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    IrishGunner

    Old Contemptible
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    Everything posted by IrishGunner

    1. Even more coincidentally, the article on occupation of Germany after WWI in "Army History" journal is followed by one titled: "Neutralizing the Hard Centre of German Militarism: US Military Government and the Wehrmacht's Elite Officers, 1945-1948". In this article it states: "In March 1946, a new denazification law took effect in the US Zone of Occupation. Promulgated by German leaders but substantially influenced by American military government officials, the new law significantly changed the approach to denazification in the zone. Where previously American authorities had interned German civilians or removed them from influential positions largely on the basis of their membership in various Nazi Party organizations, the new law gave the Germans themselves primary responsibility for denazification... The new law placed less emphasis on excluding Nazis from German political and social life and more on evaluating, punishing, and rehabilitating individuals." The article continues: "In the meantime, American and German reeducation initiatives had worked on the minds of the German people, and a dialogue on German history, the war, and the Wehrmacht had unfolded free of the voices of the many officers most passionately condemned by the Allies, and, it might be added, by their fellow citizens. Political leadership patterns were also established while they were unable to negatively influence German political life to the extent they had in the past. Finally, American decisions ensured that when these officers (former high-ranking Wehrmacht generals and staff officers) did return home, they were reintegrated into German society and faced few lasting sanctions. In the end, the absence of tight controls may have well avoided creating a pool of aggrieved outsiders and so best served American interests. German veterans already felt defamed and abused, and the extent of pension activism suggests the stronger measures might have incited even more dangerous resentment and agitation." Two very different approaches between post-WWI treatment of Germany (punish only) and post-WWII treatment of Germany (punish and rehabilitation). You tell me which one was more successful.
    2. Exactly, Doc. And the efforts of the allies, the French especially, exacerbated all those points. Coincidentally, there's an article in this month's issue of "Army History" about the US Army's occupation of Germany - specifically Koblenz - that alludes to these exact points. Since it's an official publication of the US Army Center of Military History, this journal tends to avoid being "controversial" - almost to the point of being "ahistorical" in my opinion, but I digress. The article states in its first paragraph: "The cities slated for Allied occupation on that river (the Rhein) appeared susceptible, prior to the victors' arrival, to the armed, angry stragglers and deserters from the German Army and Navy, as well as a variety of Bolsheviks, Spartacists, and other highly publicized labor organizers who were provoking violence elsewhere in Germany. Indeed, the lack of clear political authority caused by the abdication of the Kaiser and the collapse of the German Army at the end of World War I would lead to outbreaks of revolutionary violence in urban areas across Germany." While the US occupation maintained order in the narrow areas it occupied; the French exacted "revenge" in their areas. There was no effort to establish a lasting political structure of law and order as there was after WWII. We failed in 1918-23 because we didn't have a wide ranging plan to re-establish Germany as a responsible member of the international community; we either kept the lid on until we could extract (the US) or punished (the French) - with catastrophic results.
    3. Doc - thanks for sharing. And welcome to the GMIC!
    4. Ironically, I had the pleasure of being questioned by a lovely lady Carabinieri in a beret with just such a badge at a checkpoint in Bosnia some years ago; to paraphrase Chris B from another thread, I would have gladly followed her in handcuffs. :whistle:
    5. Brain, your example is probably a beret badge; but I thought the lady officers were better representatives of the Carabinieri than these two fellows in berets.
    6. I have always wondered what exactly were the contents of these tins? A pencil for 40 quid! :speechless:
    7. While "killing time" in the Vienna airport (gotta love free internet wifi access!), I did a few Google searches on our friend - nothing conclusive came to my notice. However, I did read several threads in some martial arts forums about this fellow; they were all doubting his fighting arts creds. My vote remains: charlatan
    8. Back in Yerevan - long trip

    9. Passing time in the Vienna airport, I went back to see what I could find on the internet regarding this battle. Not a lot to be found. Most sites cite excerpts from Michael Howard's book on the Franco-Prussian War. Fortunately, I have this book in my library back home; unfortunately, it's back home and I'll have to wait until December to pull it from the shelf. But von Bredow's epitaph: "It will cost what it will" rings strangely true for another book I'm currently reading on Stalingrad. Thanks again for bringing this battle to our attention.
    10. Dober dan! Welcome to the forum djn - if your modest collection includes this order, perhaps it's not so modest. PS: I lived in Ljubljana for three years - maybe you can help me brush up on my Slovene language!
    11. Whatever the truth, it sounds like an interesting story. Bob, for certain there is an interesting story here - and maybe an original kernel of truth or two. But I sincerely doubt this fellow was officially in the US Special Forces - his insignia and ribbons are completely bogus in this regard; IMHO. He may have associated with a few and maybe even taught martial arts to a few. But I've known many old Green Berets in my day and the way he's wearing "stuff" just doesn't ring true.
    12. If it looks too good to be true, it probably isn't true. :whistle:
    13. Long lay-over in Wien; should have re-booked my tix and spent the weekend

    14. Thanks for sharing Chris. I'm amazed at how many rare items are shared for knowledge on this forum. Curious question for those that frequent other militaria forums as well... Is GMIC unique in showing these type rarities?
    15. Heading back to Yerevan in a few hours

    16. Bob - care to share just who is Tetyana? :-)

    17. Actually, the law is the same for the President as it is for all government employees and military service members. One may accept a foreign award, but it is the property of the US Government until you make an official request to wear the decoration. This is how US military are allowed to wear foreign decorations. Ethics laws also limit to dollar value of a gift that an executive branch employee may receive. The rules are different for Congress (no surprise there!). As mentioned by JBFloyd, Reagan received an honorary Order of the Bath. So, did George Bush - the father. I wouldn't be surprised to see that Roosevelt received something from the King; will have to do a Google on that one. George Bush - the son - was decorated by Afghan President Karzai.
    18. Ahh, I have to read about this some more - thanks for the heads-up! And great medal! :cheers:
    19. But I defy anyone here, with 90 years of 20/20 hindsight, even now, to suggest a better, workable solution. It is all very well to tear something up, but it is of no use unless you can offer (even now 90 years later) a viable alternative. I have offered the proven viable alternative - dozens of times - and it was never the 14 Points. Well, okay, I think the first 3 Points are a good starting point. It is a solution based on the same principles applied in post-WWII Europe - with great success - maybe too much success if you ask this American (since we rebuilt and protected your continent). A solution that looked to rebuild - all of Europe - and not simply tear down Germany as punishment - that left no power vacuum (and seeds of volatile discontent) - that brought Germany into the community of nations - rather than excommunicating her to oblivion. One that had peace as it's objective, not punishment. This was the post-WWII solution that was successful. I defy you to argue with success of the post-WWII peace. And I defy you to argue why that isn't a viable solution in 1918. And don't try to say it would have never worked in 1918; it surely would have had a better chance the the solution they chose. If Britain and France wanted to go a different route, they would have - but they didn't want to do that. Oh, which led many Americans to prefer isolationism rather than become entangled in another European war and perhaps also became a factor that made German revanche and war inevitable. I completely fail to see how you believe the 1918 solution had any positive points...
    20. Agreed as far as the Kaiser part is concerned; but the real point of Churchill's statement is about a political power vacuum. We could remove the Kaiser - or let the Germans do it - but it should have been done under different circumstances - stable circumstances - rather than in a volatile political power vacuum.
    21. So, using this argument - and assuming you agree that the United States had a lesser part to play in causing these two wars - why did the Allies of WWII impose crippling reparations on Germany in 1945? As you argue, it was all Germany's fault; so, Germany should foot the bill. But that's not what happened. Why should the United States foot the bill for the Marshall Plan and the next 60 years after wards to rebuild Europe. It wasn't our fault. Why? Because it was in our interests to be more magnanimous and prevent the rotten apple of 1918 - also known as the Versailles Treaty - from being repeated. Instead we made some fairly nice orange juice - which has nourished Europe ever since. It's not comparing apples and oranges; Germany lost both wars and using your argument that it was all Germany's fault. Same fruit salad it seems to me. The difference is that we learned the lesson of spoiled fruit and didn't repeat the same mistake in the peace. There were no radical parties in 1945 because they were banned (and still are) in Germany - the lesson of the inter-war years was learned. That's the point here... We didn't repeat the same mistakes of 1918; therefore, the post-WWII peace was lasting. If they had applied the same principles in 1918, who knows what the world would be like today. I don't think anyone is saying that Germany didn't have guilt in 1918; but responsible adult behavior by the allies would have given peace a better chance. No guarantees, but surely a better chance. The post-WWII revival of Europe shows what can be achieved if the victors don't rape the loser.
    22. As you say, let me make something clear; I never said Germany shouldn't have paid. My argument is that all sides had a hand in starting the war and all sides should have taken responsibility for making sure the peace was lasting. The allies argument was it was all Germany's fault - I fail to see how you can think that is a constructive argument in international diplomacy. It just doesn't work that way...
    23. Did Chris surrender?

    24. Well, it would have made no difference as long as the Europeans - mainly France - still had insisted upon crippling reparations. Wilson caved to European pressure on most points in order to save his idea of the League of Nations - which was a still born baby as well. This ideal was adopted, but never was given serious due; because the allies never wanted anything more than short-sighted punishment. Also, if Point #1 had been interpreted to mean that Germany actually could have negotiated its terms, then it is possible there could have been a difference. The issue is not whether the 14 Pts were a better alternative as a treaty, but they were meant to be the basis for achieving a "peace without victory". They offered the hope of a magnanimous settlement; if the allies adopted the spirit of the 14 Pts as the true basis for the peace, then it could have made a difference. It was the spirit of the Pts that mattered - not the points themselves.
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