bob lembke

Bob

Again, I eagerly receive such reports and incorporate them in my materials. However, it still remains that in all my years of reading vast amounts of stuff on WW I FW warfare I have only come across perhaps four reliable accounts of this happening with standard German FW, and I have not been able to verify a single death from this sort of mishap. By design, even if ignited, these devices would catch fire, not explode, generally, and the devices tended to both turn themselves off and sometimes self-extinguish, and the slowly burning heavy oil would tend to burn the operator, not incinerate him. The two-man crew was able to cast off the unit and fire lance is seconds. I am happy to report that I just found another case of a exploding/burning German FW, but it was a case of the exception that proved the rule. There was a FW attack with two FW from Reddemann, early in the war, but additionally the commander of a truck unit got his mechanics to build several gasoline spreaying devices to spray benzine in the enemy trenches. The devices worked, the enemy trenches were taken, but one of the gasoline devices exploded, and the list of the few casualties included the Leutnant that commanded the truck unit, the text cited that he had volunteered to participate in the assault. Most Allied FW, especially early in the war, were designed by what I call "gentlemen tinkerers", and encorporated nutty ideas like using gasoline as the fuel, and also compressed air and even compressed oxygen as the propellant. These devices, like the amateur design from the trucking unit, exploded on many occasions, even spontaneously. The trucking unit remained in the sector for a couple of years, but there was no report of its gasoline sprayers being employed again, while Reddemann's FW were employed there several more times in the following months. It is 99% certain that the Leutnant did not die of his injuries. Bob Lembke

The story of the taking (or "taking over") of Douaumont is interesting and fun. The event was very important, and also for national morale, so of course there had to be an official, annointed "victor". Von Brandis wrote at least one book, the one published in the late 1930's (he includes a story of touring Douaumont in the mid-1930's, and finally it comes out to the French that he is von Brandis) was fun; he was in England when the war broke out, and got back to Germany and his regiment with some adventure, also a story of espionage in England by kayak.) The story of the Crown Prince is interesting and characteristic. Wilhelm and his father were patrons of my father's unit at Verdun, and he supposedly often dropped into the barracks and chatted up the men; my father both told me and wrote in his letters from Verdun that he often caged cigarettes from the Crown Prince. Last year I had the privilege of sharing beer and pizza with a great grand-son of the Crown Prince, and shared a really funny story about a visit of "Little Willi" and his father to the barracks with him. (I have to day that although the official format of the social meeting was beer and pizza, "Prince Fritz" seemed more partial to Congac (sp? - not my beverage) and pizza.) I have read a good deal about the Crown Prince, and he seems to have been a decent, humane fellow, seriously interested in his men, and in some cases his judgement eventually turned out to be better than his supposedly more professional associates. A great story is how the Crown Prince treated the commander of Fort Vaux after the surrender of the Fort after bitter fighting, a nice personal dinner (the extremely cranky French officer admitted that Willi's French was excellent), and then the officer went off to captivity with his sidearms (a pistol and a French sword, although he did not have one at the fighting, plus an entrenching tool), a servant, his dog, and so much cake that the officer fed it to his dog. And he was soon sent to spend his confinement in Switzerland! Despite this, the French officer complained bitterly about his treatment! Some people are never satisfied. I have digressed a bit, but I hope it was entertaining. The story of Rommel at the Ionzo is also great, how he and three companies of the mountain troops took 10,500 POWs and 82 guns at a cost of six men killed. He took the last 1500 men, a regiment, by himself and his handkerchief, as he only had about 6-8 men, clerks and messengers left, not guarding prisoners. Claudio, thanks for a great thread! Bob Lembke

I think that we have to be careful here. I read a biography of his a few years ago, and there does seem to be some questions about the precise course of his career. (Or, possibly, that idea might flow from some instinctive suspicion of Nazi leaders. I am not a student of WW I.) But there seems to be no doubt that he did serve with the tanks. (Panzer=Abteilung Nr. 13 would have been a unit of Beute=Panzer. The Bavarians were responsible for rebuilding these.) I would be 95% sure that the source that Hardy cites was self-supplied by the subject. I will go back and poke thru my note-cards on this book. The German tank units and the storm units were closely allied, and most or all tank units were trained by Sturm=Bataillon Nr. 5 (Rohr) before being released to the front. Bob Lembke

I wrote the below response about 10 days ago, but for some reason I was locked out of this Forum and another for about a week. I hope that it is useful. A bit of fluff on the Lehr units. I am going to venture an answer, although I do not know this for sure. Poking in my 1912 preuss./wuerttem. Rangliste as a guide to the relationships between units; The Feldartillerie=Scheissschule at Jueterbog had a Lehr=Regiment of nine batteries, and the Fuss=Artillerie=Scheissschule at Jueterbog had a Lehr=Bataillon of four batteries. Artillery training generally was more complex than infantry training (one reason for the three years of typical artillery EM active service vs. two years for the infantryman), and these units were probably large enough to cycle many, most, or all artillerymen in the Prussian Army thru them for some level of training. On the other hand, in 1912 there was a single Lehr=Infanterie=Bataillon of four companies, based at Potsdam, and also part of the 1st brigade of 1. Garde=Infanterie=Division. Now, it was not likely that a battalion could have much of a direct role in training the infantry in an army of 150 plus infantry regiments. Being near Berlin, and in the Garde, suggests a role in the development of new infantry concepts, tactics, etc.; in testing new weapons, etc. The Pioniere had an important role in testing new weapons, even artillery, and an important unit for this role was a pioneer company which was not formally titled a Guards unit, but which was actually the fifth company of the Garde=Pionier=Bataillon. (I am having a senior moment in remembering the formal title of this company.) The various engineering and proofing commissions and committees were based in Berlin and perhaps Potsdam, and other related activities and organizations, like the Feuerwerk=Labratorium, in nearby Spandau. The whole question of the Prussian units, structures, committees, and procedures for developing, testing, and approving new weapons and the like is quite interesting (to me); and quite complex, as is, of course, almost anything to do with the Imperial Armies. Bob Lembke

Gentlemen; I am trying to work out what is possible to figure out about the German volunteer Pionier=Kompagnie at Gallipoli in 1915, which I never tire of mentioning as a unit that my father fought in. Previously our sainted Rick Research gave me excellent help in this regard, with the Hildemann father and son, and also about a pioneer officer named Zipper, who seems to have been the commander of this company for a while. Here are my notes on what has turned out to be multiple Zippers. -quote- Zipper, Hauptmann - Klaus Wolf, Gallipoli 1915, in the text and in Anhang 2, mention that "Hauptmann Zipper" was the "F?hrer der Pionierabteilung auf Gallipoli", but due to dysentery had to be returned to Germany in August 1915. In the 1914 preuss. Rangliste there are three Zipper's, Hauptmann "A", Oberleutnant "B", and Leutnant "C". A and B are Pioniere=Offiziere, while C is an Infanterie=Leutnant (20. 6. 1908 K) in IR 14. and presumably would not be commanding a pioneer company in mid-1915. From 1910 p./w. Dienstaltersliste, p. 163, there seems to be another Pionier=Offizier Zipper, Datum des Patent als Oberleutnant 14. 6. 1906, als Leutnant 18. 4. 1896, detailed to 1. Ing. Insp. on 5. 5. 1910. Let's call him "Zipper D". (Note: In March 2009 the blessed Rick Research responded to a query of mine about The two Hildemann Pionier=Offiziere quite usefully, and also wrote about a pioneer officer named Zipper that I mentioned, who seemingly was, for a while, the commander of the German volunteer pioneer company at Gallipoli. He wrote: "Zipper was on active duty as an Oberstleutnant in the Reichsheer in 1925, then disappears. He had awards for which the rolls exist from Bavaria and Saxony-- the first not in the published rolls but hopefully to be found in Bernd's massively expanded new Rolls also due out this year I hope. The Saxon roll omits his first name. All he got from the Turks was their War Medal star suggesting either not there long or not in an active post. " Looking at the question in more detail, and looking over the period from about 1895 to 1918, it turns out that there seems to have been three Zipper Pionier=Offiziere that could have been the man at Gallipoli, plus one or two infantry officers that almost certainly were not, and also a senior Zipper, who we could call "Ur=Zipper", who might be a relative of the younger pioneer Zippers, possibly a father or uncle. As the Zipper Rick mentioned received a minor Turkish medal, and as he may only have been in Turkey for a matter of weeks, it would seem that the officer he wrote about is our man. However, was he "Zipper A", "Zipper B", or "Zipper D"? Ur=Zipper: 6. 5. 1906 Oberstleutnant Zipper 27. 1. 1906 X on the staff of IR (8. Brandenburg.) Nr. 64, from the 1906 p. Rangliste, p. 213. 5. 5. 1910 Oberst Zipper 27. 1. 1909 is Kommandeur der IR (4. Westfaelisches) Nr. 17, Oberstlt. 27. 1. 1906, Major 18. 8. 1899, Hauptmann 17. 4. 1889, Oblt. 8. 3. 1887, Leutnant 17. 10. 1876, from the 1910 p. Dienstaltersliste, p. 13. 6. 5. 1910 Oberst Zipper 27. 1. 1909 J is Kommandeur der IR (4. Westfaelisches) Nr. 17, from the 1910 p. Rangliste, p. 170. 6. 5. 1912 From the 1912 p./w. Rangliste, p. 79, General=Major Zipper 22. 4. 1912 S was the Kommandeur der 30. Infanterie=Brigade, Coblentz. Zipper A: ( Leutnant 18. 4. 1896, Oblt. 15. 9. 1904, Hauptmann 1. 10. 1912 H14h ) 1. 5. 1906 Oberleutnant Tag des Patent 15. 09. 1904, Geburtstag 10. 3. 1873, Adjutant der Pion. B. 21, Diensteintrittstag 11. 12. 1894, from k. p. 1906 Pionier Rangliste, p. 42. 6. 5. 1906 Oberlt. 15. 09. 1904 P=B 21., Adj. Ern. from 1906 p./w. Rangliste, p. 471. 1. 12. 1910 The 1911 Deutsche Rangliste has two Pionier Oberleutnante, Oblt. Zipper 22. 3. 1910 of Pionier=Bataillon Nr. 3, detailed to the Kr. Ak. (This is Zipper B); and Oblt. Zipper 14. 6. 1906, senior Oblt. of five by DOR in 1. Nassauisches Pionier=Bataillon Nr. 21, and CO of its 4. Kompagnie. (He was Zipper D.) 5. 5. 1910 From 1910 p./w. Dienstaltersliste, p. 163, 11 Pionier officers made Oberleutnant on 15. 9. 1904 were already Hauptleute, with DOR of 10. 4. 1908 to 10. 9. 1908. 1. 5. 1911 - Hauptmann Zipper 27. 1. 1911 "Ern.", P=B 21. Kommandeur 4. Kompagnie, from 1911 p. Rangliste, p. 490. 6. 5. 1912 Hptm. Ern. (Ernant?) 27. 01. 1911, CO of 4. Kompagnie, Pion.=B. Nr. 21., from 1912 p. Rangliste, p. 491. 6. 5. 1914 Hauptmann 1. 10. 1912 H14h, CO 4. Komp., P=B 21. Fr. 1914 p. Rangliste, p. 514. 1. 1. 1918 Hptm. Pion. B. 21 " " Lt. 18. 04. 1896 1918 Dienstaltersliste, p. 201. Zipper B: ( Leutnant 27. 1. 1901, Oberleutnant 22. 3. 1910 T11t, Hauptmann 2. 8. 1914 ) 1. 6. 1901 This Leutnant Zipper is not in the 1901 p. Rangliste. 1. 5. 1906 Leutnant Tag des Patent 27. 01. 1901, Geburtstag 30. 8. 1882, Pion. B. 3, Dienst= Eintrittstag 1. 10. 1900, k. z. Art. u. Ing. Sch., Ing. L., from k. p. 1906 Pionier Rangliste, p. 48. 6. 5. 1906 Leut. 27. 01. 1901 Ww P=B 3. k. z. Art. u. Ing. Sch., fr. 1906 p. Rangliste, p. 463. 5. 5. 1910 Oberleutnant 22. 03. 1910 P=B 3, from 1910 p./w. Dienstaltersliste, p. 164. 1. 12. 1910 The 1911 Deutsche Rangliste has two Pionier Oberleutnante, Oblt. Zipper 22. 3. 1910 of Pionier=Bataillon Nr. 3, detailed to the Kr. Ak. (This is Zipper B); and Oblt. Zipper 14. 6. 1906, senior Oblt. of five by DOR in 1. Nassauisches Pionier=Bataillon Nr. 21, and CO of its 4. Kompagnie. (He was Zipper D.) 1. 5. 1911 - Oberleutant Zipper 22. 3. 1910 T11t P=B 3. "k. z. Kr. Akad", from 1911 p. Rangliste, p. 482. 6. 5. 1912 Oberleutnant 22. 3. 1910 T11t, P=B 3 von Rauch, sec. To the War Academy, from 1912 k. Rangliste, p. 483. 6. 5. 1912 - Oberleutant Zipper 22. 3. 1910 T11t, P=B 3. "k. z. Kr. Akad", from 1912 p. Rangliste, p. 483. 6. 5. 1914 Oberlt. 22. 3. 1910 T11t, P=B 3 von Rauch, seconded to the Great General Staff, Berlin for "service training", from 1914 p. Rangliste, pp. 506, 26. 1. 1. 1918 Hptm. 2. 8. 1914 Pion.=B. Nr. 3., Lt. 27. 01. 1901, k. b. Gr. Gen. Stabes , from 1918 Dienstaltersliste, p. 202. Zipper D: (Leutnant 18. 4. 1896 F3f, Oberleutnant 14. 6. 1906 ) 4. 5. 1897 - Sous=Lieutenant Zipper P=B 3. im 3. Kompagnie, his company CO was a Hauptmann Sturm, from 1897 p. Rangliste, p. 441. 2. 5. 1899 - Lieutenant Zipper P=B 3. im 3. Kompagnie, his company CO was a Hptm. Rotte, from 1899 p. Rangliste, p. 442. (The only Zipper Pion.=Off. In this Rangliste.) 7. 5. 1900 Leutnant 18. 4. 1896 im P=B Nr. 3, 7. 5. 1900 "k. z. Art. u. Ing. Sch., fr. 1900 p. Rangliste, p. 465. This is the only Leutnant Zipper in the 1901 p. Rangliste. 1. 6. 1901 Leutnant 18. 4. 1896 F3f im P=B Nr. 3, 3. Kompagnie, fr. 1901 p. Rangliste, p. 467. This is the only Leutnant Zipper in the 1901 p. Rangliste. 6. 5. 1906 This Leutnant Zipper not in the 1906 p. Rangliste, Zipper "A" and "B" are, above. 1. 12. 1910 The 1911 Deutsche Rangliste has two Pionier Oberleutnante, Oblt. Zipper 22. 3. 1910 of Pionier=Bataillon Nr. 3, detailed to the Kr. Ak. (This is Zipper B); and Oblt. Zipper 14. 6. 1906, senior Oblt. of five by DOR in 1. Nassauisches Pionier=Bataillon Nr. 21, and CO of its 4. Kompagnie. (He was Zipper D.) 5. 5. 1910 From 1910 p./w. Dienstaltersliste, p. 163, Pionier=Offizier Zipper, Datum des Patent als Oberleutnant 14. 6. 1906, als Leutnant 18. 4. 1896, was found in 1. Ing. Insp. on 5. 5. 1910. 6. 5. 1912 This Zipper not in 1912 p. Rangliste, . 6. 5. 1914 This Oberleutnant Zipper not in the 1914 p. Rangliste, Zipper "A" and "B" are, above. - end quote of my notes - So it seems that "Zipper D" sort of fades away after 1910, and my guess is that Zipper A, more of the well-experienced field engineer, was probably our man, not the staff-officer-type Zipper B. Anyone have any insight into this interesting (to me) puzzle? Can Rick identify which Zipper got the Turkish medal? Any help gratefully received. Bob Lembke

Andy; Many EK were given out after the war; I'm not an expert on medals, but I think I saw someone stating that it might have been 1.5 million. In my father's case, he volunteered for Gallipoli, and then volunteered for the flamethrower arm, and fought (sporatically) as a flamethrower operator for 2 1/2 years, being wounded four times, and serving as a Trupp leader. But he only got his EK II in 1921, when he applied to the War Ministry for one, I believe. And he never was promoted past Pionier (private). He was a good combat soldier, I believe, and was wounded four times in combat, but he was a naughty, naughty soldier, not a team player at all; the leadership of his company was corrupt and abusive, and he hated them. He (and others) shot and killed the company CO, and he shot a sergeant in the ass on live fire manuvers, and he kicked in the face of another sergeant in such a way that the sergeant was put on charges for getting kicked, and he was likely to freely say his mind to anyone, such as officers. (I have a lot of correspondence, and family history, and there are many incidents; he really exasperated his father, a staff officer.)He got away with all of these misdeeds.He was quite a manipulator. But no EK during the war, not the slightest promotion, but they could not deny him his wound badge, of course. Another factor was him serving after the war in a Freikorps and then in the Schwartze Reichswehr. That is one case for a post-war EK, I imagine that most of the many others were not that dramatic. It was said by someone that the only way to avoid an EK II as a combat soldier was the grave. I imagine that, postwar, they had certain standards, months in combat, wounds, that would allow a post-war award of an EK II. But I do not know for certain. Bob Lembke

It is almost certain that II. Garde=Pionier=Ersatz=Batallion had many other responsibilities than warehousing and training men for the G=R=P=R. In the context of my study of the German troops at Gallipoli I came across a reliable listing of the various activities and responsibilities of I. Garde=Pionier=Ersatz=Bataillon, and there were a number, including being the parent unit of about 30 units of various types, mostly pioneer formations of different types. Reddemann probably got about 70 firemen from his own fire department, but also got firemen from at least one other municipal fire department, most likely most of these firemen were also reservists. Even if some of them were eventually determined to be "a bit long in the tooth" they probably would have been effective as trainers in the Ersatz battalion. The older fellow in Tom's picture looks fit and capable. Chris is right in that the true storm battalions did not aggregate enough men to syphon off any meaningful percentage of the superior replacements from other units. However, in preparing for the 1918 Spring Offensive the Germans designated a good number of divisions, about 60, as assault divisions, and stiffened them with fit replacements, more training, perhaps better weapons in some sense, and in that process another good number of divisions had to be "starved" of resources and had to be designated as something like "static" divisions, perhaps fit to hold a sector of pre-prepared positions, but not fit to conduct a serious assault. I believe that there was a third class of division between the two extremes. In this process there was a serious effect on other units caused by the effort to upgrade the assault divisions, as the numbers were so large. Bob

I received your information gratefully and entered it carefully into my timelines at the correct places. I did not ignore it. I welcomed it. The fact remains that, with your information, I have only found 3-4 examples in many thousands of hours of reading and study where I found a well-documented instance of a German FW "exploding" or more correctly catching fire. Snapping on my mechanical engineer hat, the German FW, whose design started in 1901 by a professional engineer, had many safety features which made such an outcome very unlikely, while most Allied designs, usually designed by people that I call "gentlemen tinkerers", and having to come up with a design in months, not 15 years, designed very dangerous devices that sometimes could even, in some cases, begin to explode internally before the fuel even exited the device under what passed for "normal" (suicidal) operation. (The exception was Livens, who was an excellent engineer.) Foulkes, the Brit flame CO, described the demonstration of one of these nightmare devices that he attended; the device exploded (or something) and the device and the demonstrator were enveloped in flame. Foulkes extinguished the fellow, being careful to put him out with the demonstrator's own overcoat, not his own. ("No soot on my coat, you bounder!") Many of these devices insanely used compressed air as a propellant, or even (doubly insanely) compressed oxygen! The Italians realistically dealt with their bad designs by including a man with a wet blanket in each FW team! Cheaper than good engineering. Quite pragmatic. I have a complete death roll of the GRPR, a probably incomplete death roll of the Flamm=Pionier of S=B Nr. 5 (Rohr), and I don't think that I have been able to corroborate a single death of a Flamm=Pionier from an exploding/burning FW device (I have not looked at this question in about two years; running on memory here). I happily accepted your information, before I received it I had about two instances of German devices burning/exploding; after your info was added I have about 3-4. In contrast, there is evidence that preliminary training with these devices was dangerous. But to read Horne you would think differently; he described the weapons as "suicidal". This is not a new arguement, it went on in my family between my father and his father, a Feuerwerk=Hauptmann, an explosives officer, judging by the correspondence and the oral history. Bob

I cannot address your four other "comments" at the moment; perhaps tonight. Bob

Tom; Interesting and informative pair of photos. Almost certainly the most important single historical source on the German FW in WW I is the short history written by Major Dr. Reddemann, and while I judge that the material in the history is unusually accurate, Reddemann evidentally was annoyed at anything to do with FW that he could not control, or control completely, and he expressed it by simply not even mentioning, for example, a unit that he could not control. Therefore it is difficult to puzzle out the relationships between the various units involved with FW. The II. Garde=Pionier=Ersatz=Bataillon was deeply involved with the FW (my father repeatedly was transferred between the two units in his almost 2 1/2 years in the flamethrower service), but I believe that the name of the unit is not even mentioned in Reddemann's book. While he mentions the topic of the loan of FW platoons to storm battalions (later in the war each field company of G=R=P=R (Flammenwerfer) had one Zug (platoon) specially modified for loan to storm battalions), Reddemann (from memory) never seemed to mention the few storm battalions that were allowed to have their own FW platoons, like Sturm=Bataillon Nr. 5 (Rohr). (These units with their own FW were also allowed, upon occasion, to borrow additional FW from Reddemann; my father was loaned to Rohr several times at Verdun. He loved fighting with those professionals, and despised most German infantry, who he felt could not be trusted, probably an unfair judgement, but one born of experience.) Bob

First of all, Bruce's book is an extraordinary work, and I for one would not call it dated. I got a copy at the very onset of my serious WW I study, and it was really formative. I generally avoid working with secondary sources, unless perhaps to orient myself when taking up a new topic within the field, but I place the book in the small set of nominally secondary sources that I regard as a primary source, or even have a higher regard for, as a fine military mind has already filtered through the many primary sources used in its creation. It is clear that the storm units received men and officers from a variety of sources. I am working with two others in attempting to identify the officers in an extraordinary photo taken in the officer's mess of a storm battalion, and front and center is an officer in a hussar's jacket, probably a migration like the many migrations of cavalry officers into the flying corps. It has been pointed out that the initial batch of men that formed a storm battalion may have been really picked men, but that the following Ersatz may have been hit or miss. This may have been true, and "good" men were more and more scarce as the war went on, but I am sure that generally a fairly high standard was usually applied to Ersatz for the storm units. What was not mentioned is the fact that usually these units suffered relatively light casualties, for a variety of reasons, major ones being the skill of the men and officers, and the fact that they were not kept in line, but resided in barracks well behind the lines, usually being trucked in for a quick, well-planned operation, and then quickly withdrawn. In other posts I have detailed how the CO of a flame unit sent to support an attack by an infantry unit, who may have only been a senior NCO, had, based on an order from the OHL, to right to veto a plan of attack, which may have been drawn up by or for a Generalleutnant, if the junior officer or NCO felt that the plan did not reflect the unique characteristics of the flame weapon. I do not know the analogous situation for the "ordinary" storm battalions, who were often doled out piecemeal to stiffen larger units. I only have worked on the details of this question of low casualties for my father's storm unit, which was, for unique reasons, documented meticulously by a CO who was a published scientist, as he had to report every attack, however small, in detail to the OHL on a monthly basis, reporting to a very, very smart staff officer. The flame regiment, across the entire war, lost barely more than one man to KIA, died of wounds or illness, or missing, per flame attack. I know that this seems counter-intuitive, and is counter to the common literary device (a la Alistair Horne) of the "exploding flamethrower", or the "flamethrower operator enveloped in flame", and my father and grand-father argued about this in their correspondence, but the figures are clear. My father, in a letter, described a flame attack in which three men were lost, and 12 wounded, as "a catastrophe". This is remarkable, as some flame attacks involved two or six FW teams, plus other flame pioneers, but many involved 30-odd or 60-odd or even more FW teams, and my tally for the largest FW attack was 154 FW teams, while another author puts that number considerably higher. (That attack also featured the highest FW casualty tally of the war, but an entire square mile of elaborate concrete fortifications were taken, and 4400 POWs, 27 MGs, and 12 mortars, at a cost of 21 men lost, including several died of wounds.) Given this low casualty rate, there was less need for Ersatz, with its hypothesized dilution in quality of personnel. But it is true as the war went on the general quality of replacements for the German Army became rather bad. And, as observed, the men of the storm units were not Olympic gods, or Helden=tenors, just picked men. My father, when he joined the Pioniere at 18 years, was 6 foot tall, an athlete and a crack shot (trained from about 8 years old on the range by his father, a Prussian officer and a "gun nut"), had six languages (five taught in school, and self-taught Russian, as as a teen-ager he frequently went pre-war into Russia by himself for vacation and for work delivering payrolls in gold to German construction companies), had a Gymnasium education, one year of technical institute, and was a journeyman bricklayer; he was training to become a Festungsbau=Offizier. Upon joining the Pioniere in 1915 he volunteered for the volunteer Pionier=Kompagnie at Gallipoli, and when he got back and shook off his malaria he evidentially volunteered for the flame unit. (As I have studied his history, with the aid of considerable correspondence and family oral history, I have discovered that the young Georg was also a real hothead, a real thug, an all-around dangerous person, much different than his later persona.) I can't say that he was typical, but he certainly was good material for the storm-troops and a technical arm. Bob Lembke

In the photo of the Generalkommando, von Beseler is front and center, and there is a fellow standing on the same step directly to von Beseler's left whose posture, "body English", position, clearly scream "I'm second in command." He is a couple of inches taller than von Beseler and looks like Lord Kirchner, with a fairly large moustache. So "Kirschner" must be the Chef des Generalstabs. To von Beseler's right, but one step up, is a guy that looks like von Tschischwitz, a tad younger than the photos (looks more like the second photo posted), who is also wearing Litzen (only about three of the 20-odd officers are wearing Litzen, including von Beseler.). From his position and "body English" he could easily be one of the chiefs of the sub-sections of the Generalstab Sektion of the Generalkommando, but it does not stand out as clearly as the other fellow, who has to be the 2nd in command. My grand-father is not (he was an Oberfeuerwerker in 1. Garde=Fuss=Artillery Regiment, but I don't know if being a NCO in the Guards would allow a fellow to wear the Litzen later when he was a commissioned officer, I would guess not). Only about three officers of the 20-odd were wearing swords, and three pistols, including my grand-father, who was a "gun nut" and a crack shot; he once challanged another reserve officer to a duel with automatic pistols, the fellow wisely declined, and was thrown out of the Reserve Officers' Association for the refusal; when my father first told me this, I thought it was a joke, but Pop said: "Not at all, your grandfather was an excellent shot, and fully intended to kill the son-of-a-bitch!" My grand-father's aide de camp, standing to his right and rear, is wearing a sword and a natty uniform, he was the District Attorney of Thorn, but I do not know his name. I can't tell what sort of pistol my grand-father is carrying, as his left arm partially obscures the holster, but he was partial to the C96 "broom-handle" Mauser, and I have a great studio photo of him from Russia dressed entirely in white, with a snow cape, with a map case, a sword, and his beloved C96 Mauser in its large case. Again, I veer OT a bit, but I hope that the detail is interesting. Bob Lembke

Guys; This is from the title page of Antwerpen as Band 3 von der 2. Auflage. I also have the book from the 1st edition (1. Auflage); in that edition (the one with the green covers with the helmet in gold) the book is numerated as Band 3. The book seems identical in the two editions, aside from the cover. On the title page the author is given as "Erich v. Tschischwitz, s. Zt. 1. Generalstabsoffizier beim III. Reservekorps". Due to the joys of Fraktur, there is a 10% probability that the "s" in "s. Zt." is actually a "f". Pardon the mix of German and English, but I think that it provides the greatest precision. Now isn't "1. Generalstabsoffizier" the "Ia", the head of the operations sub-section of the Generalstabs Sektion of the Generalkommando of the corps? Then there also was a Chef des Generalstabs in the army corps, who would be second in command to Gen. von Beseler. I have a photo taken just after the fall of Antwerp, on the steps of the City Hall of Ghent, I believe, of the Generalkommando with their new EKs. Beseler is sporting his new PlM. My grandfather (Heinrich Fuchs, Feuerwerk=Hauptman der Landwehr) is wearing his EK in the buttonhole position (2nd buttonhole) with the crossed two ribbons and the EK hanging from one of the ribbons. I am not a "medal guy". (I sometimes see guys shortly after getting an EK wearing it with two crossed ribbons in the button-hole, sometimes with only one ribbon. Does the second ribbon signify the EK I?) Does the crossed ribbons signify anything? I do know from a document that my grandfather got the EK II and the EK I, but I don't know if he also got the EK I at the same time. He did do something remarkable and very important shortly after the fall of Antwerp. I have the photo of the Generalkommando by me now, but I cannot see the photos of von Tschischwitz that you guys posted in the "adding reply mode" of the Forum software, so when I close this I will check to see if he is in the photo. In a letter shortly after the fall of Antwerp my grandfather mentioned that "he saw a gentleman in the evening, and that the man told him that everyone was to get the EK" (paraphrase from memory.) I assume that this was either the Chef des Generalstabs or the 1. Generalstabsoffizier, and might have referred to von Tschischwitz. Bob Lembke

I'm still not out the door. The Pass has an entry "k.v., but not for Flammenwerfer", or "fit for combat, but not with flamethrowers". His second wound at Verdun was the worst of his four wounds, and his arm spit bone for over ten years, and he was sent back to Berlin to train other men. When things went bad in Fall 1918 he tricked his way back to the front, quickly was wounded twice again, and the command was very angry with him. So he was fit for combat, but not to the standards of Garde=Reserve=Pionier=Regiment (Flammenwerfer). When Jaeger=Bataillon Nr. 3 was converted to Jaeger=Sturm=Bataillon Nr. 3, although I would consider the former unit an elite unit, they found that 500 men had to be sent to other units, and replaced with picked men. Generally you only have to look at photos of men from one of these units, they are taller, in part, young, generally quite fit looking. Generally they only wanted EM that were under 25 and single. I think that they were generally but not universally volunteers. G=R=P=R was, I think, mostly if not exclusively volunteers, and at the beginning entirely firemen, interestingly. (When I speak of "G=R=P=R" I also mean the predecessor units, like Abteilung Reddemann, as well as the regiment itself, formed in mid-1916). They certainly were better trained, and did a lot of live firing exercises, sometime losing men in the process. Both the unit history and my father said that the GRPR, as much as possible, avoided fighting in cooperation with infantry, as they were unreliable and did not understand their unusual tactics. Sometimes GRPR cadre were able to train infantry units for a few days before a big attack. However, the storm units that were later developed in line infantry units, sometimes a company per regiment or division, were quite uneven in quality, I believe. The Austrians actually seem to have developed more storm units per division than the Germans, and, from my readings, towards the end of the war were sometimes the only units that would still fight. Bob Lembke

Alexandre; This topic is of considerable interest to me. However (unless he had a brother) I think that early in the war he served in the Generalkommando von III. Reservekorps, in fact I think he was the officer my grand-father, Id of the III. RK, reported to. He wrote the book Antwerpen of the Schlachten des Weltkrieges series (unless it was his brother, again), and his position in the Generalkommando is on the title page. I will look for my copy later. Bob Lembke

I think and have concrete evidence that the storm units (the original elite one battalion per army units) were picked men, and additionally were certainly better trained. Unfortunately I have to go out in a few minutes so I cannot respond in detail now, but will later. No mention was made of Garde=Reserve=Pionier=Regiment (Flammenwerfer) , my father's unit, which arguably was both the first and the largest of the original storm units. He was also lent to the Sturm=Bataillon Nr. 3 (Rohr) at Verdun several times to provide additional Flammenwerfer support. (Rohr did have one Zug of their own FW.) He loved fighting with those professionals, entirely professional and reliable. I have concrete evidence from my father's Militaer=Pass that the physical standards were higher for Sturm=Truppen. Bob Lembke

Thanks for the explaination of the alphabetizing. Lately I've been using my Ranglisten a lot, and working with the Name Index I have realized that the alphabetization seems "faulty", which I found surprising, given the drive for perfection of the Ur=Ueber=Volk. I just learned to widen the search beyond the bounds of normal alphabetization. I must say that the deviations seem wider than the example given above. It also seems to follow the Umlaut "u" = "ue" rule given above. Incidentally, I have recently increased my collection of Ranglisten u. Dienstalterslisten to about 30, mostly but not exclusively Prussian, and I will watch the Club's post and attempt to do lookups for people if possible. I am very appreciative of the valuable assistance I have often received from the masters of the Guild of Research Gnomes, people like Rick R. and Glenn J., and I will try to pitch in with the questions that a mere mortal as myself might be able to assist with. Bob Lembke

David; Wasn't a von Rauch the Minister of War about the time of the Franco-Prussian War? I am interested as my father was sworn into the German Army by the Pionier=Bataillon Nr. 3 von Rauch, and about 1850 the unit was not called "von Rauch". I have a bunch of p. Ranglisten, but none older than 1879. Bob Lembke

Double-rats!! I just wrote a rather lengthy reply, and in its last stages there was a slip of a finger and the entire reply disappeared. As it is 5 AM, I will re-write a radically briefer version. To me, the semantics of the use of the word Abteilung to a mine thrower detachment suggest that it was a unit larger than a platoon. When used as a specific unit term one use is for an artillery ballalion of four batteries (Feld=Artillerie Abteilung, not Bataillon), another a small MG battalion of three companies of about 100-120 men (Machinengewehr=Scharfschuetzen=Abteilung). As it was the MW unit of an infantry regiment I would guess that we are talking about a unit roughly company-sized, a platoon sized unit would probably be called a Zug, and we cannot expect that an infantry regiment would have a mortar battalion. (As the war went on German infantry units acquired more and more crew-served weapons, until it seemed like the rifleman was a disappearing species.) The word might suggest something a bit larger than a company. On the other hand, the storm detachment of a Landwehr infantry regiment would be fairly small. There were only about 18 of the classic largely infantry storm battalions (one was a company), one per Army. (They were mostly infantry units, but not all) Most of these had three infantry companies and one MG company, but a few were larger, the famous Storm Battalion Rohr had five "infantry" companies (the unit was a pioneer unit) and two MG companies, but it had a dual role, combat and training, more so than other storm battalions. As the classic storm battalions trained the infantry, infantry units were expected to set up storm units within their framework. Storm units were usually doled out by squad and platoon to stiffen attacking infantry. A Landwehr regiment might set up an internal storm unit, as you said perhaps manned by somewhat younger and more nimble men than the average Landwehr man, who usually were men between 28 and 35. But it is hard to see such a unit larger than a company, and I think that it was more likely to be more like a large platoon. So it is hard to see a storm unit of a size of a large platoon up to a company having its own mortar battalion, or even a mortar company. Sort of the tail wagging the dog. In short, it is very unlikely that the MWA was attached to the regiment's storm unit, if in fact that Landwehr regiment actually had a storm detachment. (I think that in some of these infantry units the storm unit was not permament, but may have been formed from some of the more active unit soldiers for a particular attack or operation.) I am not 100% sure about all of the above, there seems to have been some variability between the organic storm detachments of ordinary infantry units. I hope that my bombast will not deter other comment. In short (not my strong point), the "Artillery Luger" almost certainly was issued to the regiment's MWA, but that detachment was almost certainly not subordinate to the regiment's storm unit, if in fact LIR 382 had an organic storm detachment, which I do not think has been established. The MWA, which we tentatively know existed, was probably somewhat larger than the regiment's storm unit, which we do not know existed. I might add mention that German (or other) dealers in military photos and PCs often willy-nilly describe any soldier holding a stick grenade or wearing puttees as a "storm trooper", even if he was a tooth-less 40 year old, leaning on a crutch, knowing that many gullible collectors will immediately treble their bid. This tactic may add to the impression of the number of "storm troopers". Bob PS: A bit of pedantry, despite my poor German grammar. Pistole is feminine, so lange is probably correctly written with a trailing "e", but it should not be capitalized, possibly unless really coopted into a fixed term for the firearm. I would guess that the Germans would have called the handgun the lange Parabellum; parabellum of course being the Latin for "for war". My father's flame storm company dealt with the problem of repelling a counter-attack by carrying light MGs into combat. The German Army allocated each flame company two German MG 08/15s, but they wanted more, and a lighter MG, so they used captured French LMGs, the notorious Chauchat, which they used about two per platoon. When converted for the US .30 rifle round, as issued to Yank troops, the weapon was almost unusable, while in the original French round, if clean, it had a fair chance of actually operating, especially if cleaned well and then test-fired, allowing selection of weapons that actually operated. (It really was a terrible weapon overall, but not quite as bad in the French round, but it was light enough to be fired from the waist on the advance. And one would probably find ammunition and even possibly magazines in a captured French position.) To make you grind your teeth, as a collector, about 1920 my father had 33 spare P 08s; an armory in Germany blew up and it rained new "Lugers" on the town, he bought P 08s with a 4" barrel for two pounds of butter, and with a 10" barrel (yours, I presume) for three pounds of butter, a convenient price, as Pop worked on a farm at that time. I imagine that you paid more.

Thanks for that info. It makes a lot of sense, but I did not know it. I have about 30 pre-war Ranglisten u. Dienstalterslisten, but only the 1918 preuss./wuerrtem. Dienstaltersliste, which I do not use for bed-time reading, so I have not seen a lot of data on the wartime promotions. Still a more conservative promotion policy than most of the Allies, to generalize. I have to get a better set of the war-time resources. I imagine that there is not much to track down the wartime Leutnant d. Res., usw., unless your subject had the misfortune to get killed, so you might get a hit on the war graves registry. Bob

I will get my Super-Librarian wife (some of her librarian friends actually wear "Super-Librarian" tee-shirts) on the case to see where these books are, especially in the US. She has worked searching down books (and other things) for a major research library for 27 years, and has search tools not available to ordinary humans. I gather this WorldCat (I am not very familiar with it myself) is now available to the public, but my wife is allowed to go in and look up stuff and actually change the data in the WorldCat entry. (That is called trust.) However, I assume that you have the Das Offizierskorps --- book, but I would like to look at it myself. Does it have more info on von Kaltenborn-Stichau? Bernhard, do not hesitate to ask me if you have a difficult book search. But I look at my PMs infrequently. Bob

I have poked about, and my Super-Librarian wife obtained a copy of Blockade-breaker Marie from a Mid-western library, and I have more information on this interesting officer. His Datum der Patent as a Leutnant was 18. 8. 1906, and he was still a Leutnant in 1914. We all know the glacial rate of promotion of junior Prussian officers. But Klaus Wolf, in Gallipoli 1915 , described him as an Oberleutnant at Gallipoli in mid-1915. And the 1918 preuss./wuerttem. Dienstaltersliste carries him as a Hauptmann von der Fuss=Artillerie with the African forces and gives his "date of rank" as 22. 3. 1916. (After the war he retired as a Hauptmann a. D. ) I have not had time to read Blockade-breaker Marie (I am in Tax Hell, with about five tax returns to crank out in the next few days), but I quickly skimmed it, and it seems to mention him having been at the Dardanelles, but without any detail. It does seem to mention that he was the only replacement shipping along to Africa, there were only 14 men on board, and that he was slated to take the position of von Lettow-Vorbeck's commander of artillery. He had a wide experience and training, including serving in a Feld=artillerie regiment as well as two Fuss=Artillerie regiments and military academies and the training battalion of the Fuss=Artillerie shooting school. The Marie was carrying mountain guns and shells for the cruiser guns that von Lettow-Vorbeck had stripped from the beached cruiser (Koenigsburg?). So von Kaltenborn-Stichau received a promotion to Oberleutnant shortly before traveling to Gallipoli, which probably was about when it should have been in the usual course of those things, but his promotion to Hauptmann only a year later seems very unusual. I guess it was felt that the rank would match his new position, as von Lettow-Vorbeck probably had the equivalant of several batteries of artillery. Was there some special mechanism or term for such a quick promotion? It must have required some special process or approval. The book does not seem to mention any detailed description of von K-S's service at Gallipoli, although I may be happily surprised when I can read it. Can someone suggest a detailed book on the von Lettow-Vorbeck campaign that might include such information? Bernhard, thanks again for the lead to the Marie book. Bob Lembke

My father's storm unit (Garde=Reserve=Pionier=Regiment (Flammenwerfer) ) made special 76 mm spigot mortars (would they have been called a "l. Minenwerfer" or a "Granatenwerfer"?) that only weighed 20 kg in their own workshop, which could be carried on the back of a gunner like a backpack, and another gunner or two carried a special backpack with 12 Granaten, which also would weigh 40-45 lbs. These mortars were imbedded in the actual field flame companies, about two per company; the flame regiment had no seperate Minenwerfer unit. My father discussed the weapons that his unit carried into combat, and almost every soldier carried a regular P 08. He never mentioned Artillery Lugers or snail magazines in the context of his unit and WW I. I wonder if the snail-shell magazines would make themselves into a Landwehr unit (we are not talking Landsturm here, are we?) as they were, I assume, rather scarce and also rather delicate. He talked a good deal about his P 08s (he carried one for years after the war, photos of him in the street show a tight suit jacket with an enormous bulge where he carried a P 08 in a shoulder holster, he had a "carry permit" thru the Schwarze Reichswehr, and ran "Lugers" to the Turks after the war, during their War of Independence, including Artillery Lugers. He never heard the term "Luger" until he reached the USA in 1926, they called them "Parabellums".) His cell leader in the Schwarze Reichswehr had a MP 18 and therefore snail-shell magazines. Bob Lembke