire. Snapping on my mechanical engineer hat, the German FW, whose design started in 1901 by a professional engineer, had many safety features which made such an outcome very unlikely, while most Allied designs, usually designed by people that I call "gentlemen tinkerers", and having to come up with a design in months, not 15 years, designed very dangerous devices that sometimes could even, in some cases, begin to explode internally before the fuel even exited the device under what passed for "normal" (suicidal) operation. (The exception was Livens, who was an excellent engineer.) Foulkes, the Brit flame CO, described the demonstration of one of these nightmare devices that he attended; the device exploded (or something) and the device and the demonstrator were enveloped in flame. Foulkes extinguished the fellow, being careful to put him out with the demonstrator's own overcoat, not his own. ("No soot on my coat, you bounder!") Many of these devices insanely used compressed air as a propellant, or even (doubly insanely) compressed oxygen! The Italians realistically dealt with their bad designs by including a man with a wet blanket in each FW team! Cheaper than good engineering. Quite pragmatic.

I have a complete death roll of the GRPR, a probably incomplete death roll of the Flamm=Pionier of S=B Nr. 5 (Rohr), and I don't think that I have been able to corroborate a single death of a Flamm=Pionier from an exploding/burning FW

device (I have not looked at this question in about two years; running on memory here). I happily accepted your information, before I received it I had about two instances of German devices burning/exploding; after your info was added I have about 3-4. In contrast, there is evidence that preliminary training with these devices was dangerous.

But to read Horne you would think differently; he described the weapons as "suicidal".

This is not a new arguement, it went on in my family between my father and his father, a Feuerwerk=Hauptmann, an explosives officer, judging by the correspondence and the oral history.

Bob

[Thomas W]

So... to bring this the full circle and back to what I said in post one..... I believe that the argument that "Other units did not like the SB because they took the best men from these other units" to be dead wrong.....

But it is a theory and I would like to generate some discussion...

You're probably right that the overall numbers were too small to make much of a difference. The definitive answer would be found if somebody determined the total number of young, fit, smart men available to the German army and figured out how many went to the assault battalions. I'm guessing it was a single-digit percentage.

I can only talk about the flamethrower formations, since that's my field of interest.

In early February of 1916 the OHL expanded each field company of the III. Garde-Pionier-Battalion from 139 men to 200 men. To do so pioneers were brought in from the battalion recruit depot and the Garde-Pionier-Ersatz-Bataillon, and 360 infantrymen were handpicked from various regiments.

On September 26, 1916, the 11th and 12th Companies were added to the Garde-Reserve-Pionier-Regiment, using officers and men from the recruit depot and the II. Garde-Pionier-Ersatz-Bataillon, the official replacement battalion for the flamethrower regiment. In addition the Fifth Army High Command transferred 500 young infantrymen into the regiment.

I have several photos of men from the II. Garde-Pionier-Ersatz-Bataillon, and they range in age from about 17 all the way up to mid-40s. I've read that to be eligible for the assault battalions there was a cutoff age of 25 (or 27), but that was clearly not the case for flamethrower troops. The older men were almost certainly firefighters, who tend to be very strong, fit men even well into middle age. For many years a firefighter in his 50s won the annual race up the stairs to the top of the Empire State Building in New York.

Here's a flamethrower pioneer attached to an assault battalion in 1917. All of the flamethrower pioneers attached to assault battalions were combat troops and not workshop personnel. This guy is no kid. I have trouble telling how old he is, but I'd say late thirties at least.

Edited April 28, 2009 by Thomas W

[Thomas W]

Men of the II. Garde-Pionier-Ersatz-Bataillon. Check out grandpa in the middle.

[Thomas W]

And one more, of the II. Garde-Pionier-Ersatz-Bataillon, perfectly illustrating the age range of flamethrower troops.

[bob lembke]

It is almost certain that II. Garde=Pionier=Ersatz=Batallion had many other responsibilities than warehousing and training men for the G=R=P=R. In the context of my study of the German troops at Gallipoli I came across a reliable listing of the various activities and responsibilities of I. Garde=Pionier=Ersatz=Bataillon, and there were a number, including being the parent unit of about 30 units of various types, mostly pioneer formations of different types. Reddemann probably got about 70 firemen from his own fire department, but also got firemen from at least one other municipal fire department, most likely most of these firemen were also reservists. Even if some of them were eventually determined to be "a bit long in the tooth" they probably would have been effective as trainers in the Ersatz battalion. The older fellow in Tom's picture looks fit and capable.

Chris is right in that the true storm battalions did not aggregate enough men to syphon off any meaningful percentage of the superior replacements from other units. However, in preparing for the 1918 Spring Offensive the Germans designated a good number of divisions, about 60, as assault divisions, and stiffened them with fit replacements, more training, perhaps better weapons in some sense, and in that process another good number of divisions had to be "starved" of resources and had to be designated as something like "static" divisions, perhaps fit to hold a sector of pre-prepared positions, but not fit to conduct a serious assault. I believe that there was a third class of division between the two extremes. In this process there was a serious effect on other units caused by the effort to upgrade the assault divisions, as the numbers were so large.

Bob

[Thomas W]

It is almost certain that II. Garde=Pionier=Ersatz=Batallion had many other responsibilities than warehousing and training men for the G=R=P=R.

The War Ministry ordered the establishment of the II. Garde-Pionier-Ersatz-Batallion on February 26, 1916, as the official replacement battalion for flamethrower pioneers. It was created on March 1 by expanding the Replacement Company of the III. Garde-Pionier-Bataillon into four Replacement Companies and one Garrison Company.

Prior to the establishment of the II. Garde-Pionier-Ersatz-Bataillon replacements for the III. and IV. Garde-Pionier-Bataillone came from the Garde-Pionier-Ersatz-Bataillon, which was already providing replacements for the Garde-Pionier-Bataillon and other formations, including trench-mortar units. The two flamethrower battalions were taking too many men, so the War Ministry established the II. Garde-Pionier-Ersatz-Bataillon specifically to provide replacement flamethrower pioneers.

Edited April 29, 2009 by Thomas W

[bob lembke]

Bob, I have on a number of occasions pointed out to you of period documented incidents of FW catching fire, on one occasion the same incident described by the Germans, AND the opposing French (I pointed this out to you 3-4 years ago, an incident on 304 or Mort Homme... you seen determined to ignore this as it does not fit your argument :-(

Again, I eagerly receive such reports and incorporate them in my materials. However, it still remains that in all my years of reading vast amounts of stuff on WW I FW warfare I have only come across perhaps four reliable accounts of this happening with standard German FW, and I have not been able to verify a single death from this sort of mishap. By design, even if ignited, these devices would catch fire, not explode, generally, and the devices tended to both turn themselves off and sometimes self-extinguish, and the slowly burning heavy oil would tend to burn the operator, not incinerate him. The two-man crew was able to cast off the unit and fire lance is seconds.

I am happy to report that I just found another case of a exploding/burning German FW, but it was a case of the exception that proved the rule. There was a FW attack with two FW from Reddemann, early in the war, but additionally the commander of a truck unit got his mechanics to build several gasoline spreaying devices to spray benzine in the enemy trenches. The devices worked, the enemy trenches were taken, but one of the gasoline devices exploded, and the list of the few casualties included the Leutnant that commanded the truck unit, the text cited that he had volunteered to participate in the assault.

Most Allied FW, especially early in the war, were designed by what I call "gentlemen tinkerers", and encorporated nutty ideas like using gasoline as the fuel, and also compressed air and even compressed oxygen as the propellant. These devices, like the amateur design from the trucking unit, exploded on many occasions, even spontaneously.

The trucking unit remained in the sector for a couple of years, but there was no report of its gasoline sprayers being employed again, while Reddemann's FW were employed there several more times in the following months. It is 99% certain that the Leutnant did not die of his injuries.

Bob Lembke

[Naxos]

Chris;

From Stammrolle and Milit?rpass of Gefreiter Maier

Jakob Maier, born Oct. 22, 1896

October 1915 to IR169 in Lahr

From Jan 22, 1916 to Dec 1916 at the front (Serre, Somme North) with 5./IR169

Jan 1917, Musketier Maier volunteered for Sturmbataillon 16 (fighting in the Ober Elsass).

Maier was wounded in April 1917 while fighting in 4. Sturmkompagnie SB16 (rifle round to left thumb) Maier lost half of his left thumb.

After hospitalization he was first placed in Ersatzbataillon 114, then in August after a full recovery he rejoined his old unit, 5./IR169

Maier was promoted to Gefreiter (f?r Tapferkeit vor dem Feind) and awarded the EKII.

Since he lost the use of his left thumb he was no longer fit for Sturmbataillon 16.

Edited May 30, 2009 by Naxos

[bob lembke]

Hardy, some comments on your points:

From Stammrolle and Milit?rpass of Gefreiter Maier

Do you have Gefreiter Maier's Militaer=Pass?

From Jan 22, 1916 to Dec 1916 at the front (Serre, Somme North) with 5./IR169

Jan 1917, Musketier Maier volunteered for Sturmbataillon 16 (fighting in the Ober Elsass).

I think that it was argued that the storm battalions had to rely on the same Ersatz Abteilungen as everyone else, so their men were probably of ordinary quality. Here we see that a presumably superior soldier was able to use some mechanism to leave an ordinary line regiment for a storm battalion, and if I am not wrong, even the storm battalion of a different army. Is there a clue to the mechanism? I have to comment that although we may be able to track what seems to be the mechanisms behind such transfers, the actual mechanisms are probably hard to figure out. I am presently studying the probable mechanisms behind selecting the officers for the volunteer Pionier=Kompagnie at Gallipoli (In which my father served), and studying the officers involved, and the possible decision mechanisms in a great deal of detail, I found a rich web of personal relationships between the officers and even their fathers, and leading decision-makers in the Pionier=Korps going back 20 years. I think that it will be hard now, after 97 years, to figure out how these men actually were selected.

Maier was wounded in April 1917 while fighting in 4. Sturmkompagnie SB16 (rifle round to left thumb) Maier lost half of his left thumb.

After hospitalization he was first placed in Ersatzbataillon 114, then in August after a full recovery he rejoined his old unit, 5./IR169

Maier was promoted to Gefreiter (f?r Tapferkeit vor dem Feind) and awarded the EKII.

Since he lost the use of his left thumb he was no longer fit for Sturmbataillon 16.

Yes, this does show high standards. A missing or stiff left thumb was not that severe a handicap for an infantryman in a storm unit, where the P 08 and the grenade were major weapons for enlisted men, and the rifle less so..

Bob

[Naxos]

... Do you have Gefreiter Maier's Militaer=Pass?

Yes, and a copy of his Stammrolle. He was my maternal Grandfather.

Here we see that a presumably superior soldier was able to use some mechanism to leave an ordinary line regiment for a storm battalion, and if I am not wrong, even the storm battalion of a different army.

The (badisches) Infanterie-Regiment 169 (52. Division) was removed from the Somme sector late in December 1916 and send to the Ober-Elsass were it received extra training and took part in the fighting (Stellungsk?mpfe) there.

At the same time SB16 was created in the area (Ober-Elsass) by Armeeabteilung B (from mostly W?rttemberg and Baden men).

According to my Grandfather they were looking for volunteers in the Regiments of the 52. Division, SB16 wanted men with front experience.

He and some others in his company volunteered.

Not all volunteers were taken by SB16 or remained with the battalion after the training.

Edited May 30, 2009 by Naxos

[Thomas W]

Most Allied FW, especially early in the war, were designed by what I call "gentlemen tinkerers", and encorporated nutty ideas like using gasoline as the fuel, and also compressed air and even compressed oxygen as the propellant. These devices, like the amateur design from the trucking unit, exploded on many occasions, even spontaneously.

Indeed. Possibly the weirdest flamethrower of the war was the Russian Tilly-Goskin, which I've included in my upcoming book. It was a tiny thing about 22 inches tall by 6 inches in diameter, with a swiveling rigid lance on the left side.

It was also equipped with a hand pump to compress atmospheric air into an internal chamber; the igniter consisted of a mailbox-shaped container filled with inflammable liquid that was lit with a match; and the lance had--wait for it--a bayonet! Yup. For when the flamethrower sapper ran out of fuel. Charge!

If that weren't bizarre enough, both the lance and the hand-pump handle were on the left side of the flamethrower, requiring the sapper to reach across his body with his right hand to hold the lance while he pumped the air into the propellant chamber. Needless to say this was not a successful weapon, even though records indicate that it was fielded and used in combat.

Here's my drawing of the Tilly-Goskin, based on a photo and a detailed description in a Russian document.

[dond]

"Yes, this does show high standards. A missing or stiff left thumb was not that severe a handicap for an infantryman in a storm unit, where the P 08 and the grenade were major weapons for enlisted men, and the rifle less so.."

A thumb is essential for throwing grenades and shooting a pistol so that would be a major handicap.

[Naxos]

"Yes, this does show high standards. A missing or stiff left thumb was not that severe a handicap for an infantryman in a storm unit, where the P 08 and the grenade were major weapons for enlisted men, and the rifle less so.."

A thumb is essential for throwing grenades and shooting a pistol so that would be a major handicap.

He did not loose his whole thumb.

I don't think that throwing grenades would be a problem since he was right handed, but Don is right about handling a pistol. One needs the entire left thumb to chamber a round into a P-08.

Jakob Maier was fully kv in August of 1917 and rejoined one of the best fighting Divisions of the German Army, but not the Sturmbataillon.

Edited May 31, 2009 by Naxos

[Guest Rick Research]

An Austro-Hungarian unit badge (Thanks Ian! )

http://gmic.co.uk/index.php?s=&showtop...st&p=345927

[Thomas W]

Just found this:

NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS

JULY, 1917

WASHINGTON, GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WAR DEPARTMENT

Document No. 630

Office of The Adjutant General

The noncommissioned officers and privates who form a [German] battalion of assault are specially selected. They are young, strong, single men, or married men without children. Sometimes even the more unruly or undisciplined men of the company are taken. (From statements of prisoners.) The drafts from some companies have amounted to 25 men. The best of them have remained with the battalion after a course of training, which lasts six weeks; the others are sent back to their organizations, where they form platoons of assault or patrols when needed to execute raids. Under certain conditions these platoons may be united into one company of assault by infantry brigade; the companies in their turn may form a battalion of assault for an army corps.

http://www.archive.org/stream/notesonrecen...itrich_djvu.txt