The Balkan Wars 1912-13 as Prelude to the Great War

[IrishGunner]

It's been mentioned in other topics that next year will be the 100th anniversary of the start of the Great War or World War I. Of course, 100 years ago this month, Europe was witnessing the middle of the First Balkan War, which also had Serbia at the core of it's ignition. The Great War or World War I provides the backdrop to many (dare I say most) of our discussions of medals, photographs, weapons, and militaria here on GMIC. The Great War is a the source and foundation for many of our common collecting interests. Therefore, I propose a discussion of the events over the next 19 months - leading up to August 2014, the 100th Anniversary of the outbreak of the Great War - on or close to their anniversary dates. Questions could be... At what point was war inevitable? At what point could war have been averted? What are the interesting pre-war side events or anecdotes that set-up later something more interesting during the war itself (the development of a weapon, the promotion/assignment of a particular officer) - we all have these interesting little tid-bits in our reseach.

To start, it is my supposition that the Great Powers were already inclined to fight a war in 1912-13 and had they felt more ready for war at the outbreak of the Balkan Wars 1912-13, World War I would have started in 1912 instead of 1914.

On 18 October 1912, Peter I of Serbia declared to his Kingdom that the Turkish government showed no interest in the rights of its citizens in the Balkans and that the situation had become unbearable. He called upon Bulgaria, Greece, and Montegnero to join him in the Balkan League to oust Turkey from the penninsula. There was no doubt as to rising Serb nationalism and as to Belgrade's willingness to go to war to satisify Serb aspirations. This was already a great concern to Austria-Hungary. The Ottoman Empire long had been in decline and the question of what to do with the "Dying Man of Europe" was a frequent question. Russia encouraged the Balkan League and saw it as a way of extending Moscow's influence in the region - even at the cost of Austria-Hungary. But unlike more than 50 years prior when Britain and France fought the Crimean War to limit Russian influence in the decaying Ottoman Empire, none of the Great Powers, Britain included, seemed to really care this time about tossing the Turks out of Europe. There were half-hearted diplomatic attempts by the Great Powers to prevent action by the Balkan League; mainly because France wasn't feeling ready for war in 1912 and couldn't get a clear statement of support from Great Britain in case of war.

But perhaps the most important event that prevented the Great War from starting in 1912-13, was the non-result of the German Imperial War Coucil of 8 December 1912. Both Wilhelm II and Army Chief of Staff von Moltke agreed that if a war were necessary, the sooner the better. However, according to the Navy Chief, Admiral von Tirpitz, the Imperial Navy wouldn't be ready for war until mid-1914. Wilhelm II ultimately sides with von Tirpitz and there is no decision for war in 1912. Interestingly, as a result of this meeting, Berlin informs Austria-Hungary in a message that Germany will not be ready for war until the summer of 1914 - a foreshadow of councils to come. Austria-Hungary stays out of the Balkan Wars 1912-13 - for the time being.

A side note, Field Marshall Alfred Graf von Schlieffen - architect of the Schlieffen Plan, Germany's blueprint for the launching the Great War - died 100 years ago yesterday on 4 January 1913. Against the backdrop of the Balkan Wars, one can only imagine the side-bar discussions among German officers at von Schlieffen's funeral at the Invalidenfriedhof in Berlin. (I imagine there was no commemoration in Berlin this week?) Von Schlieffen's alleged dying words: "Remember: keep the right wing very strong."

Edited January 5, 2013 by IrishGunner

[Chris Boonzaier]

To start, it is my supposition that the Great Powers were already inclined to fight a war in 1912-13 and had they felt more ready for war at the outbreak of the Balkan Wars 1912-13, World War I would have started in 1912 instead of 1914.

.

Here is what I think the argument that often pops up that the allies were wanting and pushing for war....

The British non conscript Army needed almost 2 years from the outbreak of the war to get ready for proper offensive actions....

SURELY if Britain was expecting and hoping for a war, she would have introduced conscription in 1910 or thereabouts?

SURELY the French would have said... "well, we want a war, but are worried we will have to carry the first 2 years on our shoulders? We're not having any of it if Britain can't pull its weight?"

[IrishGunner]

Here is what I think the argument that often pops up that the allies were wanting and pushing for war....

The British non conscript Army needed almost 2 years from the outbreak of the war to get ready for proper offensive actions....

SURELY if Britain was expecting and hoping for a war, she would have introduced conscription in 1910 or thereabouts?

SURELY the French would have said... "well, we want a war, but are worried we will have to carry the first 2 years on our shoulders? We're not having any of it if Britain can't pull its weight?"

I think Britain never wanted war. But if the Brits had done proper analysis of the 1912-13 Balkans wars, they should have started preparing and by 1914 would have been in a different position. Or London should have stepped up its diplomacy to try and make war less inevitable. The others - Germany and Russia especially - were another story - war was on their minds in 1912. London just didn't see the reality and would have been in the same boat in 1912 that it found itself in 1914.

[Odulf]

An interisting and intreaguing thesis, which cannot be dissolved from the development of central Europe in an economic, political and military subjective.

Apart from the Crimean war, half a century earlier, none of the large European countries (as possible participants in a full blown international incident) had any idea of the impact of a involving large countries who were rapidly adepting to modern warfare. So the matter was regarded from various corners, such as: what is to gain in a political, economical and military subjective.

Since the latter stages of the 19th century, European countries tried to rub shoulders with the Ottoman Empire, not only by gaining access to the Suez canal, but also by selling arms and military knowledge (advisors), in the perspective of national arms productions, and to get a foothold in the Middle East. From the past England had a strong card, in cooperating with the Turks in the Egyptian War. Turkish diplomacy was cunning, and they played their cards well, to get the best of all worlds. So the French and Germans did their utmost to get the Turkish contracts and benefits. France lost it and the Germans gained, and supported Turkey with weapons and advisors (that is why Turkey was factual drawn into the war).

Russia, on the other hand, worked hard to establish a grand Russian hemisphere, and thus furthered all initiatives for a Slavic inspired pact by supporting nationalist (anti Turkish, or anti muslem initiatives). The objective was to expand influence and get more access to the Mediterranean. Austria, which incorporated Hungary, streched from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, held so much difficult to control territory and was hungering for more to consolidate. The British tried to postpone clashes by diplomacy (for which Edward VII moved about quite a bit), because the politicians were not ready for war. In the mean time "peace keepers" from minor European countries were employed in the Balkan states to help the local rulers in enforcing their feeble governance. Tension was building up, but all countries hoped to keep the lid on by conferences and treaties. No country was prepared to risk lives on a foreign shore without a consolodated plan of attack, let alone a plan of retreat.

The only countries whith some experience in a real war were Germany and France (Franco-German War), and Russia (in the East). In that respect Russia had the best cards, because of the unlimited resources of that country (in man power).

Until about that time, the way to avoid wars was the policy of mariage (an old and crumbling mediaval manner, to consolidate alliances by monarchies), but since about 1848 the influence of monarchs was declining, and parliamentary factions (supported by the middle classes and workers) gained influence. The world had entered a new era, where other interests (such as industry and resources) prevailed.

All these factors decided the hesitance of politicians, and also the state of the tools of politics; the armed forces.

The British Forces were mainly based on a defense concept, and to maintain order in the colonies and dominions, and a powerful fleet to prevent invasions. The French Forces were equaly equipped to keep the colonies, and to defend france from a German attack. Germany, as it was established in Versailles, and under the enterprising Emperor Wilhelm II, wanted influence and colonies (which it gained, following the bluff poker after Morocco), but it wanted to blot out the Bismarck statement that Germany's future was not overseas. Russia wanted access to the Mediterranean, not by a Bosporus controlled by its enemy Turkey. Italy was a new state and eager to find a place in history. Austria wanted to consolidate, but history placed the Empire as a treshold against the Muslims, and they were looking for revenge for territories lost. The minor Balkan States were too busy suppressing local groups which strived for their own goals. Turkey was suffering from an ill government and ripe for the slaughter, as it concerned their influence in Europe. Bloody battles had been fought on the Balkan, between muslims and christians and nationalists. The problem with the area is, that the various factions could not/cannot claim any ground to consolidate. So, the best solution was to concer it all and put rule by Austrian Law to it (as they did it before).

Though Prussia (and it's allies) and Austria had a war some 50 years earlier, these two countries had much more in common than all the other European nations. Together they were very powerfull, also in a military perspective, but a two front war was not a prospective future. Because of all the alliences (made in better times) hope was that the Western Democracies would not intervene, but...

No country was ready for a war in 1912, and Wilhelm II was not a strategist, he was a foolish romanticus. However, the German General Staff worked like hell, in cooperation with the Austrians (not hampered by language) to work out concepts for war. But there was no iminent political reason yet, and the question is, if the murder on the Arch Duke Ferdinand was reason enough; it could have been regarded as another anarchist or seperatist action (there had been many like that). But the public (and the press) obviously felt strong enough for such an engagement, and politicians....

If war was a matter of military technicians only, there would have been less lives lost, and the world would benefit from it. But events take their turn...

[IrishGunner]

Odulf...an excellent summary of national interests of the time... And I agree with the key statement: "No country was ready for a war in 1912"

But your summary also proves my point. National interests were in competition long before 1914 and on a collision course. If the Continental Powers had been ready, my argument is that they would have in fact gone to war in 1912. They were willing - but not yet able for many reasons to which you allude. The conclusion to my supposition is this... Europe didn't rush headlong into war in August 1914, they had been preparing since 1912 - or even before, only waiting for the right moment. Because of this "willingness" in 1912 there is little that could have been done in this last year - 1913 - to prevent the inevitable. We can look at events over the next year - 2013 - to see if that supposition continues to hold any water - or were there opportunities in the next year to avoid the "inevitable."

I also really like that you mentioned Germany and Morocco. The Moroccan Crises - the first 1905-06 and the second in 1911 - are excellent examples of how the course towards war was set well before hand. The result of the First Moroccan Crisis 1905-06, in which Germany pushed Morocco's independence in hopes it would increase friction between France and Britain only did the reverse - sealing their deal on the 1904 Entente Cordiale - one of the alliances that left little room for maneuver in August 1914. In fact, both Germany and France moved toward mobilization in 1905 after the Kaiser visited Tangiers. Mobilization had already become a tactic in the diplomatic game of push and shove being played by the Great Powers. Germany's precipitation of the First Moroccan crisis then caused Russia and Britain to give up the "Great Game" and conclude the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. Trying again in 1911, this time with gunboat diplomacy, Germany precipitates the Agadir incident or the Second Moroccan Crisis by sending one a ship as a sign of "support" for the Sultan and his rebellion. Of course, the "Panthersprung" only further solidifies the other powers against Germany.

So, we see - the national interests you describe were long in play. And only served to increase the urge to find the "right moment for war." These little incidents prior to 1912-13, were not sufficient - and war was avoidable. But after the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, all pretense of "avoiding war" was gone - the will was now quite strong - they only needed to wait for the "right moment."

Edited January 6, 2013 by IrishGunner

[Odulf]

Thank you for your kind comments. To this I may add that the international military complex, an important factor for war, had developed very much since the Crimean War. The navies of seafaring nations had expanded and large units (battle ships) became the back bone of the large countries (Britain, USA, Russia, Germany). Normally countries had no use for these, if they had no colonies to protect and merchant fleets (carrying raw materials) to escort. Germany, as I pointed out before, had always been a "land nation", but with Bismarck out of the way, Wilhelm II wanted to boost the international respect for the newly shaped German Reich, and what was a nation without colonies? Alas, Germany was too late; all Third World territories were either well established independencies or colonies, protectorates or allies in a wider sense of Western nations. That was the reason why Germany was attracted by Morocco, the last independent bit of Africa. The Moroccan affair ended with an agreement, that Germany would not get Morocco, but as compensation it received other territories such as Togo, Cameroon, German East and West Africa, Tsing-Tau (on the northern shores of China) and some other crumbs from the great colonial pie. This was second best, but it satisfied the newly felt sense of being a world nation of the German politicians. Morocco went to the French and some other swaps were made in Northern Africa. Morocco, however, was an important and strategic place, at the mouth of the Mediterranean, and with huge resources of coal, to fuel (battle) ships. Coaling facilities became of strategic importance for sea faring nations, and without these a large battle fleet, as Wilhelm II wanted (like a toy), was useless. His naval aspirations were fed by his honorary rank in his grandmother's Royal Navy, and in a future war, a battle fleet was a need to cut off European countries from their resources overseas. So one may presume that the building of a serious navy was one of Germany's first steps on the road to a European war.

Also, other (heavy) weapons had been developed during the last half of the 19th century, such as great guns (with explosive shells) and machine guns, hand grenades, mortars. But also the tactics changed severely. Where the Crimean War was fought with principles dating back to Napoleonic times, the Boer War (not really an international war, but still an armed incident where observers from all nations learned lessons) and the Russo-Japanese War, made it clear that war would never be the same again. Not in the least, the supply and care of fighting troops was under construction; an important fact when a war was to be fought with specialist soldiers who were not easy expendable as the gun fodder from the past. The Russo-Japanese War had been an interesting experiment for the observers, as many tactics and tools were used, later to be seen in Europe, such as trenches, bunkers, mines and minefields, etc. All this crossed the minds of the German General Staff when they were preparing scenarios for a possible European War.

The Czar and his advisors had fought many battles on all fronts of the immense Russia, partly suppressing local uprising, but the 'tour de force' was gaining a harbor (Port Arthur), not to freeze over in winter, on the Pacific. This ambition was blocked by Japan, and a reason for war.

Since the naval action at Shimonoseki, in Japan, the empire was declared an open market for western nations to push modern technology and products of the technical revolution of the mid-19th century. Japan was quick to learn, and changed from isolanism to expansion; also in need for raw materials to feed the expanding industry. But Japan is far away from the Balkan, and not yet a factor in the future Great War.

The French and British staffs were mainly pondering defense tactics, and how to keep their territories, but also maintaining contact with the overseas territories and gaining fuels for the industry.

To summarize:

The balance of power in Europe was shifting rapidly, with the potent new Germany (fragmented before 1870, but united since), and the (military) German-Austrian pact, inclusive the tools and newly developed strategies, and the right reasons. Russia was casting a shadow over the Balkan; industrialization cried out for new raw materials (from the colonies) and safe roads to get these to the 'home lands'; world competition (due to industrialization) became imminent. The USA was present in international politics, but the size of the country and the self-supporting nature created an atmosphere of isolationism. However, American products of industry were pushed on the European and world markets; a European clash in the Balkan region was not regarded as a starter of something bigger, yet. But why wait for something better when a smoking gun is detected?

[IrishGunner]

But why wait for something better when a smoking gun is detected?

All good points, but I think you are getting ahead of the game. Indeed, that may have been what was missing in 1912-13 - a real or even fabricated Casus belli.

If something like Sarajevo 1914 had occurred during the 1912-13 Balkans Wars, perhaps that would have pushed the very willing Austrians and Germans into war - dragging along the Russians et al in defense of the Slavs etc etc. While the 1912-13 Balkans Wars showed there was growing willingness to go to war over national interests, there was yet to be a real or perceived threat to those interests for the Great Powers. Add in the fact that some parts of their military establishments didn't feel ready (insufficient naval or mobilization resources), the ground was fertile for war, the seeds had been long planted and had already germinated in 1912 - however the sprout would still take some time though to break the surface.

I think the atmosphere around the 1912-13 Balkans Wars was sufficient enough to give "fair" warning that a larger conflict was in the near future - but rather than the Great Powers taking steps to avoid it, I think we will see over the next 19 months, that they were indeed looking for the right moment to unveil the smoking gun.

Edited January 6, 2013 by IrishGunner

[Odulf]

The Balkan Wars of 1912/1913 had very much to do with the ridding of Turkish ruling over these territories. The local entilments were enflamed by local nationalists, Russia, religious sentiments and the general feeling to be done with the Turks. However, I feel that all international intentions involved did not want war, and the Balkan nations were solving out themselves; but a lamb had to be slaughtered to satisfy the Gods, and all were eager not to hand the knife.

The causes are many, but the reasons are to be discussed.

To my opinion, the Balkan incidents were local, and no reason for such a reaction. But perhaps (or not) this reaction was the spark to ignite the welcomed blast.

Serbia and other minor independencies in the region were solving their internal affairs, but the (Austrian/German) globalists did not believe in small states, they only accepted body and armor. And as these young nations did not apply to the general acceptances, they had to be consumed by old well established monarchies. In general (to my opinion) it was a clash between establishments. Why, did most of the European monarchies die, after the Great War? Because it showed the incapacity of the ruling Houses to lead nations. Since the defeat of Napoleon and the general revolts in Europe in 1848, and furthering on the fruits of the French Revolution, monarchies were bound to decline. An Emperor as general leader and leader of an army was overdue. The French lost their emperor, but were split in controversy, but still, since the mid-19th century, royal systems were proclaimed to be the best for new nations; that is why Rumania, Greece and other nations were proclaimed monarchies. Parliamentary democracy was the solution. European princes were established all over the newly found territories, and they did not poorly. They ran their countries well, but not well enough to the impatient established monarchies.

Monarchism and eclectisism (as a form of state) do not marry, not in the Balkans where the Turks ruled for centuries, in their capacity of supporting one and punishing the other, but revering when it came in useful. Thus, no reason for a World War, but preparations were set, and Russia, could not refrain from retaliation. The Turks were bound, so let's settle this before anything severe happens. When not, only Russia to deal with, albeit the treaties with France and England.

[IrishGunner]

Well, my friend, at the risk of over-dramatizing the event, today (8 Jan 1913) is the 100th anniversary of Serbia giving up its demand for access to the Adriatic, including the port of Durazzo (Durrës), at the London Peace Conference. And perhaps the only issue that might have sparked a broader war 19 months earlier than it actually did erupt.

The Albanian territories were claimed by Serbia in November 1912 after defeating the Turks at Kumanovo. At that time, Austria-Hungary actually mobilized three army corps in Galacia along the Russian border and three army corps near Serbia in order to put pressure on Belgrade to give up the territory and prevent Serbia from almost doubling in size. Tsar Nicholas II told his Council of Ministers that he wanted to mobilize three Russian army districts – Kiev, Warsaw, and Odessa – in response to the Austro-Hungarian mobilization. Whilhelm II gave assurances in Nov 1912 to Vienna that Germany would back-up Austria-Hungary; however, as pointed out above, the Imperial military convinced the Kaiser the time was not right for war in Dec 1912. Also in Nov 1912, French premier Raymond Poincare assured the Russian ambassador that France would back up Russia. As in Berlin, The Russian Council of Ministers convinced Nicky to back down, which some historians argue gave Vienna the impression that Moscow would give in easily to military intimidation, leading to perhaps a false confidence in August 1914. So, as also pointed out in the posts above, the other Great Powers were not ready for war at this point; Germany, France, and Britain successfully maneuvered the belligerents into the London Peace Conference. As part of the initial negotiations, the Great Powers pushed for creating an independent Albania rather than allowing Serbia to control the territory. We shall soon see that the armistice expires before concluding a peace treaty and hostilities will resume, but the biggest concern of the Great Powers - that is Austria-Hungary - is resolved; Albania will not be under Serb control.

One thing that I haven't read in any published history, is exactly why Serbia backed down on its demand for access to the Adriatic; historians only note that was their demand, that Austria-Hungary was willing to take military action to prevent this from happening, and that Belgrade gave up the demand at the London Peace Conference.

This is key I think to understanding why these first "Balkan incidents were local, and no reason for such a reaction" as war as my friend states above.

Stay tuned...

Edited January 9, 2013 by IrishGunner

[IrishGunner]

Despite Serbia giving up its demand for access to the Adriatic, 100 years ago today the London Peace Conference ended as the Balkan states and the Ottoman Empire were unable to reach an agreement in negotiations. Hostilities resumed.

Did this failure suggest that diplomatic efforts were not sufficient to avoid further conflict?

[paul wood]

The main reason that the Balkan wars did not escalate to global conflict was the fact that the Russians refused to back the Serbs carte blanche over Durazzo as a result the Serbs backed down. By the time of the Sarajevo incident the Russian government had lost its more moderating influences and were prepared to fully prepared to mobilize against Austria (and subsequently Germany), had this not been the case it is quite likely that the Serbs would have reluctantly accepted the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum (even clause 6). Bolstered by Russian support the Serb govermment under Pasic felt more confident that they could enter a major conflict, which although would initially mean abandoning Belgrade, would eventually pan out to their advantage and therefore would achieve the goal of the Serb nationalist movement of a greater unified Serbia.

Paul

[IrishGunner]

The main reason that the Balkan wars did not escalate to global conflict was the fact that the Russians refused to back the Serbs carte blanche over Durazzo as a result the Serbs backed down.

Ahh, excellent point, Paul. I had only read that Russia mobilized a few military districts during the First Balkan War in response to Austrian mobilization, but have not read that the Russians refused to back the Serbs over Durrës. That certainly would be sufficient to cause the Serbs to back down over that issue. No basis to push back against Great Power pressure.

How was this communicated by Moscow to Belgrade in early 1913?

As for Sarajevo; you are getting ahead of the game.

[Les]

"I think Britain never wanted war. But if the Brits had done proper analysis of the 1912-13 Balkans wars, they should have started preparing and by 1914 would have been in a different position."

There are several historial details suggesting Britain was not adverse to planning for a war with Germany as early as 1902, and there are historical facts suggesting thoughts about a war was seen differently by the British "senior" and "junior" services. There was planning and financial expenditures made by the two services, however, the British government itself did not have a unified outlook on how the navy and army together would be engaged in a potential European war.

The Anglo-Japanese agreements of 1902, and re-iterated in 1911, effectively allowed Britain to let the Japanese navy stand in for British interests in the northern Pacific, and to readjust British fleet disposition elsewhere (with a view towards building up the Home Fleet vis-a-vis German naval buildups).

Britain -always- maintained greater interests in having a large navy which takes much longer and requires far more money to build, and can't be done in the "two years" required to turn out an infantry-man. If you look at the naval arms expenditures among the European powers (and that includes Britain and the Empire), the "Fisher" and admiralty maxim of mainting a two to one supremacy over the combined strengths of the next two largest navies if they ever combined against Britain, suggests that Britain was not about to be unprepared in a sea-war.

Even in the matter of land wars after 1815, Britain's interests in the army were traditionally aimed at small armies and forces needed for colonial wars. There was a tendancy to think that European wars on the continent itself should be left to the states on the continent to do most of the actual land warfare while Britain kept watch on what she considered her primary interests...the sea lanes.

Henry Wilson, began planning for British participation in a possible European land-war, as early as 1906. In 1910 he became Director of Military Operations at the British War Office. Secret Anglo-French Staff talks had begun in 1906, but now gathered impetus in 1910, when Wilson became direcor of Military Ops at the War Office. Wilson advocated the landing of a British Expeditionary Force in France in case of German attack, and in July 1911 held secret talks with General Dubail (French Chief of Staff) and Adolphe Messimy (French War Minister). The French called the Expeditionary Force “l’Armee Wilson” although they seem to have been left with an inflated idea of the size of commitment which Britain would send.

Between 1906-1912, Wilson was a constant visitor to France and the low countries, studying potential routes for troop movements, consideration of where troops could be based/billeted/deployed, etc. The BEF plans put into effect in 1914, were not a spur of the moment plan, but the result of years of Wilson's considered planning and high-level talks with members of the French political and military establishments.

The underlying point here, is that it takes much more time and money to maintain and expand a traditional blue water navy if needed in a war against a rapidly expanding European naval rival, than an army, particularly if Britain can use and rely on other allied European armies to provide the ground forces. A trained infantryman might not be made over night, but then neither is a battleship and British military and political thinking at the time relied on British sea power to preserve the Empire, arguably more than the small number of Tommies in the pre-war establishment of 1902-1914.

[IrishGunner]

Les, thanks for your comment. That is a great run-down of how Britain was indeed "preparing for war."

As an old ground soldier, I'm certainly not a naval expert, but I've always wondered about the validity of the "naval arms race" as one of the base causes for the impending war. Germany had already decided in its War Council of Dec 1912, that it would take two more years before the German navy was ready for war; therefore - at least at this point in our history early 1913 - it was one of the reasons war did not break out over the Balkans. Certainly, the naval race caused tension between Britain and Germany, but I don't it guaranteed that war had to be inevitable. There is some evidence that as early as 1913, Germany had given up the idea that it could "compete" with Britain on the high seas and by mid-1914 Germany had shifted focus to building submarines in order to counter the effect the Royal Navy might have on Germany's ability to wage the "inevitable" land war.

[paul wood]

The main reason that the Balkan wars did not escalate to global conflict was the fact that the Russians refused to back the Serbs carte blanche over Durazzo as a result the Serbs backed down.

Ahh, excellent point, Paul. I had only read that Russia mobilized a few military districts during the First Balkan War in response to Austrian mobilization, but have not read that the Russians refused to back the Serbs over Durrës. That certainly would be sufficient to cause the Serbs to back down over that issue. No basis to push back against Great Power pressure.

How was this communicated by Moscow to Belgrade in early 1913?

As for Sarajevo; you are getting ahead of the game.

Via the Russsian ambasasador in Belgrade who's name escapes me but who had tremendous influence within Serb government circles and later managed to drop dead during the Sarajevo crisis. The diplomatic service (although everyone knew everyone elses cyphers) was very rapid and quite efficient. One has to also realise that at the beginning of 1913 Russia while favouring Serbia against Bulgaria had not decided to give up on Bulgaria totally which she had eighteen months later.

Paul

[Odulf]

Les, thanks for your comment. That is a great run-down of how Britain was indeed "preparing for war."

As an old ground soldier, I'm certainly not a naval expert, but I've always wondered about the validity of the "naval arms race" as one of the base causes for the impending war. Germany had already decided in its War Council of Dec 1912, that it would take two more years before the German navy was ready for war; therefore - at least at this point in our history early 1913 - it was one of the reasons war did not break out over the Balkans. Certainly, the naval race caused tension between Britain and Germany, but I don't it guaranteed that war had to be inevitable. There is some evidence that as early as 1913, Germany had given up the idea that it could "compete" with Britain on the high seas and by mid-1914 Germany had shifted focus to building submarines in order to counter the effect the Royal Navy might have on Germany's ability to wage the "inevitable" land war.

The question is: did Germny aspire a fleet before they actually had a use for it (colonies and support of merchant travel), or was it the opposite. If my memory serves me well, the Emperor (W2) wanted a fleet, and because the nation could afford it, he was served. But without any purpose, this fleet was just a toy to puddle. So, he needed overseas territories, and that's how the balloon got up.

In practice, in the (late) 19th century, nations with a shore more or less leeded an outward defense of their shores. Either by mines/mine sweeping, to guard river entrances or islands off the coast. visgery protedtion, but in general these were no large units or gun-platforms. Germany, inspired by the RN and flamed by the Emperot wanted a large fleet...., for future purposes. For what or whom? There was a Naval balance, but these German aspects did tip the balance, and so a naval weapons race was entertained as other sea faring nations felt the need to show their price cocks (?!). The Ottomans orderes batte ships in England (most to be taken in RN service), but also Russia, Japan and others joined this race of naval prestege.

But, what is the use of maintaining such expensive military units without use? And how to test these, in combat? The money most colonial nations spent on armies was little compared to the spenditure on navies, and all for (good) reasons, to little use. Also the politicians, in firm trust in their "walls of steel" supported the navies (because funding a well established navy was considered cheaper than keeping and maintaining a ground army.

Leaping ahead of the discussion, with the academical question: how would the Great War have ended without the war at sea, and how important was the sea regarded in the general concepts of a European war in 1913? How well established were the connections between the Admiralties and the General Staffs, and was there any coordination/liason or were these only seperate tools of the Secretary of War?

[IrishGunner]

So, it seems these discussions lean towards the idea that the circumstances surrounding the Balkan Wars may have been simply "local quarrels." Nonetheless, these events certainly would have an impact on the course of events over the next year. One event that many might forget was connected to the Balkan Wars was the rise of the Young Turks.

The multiple military defeats in the First Balkan weakened the Turkish Government and gave Enver Bey the chance to lead a coup in late January 1913. Enver Pasha established a military dictatorship and unilaterally established the alliance with Germany - which set the stage for Gallipoli and the Salonkia Front in WWI. And in the inter-war years, Enver Pasha's relationship with Reichswehr Chief-of-Staff Hans von Seeckt, led to a secret mission to the Soviet Union, which led to secret training arrangements for the German military to avoid the Versailles restrictions. (Coincidentally, the subject of one of my major Masters degree research projects.)

The Young Turks also were the origin of the Turkish military's long-standing image of itself as the protector of Turkey - leading to several modern coups. This has only been recently subdued as several Turkish generals have now been arrested for abuse of power.

So... While the Balkan Wars may have been local quarrels, they deserve study - and I think are the real starting point for the events that lead us to August 1914.

Edited January 27, 2013 by IrishGunner

[paul wood]

If circumstances, especially the the warlike policies of Poincare and post 1913 Russia, had not conspired to cause Sarajevo to escalate into global conflict. Sarajevo would have become (and very nearly did) the 3rd Balkan War and had that been the case, it would have been little more than an incident in 20th century history which apart from a few people specifically interested in Balkan history would have merited little study, like the 2nd Balkan war it would have gone into the sideshow shelf. While there is a lot of good points made in the previous post one should be careful of looking at events with a hindsight which the protoagonists of the time did not possess.

All the best,

Paul

[IrishGunner]

one should be careful of looking at events with a hindsight which the protoagonists of the time did not possess.

Isn't that what "historical research" is all about?

[paul wood]

From my point of view I would respectfully agree to differ. When I am researching an historical event I attempt to strip away the veneer of interpretations placed at a later time and try and see events as they were viewed at the time, surprisingly I often find it makes more sense of the later events than current interpretatons. While later events are bound to creep in ones thoughts it is often instructive to try and eliminate them and get back to the time of the event

There are many schools of historical thought (just as each religion has its miriad of sects) and they all have their followers and validity and there are those who would disagree with my views wholeheartedly.

If you ever get bored and want a really good belly laugh, many years ago there was a (spoof) critique of Winnie the Pooh. The Christian and Marxist interpretations are a real scream, alas I don't have it any more, like many books I owned I lent it to some one many years ago and that was the last I ever saw of it.

If any one can locate it I would love to read it again.

All the best,

Paul

[IrishGunner]

From my point of view I would respectfully agree to differ. When I am researching an historical event I attempt to strip away the veneer of interpretations placed at a later time and try and see events as they were viewed at the time, surprisingly I often find it makes more sense of the later events than current interpretatons. While later events are bound to creep in ones thoughts it is often instructive to try and eliminate them and get back to the time of the event

There are many schools of historical thought (just as each religion has its miriad of sects) and they all have their followers and validity and there are those who would disagree with my views wholeheartedly.

If you ever get bored and want a really good belly laugh, many years ago there was a (spoof) critique of Winnie the Pooh. The Christian and Marxist interpretations are a real scream, alas I don't have it any more, like many books I owned I lent it to some one many years ago and that was the last I ever saw of it.

If any one can locate it I would love to read it again.

All the best,

Paul

Paul, I appreciate your perspective; it's a very worthwhile approach. But with all due respect, even your "attempt to strip away the veneer of interpretations placed at a later time" is nothing more than your own interpretation. Unless we have actually participated or witnessed first-hand an event, it's merely "interpretation" no matter what attempt we make to be "purely" objective.

While you may not agree; actually, I'm advocating your approach with this thread. Conventional historical interpretations put little importance on the Balkan Wars. I am arguing, even if in a feeble way, that the facts suggest something more... That Europe did not just "stumble" into war in August 1914; that events surrounding the Balkan Wars show that some powers were already contemplating war...and that circumstances surrounding the Balkan Wars were more than a sideshow, but rather essential tinder to the ultimate conflaguration.

I realize your view on this may be different - as others have argued above as well; however, I'm curious about your statement regarding Poincare. In keeping with the timeline (I'm trying to not jump ahead chronologically - we have a lot of ground to cover before the Guns of August); Poincare was Prime Minister, but was elected French President on 17 January 1913. What are your views of his policies in 1913 that put Europe on the course to war?

Edited January 29, 2013 by IrishGunner

[paul wood]

Thanks for your kind your reply. Poincare was prime minister a year prior (1912 (a great year my father was born then)). He was strongly anti German and was very supportive of Joffre and the French military in planning for a future conflict with them (althought military assumption were based on a conflict occuring in 1916 or 17). While prime minister and later president he was a very strong supporter of the Russian alliance (and through various methods of bullying was able to get the Quai d' Orsay on board). I believe Russia would have been less likely to have so actively pursued the policies they did post 2nd Balkan war they had not had the full backing of the French government. Poincares visit to France in July 1914 was the final stamp of approval. If you want an amusing read the French ambassador to Russia, Palaeologue's memoirs, which although somewhat egocentric give a flavour of events of Poincare's visit.

Paul

[paja]

The main reason that the Balkan wars did not escalate to global conflict was the fact that the Russians refused to back the Serbs carte blanche over Durazzo as a result the Serbs backed down. By the time of the Sarajevo incident the Russian government had lost its more moderating influences and were prepared to fully prepared to mobilize against Austria (and subsequently Germany), had this not been the case it is quite likely that the Serbs would have reluctantly accepted the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum (even clause 6). Bolstered by Russian support the Serb govermment under Pasic felt more confident that they could enter a major conflict, which although would initially mean abandoning Belgrade, would eventually pan out to their advantage and therefore would achieve the goal of the Serb nationalist movement of a greater unified Serbia.

Paul

Greetings Gentlemen,

I have just recently saw this topic. Very interesting material, I have read some of the details here for the first time and for that I am thankful.

I do not have such a great knowledge like other participants in this discussion when it comes to a broader picture but couple of things that Paul wrote attracted my attention. I believe Serbia tried to do everything possible to avoid conflict with Austria. Ultimatum had ten points, lot of them were very hard and humiliating for an independent state, not only the fifth one. Their demands were deliberately formulated that way because they knew there was no chance that one state could accept them. I believe that the British Foreign Secretary said that it was the hardest ultimatum ever to be given to one state by another. But in spite of that Serbian government agreed to accept nine points, only one was rejected, with hopes that that would be enough to satisfy Austrians and thus avoid war. One more fact is very important here, Serbia just ended two wars, one more so quickly after that was surely not desirable. On the other hand with Austrians so eager to punish and destroy Serbia I believe that even if the complete ultimatum was accepted they would have found another excuse to start the war. When it comes to a Greater Serbia in December of 1914, Assembly adopted Nish Declaration, where Serbian war goals where proclaimed. Primal goal was to liberate and unify in one state all of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians, so not creation of a Greater Serbia but of Yugoslavia. Personally I believe that that was one of the biggest mistakes, I always thought that a smaller Serbia was a better solution than a bigger Yugoslavia. But who knows what would then have happen with Croats and Slovenians, territory they inhabited would have probably been divided between Italy, Austria and Hungary. But enough with that I'm going off topic.

Some time ago I have read an article saying that in the period between 1910-1914 military budgets were increased in some cases drastically. British and French around 10 percent but Russian around 40, and German above 70!

Kind regards,

Radmilo

[IrishGunner]

Some time ago I have read an article saying that in the period between 1910-1914 military budgets were increased in some cases drastically. British and French around 10 percent but Russian around 40, and German above 70!

A study of military budgets during the period you suggest would be a very interesting article...

[paul wood]

Radmilo, thank you for your most interesting comments and observations. While I think you maybe right that Austria would have found some other way to attack Serbia had they agreed to all 10 points, I suspect there would have been an interim period before Austria may have "organised" an incident which would have given them the excuse to say that while the Serbs have agreed to the ultimatum they had no intention of carry out the provisions.

Paul