Les

The conventional date for the start of the Armenian holocaust is 24 April 1915, or exactly one hundred years ago today. It's remarkable that despite the historical evidence and documentation of what happened, there are people who claim it never happened, and it does not appear in some national history books.

Brian, I'd like to add a little bit that was not included in your very good overview. During the summer of 1940, the French military collapsed and a Franco-German treaty divided France into an occupied zone, and unoccupied zone with a government in Vichy. One of Churchill's first actions was to order a military strike against the French fleet, to prevent it from potentially falling into German hands. The British attack on the fleet at Mers el Kebir in French Algeria on July 3, 1940 resulted in roughly 1200 French sailors being killed, and the fleet put out of action. In Cairo, elements of the French fleet were given the option of surrendering, or being interned. The French admiral in charge opted for the later. The attack on the French fleet is controversial, and soured relations with the Vichy government, and the government in exile in London. The bitterness of the French lasted well into the post-war years. From the British point of view, Churchill acted to prevent a potential threat, and "to hell with the consequences" and demonstrated he was intent on carrying on the war, even without the backing of the French in any form. The Germans used the attack against a "non-belligerent" to paint Churchill and the British war effort as ruthless, particularly with other countries who might accept the point of view that the Germans were not alone in invading neutrals, particularly after the British pre-emptive occupation of Greenland and Iceland, and the failed attempt to beat the Germans in invadiermng Norway. Contra the comment above, about Romania being in "German hands", that's not correct. There was British support for Greece and Romania, before the war, however, that support was not all it was said to be. The Germans and Russians prior to the German invasion of Russia, quietly agreed to Russian claims on parts of Romania. When Stalin acted against the Romanians, that led to the fall of the Romanian government, and the rise of Antonescu and the Iron Guard, with a decided shift of Romanian support to Germany. Despite the prewar claims of British support for Romania if it were attacked, there was no forthcoming declaration of war by Britain against Russia. (The same thing happened when Russia invaded eastern Poland in 1939; the British and French declarations of war were strictly limited to Germany, and not it's co-aggressor against Poland.)Romanian willingly became an ally of Germany, and was not a conquered or occupied state. When Germany invaded Russia in 1941, the Romanian army fully supported the German war effort in the invasion, and supplied troops until the Red Army overran Romania in 1945. Please don't take any of this at nit-picking, because it isn't meant as such. At times, situations can be complicated, and a general statement can often give an impression that's not entirely on.

I have the same colored case for the GMVK that Wild Card shows. ​The RAO and GMVK cases from the GOK are the same size, and both medals fit comfortably in the same boxes. There were thousands of RAO's awarded during the Imperial era, and not all that many GMVK's during the war years. Pre- and early war,, there may have been a color distinction to know by sight, what was inside. I strongly suspect the cases made late in the war might have been interchangeable for BOTH awards. Cheaply made wartime cases that fell apart after the war may have been replaced with another case that fit, regardless of the color it was originally in. Many people take the view that if something works, then use it.

Eric, you're quite right about Singer developing a commercial zig-zag machine in the early 1890's, but those machines were made for stitching zig-zags only, not being able to do both. The dual purpose commercial machines came about after the war, and the development of home-use sewing machines that could do both (without having to use an attachment) and were affordable to the general public, was introduced after WWII. Along those lines, the date something is patented or produced for the first time, isn't necessarily an indication of when it made it's way into common use. (Humor only: the first time atomic weapons were made was in 1945, but that doesn't mean everyone has them and uses them routinely to make holes in the ground.) Look at how Chips cover was made. ALL of the seams are tucked and folded over, then sewn down with a straight stitch leaving no raw edges. Any machine that sews only a straight stitch line could do this. My Austrian cover was done exactly the same way. Eric, now look at your cover. The seams along the center of the cover, are folded out, then left raw edged without being sewn down. There is nothing wrong with this way of sewing, and saves time. Now, look at Dante's cover and we see there two types of stitching methods used, that require two different types of machine types, when a straight stitch made could have been used by its' own, to do everything, without using zig-zagging at all. Zig-zagging takes longer than straight-stitching, and is not necessary to produce a finished seam.

Check the way the seams are finished. These were machined using a zigzag process, which was not typical of how garments were sewn and finished during prior to the end of WWI. Industrial sewing machines developed between the wars were capable of doing this, and only after WWII did home-use machines have that capability.

Eric, yes, that is the one I was yapping about. Although Baer's comments on the page below suggest the helmet and cover are both German, they aren't and the helmet along with the cover are actually Austrian. There are stains and wear marks on the cover that match up with rust or wear marks on the helmet underneath. Both were together for a very long time. Unlike the coarser material used on German covers, the cover in the photo is not unlike polished cotton.

The rule of thumb on these is that Austrian covers use a draw-string, while issued German ones are held on the Stahlhelm with small metal hooks. Austrian covers were not brown, but originally died a light green, and over time the vegetable dies faded out to a light brown-tan. (I owned the one in Baer's book and was examined it very closely: traces of orginal color could still be seen in the seams, and the stains on the cover matched rust spots on the exterior of the helmet.) Also, the material, weave, draw-tape instead of cordage, and a few other details aren't right for an Austrian cover. German field made? The machine stitching suggests that cover was not made in the field. IMO? Fu'gedatboutit.

Brian, The article notes the primary focus of the investigation at Hougomont, not the rest of Waterloo, is to locate "graves." It is already known from contemporary accounts, the bodies at the Hougomont compound were collected, stripped, and burned to the immediate south of the farmstead's walls. There is also an 1817 litho of stripped corpses and wood being piled up there, in preparation for burning. Later the same spot was used as the farmsteads compost heap. After the cremation process, not all of the large and dense bones are going to be reduced to ash. There would be many small fragments remaining, and later composting would turn the underlying soil into a very organic rich (not acidic at all) soil that would have been spread over fields as fertilizer. None of this is conducive to finding "graves" although it should be easy enough to locate the cremation site seen in the 1817 litho with the farm building in the immediate background, and from the presence of high concentrations of human collagens (and other related compounds) that leached into the underlying soil. In many ways, we already know what happened, and that raises questions of what is the underling need to know "what." Are the investigators aware of those contemporary accounts? I don't know. I wonder if there's a really some need to know, or a desire to drum up p-r, in the days leading up to the 200th anniversary?

I have mixed feelings about "conflict archaeology." Archaeology is a destructive approach to investigating the past, and when something is dug up, any details not noted or written down, are gone forever. Current approaches to digging is to have questions in mind before taking something out of the ground, instead of a "dig it up" and see what comes out of the ground approach. Unless the site is threatened, or there are important questions that can be answered, the current trend in archaeological thinking is to leave sites alone, because once they've been dug up the evidence is gone. The analogy of a crime scene being cleaned up, and coming back later for other questions comes to mind. The article doesn't say why the farmhouse location is being excavated, and if it's necessary at all. Mervyn, the "we won" comment always makes me smile. Lord Chalfont wrote a book on Waterloo, dealing with how the French, British and Germans have written about the battle. It's an interesting read, because each of the three nationalities see the battle very differently. On the Allied side, the "British" componesnt of 25,000 men (and another 6,000 for the KGL), compromised a little less than half of the Dutch (17,000), Hannoverian (11,000), Brunswick (6,000) and Nassauers (3,000) under Wellington's command. Then there's the Prussians under Blucher who arrived late in the day adding another 50,000 men against the 73,000 Frenchmen who were there. So, the "we" is due to quite a lot of people who were not British... ;-) I was seriously tempted to go to the events for the 200th, but decided there were more pressing reasons to not go and get some long overdue things worked on. I have a direct ancestor who was a member of the 4th Westphalian Landwehr that fought at Ligny the day before Waterloo, and arrived with the Prussian I Corps (4th Brigade) towards the end of the day, and then took part in the pursuit. He was proud enough of what his part in the War of Liberation that it was recorded in his local church's records, and also inscribed on his tombstone. Peter, Mervyn is right, take lots of pictures!

The topic of Churchill and the air war, is being relevant to the commemorations in Dreden today and tommorrow on the 70th anniversary of the 13/14th Feb 1945 area/carpet bombing there, the resulting firestorm and civilian death toll. There is a fair amount of controversy regarding the raid, and Churchill's part in it. I'm not trying to divert the subject at hand, or engage in that controversy, only to note there is a link between the topic at hand and Dresden, and a rememberance being conducted today and tommorrow.

"For many in our generations Churchill was an important part of our lives; what would current events have been without him." I can think of several things that Churchill's participation in events had very negative consequences. In the fall of 1914, Churchill ordered the seizure of two battleships being built for the Turkish government. That seizure led to howls of outrage in Turkey, and ultimately was one of the reasons the Tukish government decided to enter WWI on the side of Germany. It's quite possible if Churchill had not ordered the seizure of the two ships, Turkey might not have entered the war and stayed neutral. Without the Turkish involvement in WWI the history of the Middle East since 1914 would have been very different. The breakup of the Ottoman Empire might have worked out on internal lines, rather than the externally imposed treaty terms that have complicated the history of the region since the treaty of Sevres in 1920. At Yalta in the closing days of WWII, Churchill's acquiensce to Stalin's demands regarding all of eastern Europe provided Greece was left alone, resulted in communist rule in all of the territories over-run by the Red Army, between 1945-ca 1990. Churchill had a huge effect on milllions of people in eastern Europe and not one that's well liked by people who lived there between 1945-ca 1990. That's the short list of major blunders....

Dealers can and do ask INFLATED prices. The real indicator of value are the prices collectors are willing to pay. Perhaps the real question is, what are you willing to pay for items this year, as opposed to a year or two ago?

Pre-war a huge amount of Germany's deamd for leather came from Argentina in the form of dried cowhides. Once the RN blockade started those shipments stopped.

Technically speaking, the war didn't stop until the Versailles Treaty was signed in 1919. While the German armies pulled back to pre-war boundaries, the Royal Navy blockade continued in full force and prevented all shipments of food, medicine and other supplies (both military and civilian items) from being sent to Germany, or German merchant ships from getting in/out. During the continued blockade, a state of war technically existed, and the result of the blockade itself resulted in a civilian deaths from lack of adequate food and medical supplies that adversely affected the young and old. Add the Spanish flu to that mix and you get a higher death rate than would have been otherwise. Although no bullets, artillery rounds, or similar weapons were being fired on either side, make no mistake about the effects of the blockade levied and still in force against the entire German population. These deaths are harder to pinpoint and put names to faces, places and dates, however they are still deaths due to the blockade (and the war) that was still in effect until the summer of 1919.

Mark, The Germans were aware there was a spy working within the Austrian system, and passed on their concerns to Max Ronge, head of the "Evidenzbureau" (Austro-Hungarian counter-intell). Ronge was trained by Redl, and when Redl went to Prague, took over Redl's position and was head of the bureau. Ronge conducted his investigation internally, without German "leg work." The investigation, on Austrian territory, fell under Austrian jurisdiction, not German. Saying the Germans "helped" needs to be considered in that light, and not overstated. Once Redl was exposed, the Austrians attempted to conceal as much as they could from the Germans. Redl's death before he could be interrogated, made it difficult for the Austrians to determine exactly what the Russians had learned. The Austrians knew their own war plans had been handed over to the Russians (plans for an invasion of Serbia in the event of a war and with plans to various frontier fortess such as Prezymsl) while knowing that openly changing them would raise questions with their German counterparts. Robert Asprey, among other books, wrote "The Panther's Feast" which is a semi-fictionalized novel about Redl and his life. The original version was a matter of fact telling of events, which the publisher decided to spice up in order to enhance sales. Asprey earlier in his life, worked in Austria for several years, and came to know Max Ronge quite well and he drew on what he was told. In the years before the start of WWI, Redl's case officer worked out of the Russian intell office in Warsaw. In August 1915, German troops captured Warsaw, and when they examined case files, they learned about Redl and much of what he did for the Russians. It's been a while since I read "The Panther's Feast" and don't have access to my copy, he says the Russians apparently had details of the Schlieffen Plan. I'll look for my copy and see if I can find the exact page and quote. Exactly where the Russians got that information could be argued as being passed on by the French who acquired a version of the plan circa 1905. Alternatively, they could have been given that information by Redl before 1912. Co-incentally or not, the Russians changed their war plans against Germany about the same time. The Russians developed two war plans known as Plan G and Plan A (also called plan 19). The Russians saw two possible alternatives. Plan G entailed a massive German invasion. The reponse was the traditional Russian strategy of sacrificing border territory and withdrawing into the vastness of Russia buying time to mobilize a huge conscript force. Thus using this force, the German army with streached supply lines and facing the severe winter weather could be defeated like Napoleon's Grand Armee. The initial Russian version of Plan A theorized the German attack west and called for only minor Russian actions in the East. The French pressured the Russians to adopt a more aggressive strategy. The modified version of Plan A is known as Plan 19. General Danilov conceived of Plan 19 (1910). It was further modified in 1912, involving a Russian offensive drive into East Prussia and Silesia to prevent the Germans from focusing its forces on France. The Russian decision to change war plans would have been based on gathering on a wide range of intell, and would definitely include estimations of German and Austrian capabilities and assumed intentions. In simple terms, changing plans would have meant a decision was made that one response was outdated, inadequate, various things had changed or were about to, and so on. Co-incidence?

I spent some time in central and east Africa doing surveys and inspections, and from personal experience know how difficult it can be to get to some of the battlefields there. Roads and transportation spring to mind for most people, but there's other matters. If you're not in towns or villages, the environment can be hostile (wild game, exposure to various diseases), locals wondering what a "mzungu" (or white man) is doing walking around on his own, armed poachers, political instability, etc. Ah...the good old days. ;-) The Livingstone Museum in Zambia was at one time, the main museum in the country that was once known as Northern Rhodesia. After Zambian Independence in 1964, some of the old white settler families began leaving, and frequently donated items to the museum. One of the rooms had a small display of items associated with the former Northern Rhodesian regiment. In the center of the room and accessible to the public, was a M08 Maxim that was taken from the Koenigsberg in 1915. It was used by Lettow-Vorbecks men until they surrendered it on November 25, 1918, taken home by a NR farmer, and donated to the museum. I have a very vivid recollection of putting both hands on the grips and thinking about where it had been. The East African campaign won't be forgotten by me.

Herwig's ideas are interesting, however, they are still part of the current mainstream of thought since Fischer. Fischer, Herwig and others who have combed through German sources have pointed out documents are missing, diaries and personal accounts have been slanted, etc. There's no denying that happened, however, the Germans weren't the only people practicing the fine art of "C.Y.A." The Marne tends to get considerable attention for many reasons, and it overshadows what was going on in the east at the same time. It's important to always remember the war was a multifaceted coalition war fought on many fronts, with each of the various powers fighting with their own national interests always in mind. Many western historians who read German, may not read Russian, and very few westerners have had the same level of access to Russian sources as they've had to German archives. If you want an interesting take on what was going on from the Russian side of matters, take a look at: http://www.amazon.com/The-Russian-Origins-First-World/dp/0674062108 This book, published in 2011, challenges the way most western historians see the causal factors leading up to the war. I am not personally saying he is right or wrong, or blaming Russia and a very small coterie of Russian leaders for starting the war. As an aside, one of the not so insignificant matters that was part of the military and political miscalculations, was the espionage of the Austrian Oberst Redl, who committed suicide in 1912, after he learned he was about to be arrested by the Austrians after they discovered he had been spying for the Russians for many years. Redl had given the Russians a wide range of Austrian and Germany military documents, including the Schlieffen plan almost in it's entirety. The Austrian government and military aware of the security breach, never informed the Germans, and pretended nothing had happened. The Germans never found out about the security breach until 1915, when Russian documents in Warsaw were found that detailed the degree of espionage that had taken place. The Russians aware of Austro-German plans, knew how the German and Austrian armies would react if there was a continental war. This places the matter of mobilization vis-a-vis the Germans, Russians, and Austrians in a different light than usually argued.This means Russian mobilization was a an act that Germans could not ignore as anything other than a very real threat, existential or otherwise and could not be allowed to continue. Without trying to dredge up a fruitless discussion/debate/argument regarding origins of the war, remember, this post is another suggestion of where to get an interesting take on causes leading up to the war, and one based on recent historical studies using sources that most western historians have not used.

Available to read on-line, and searchable: http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015008245980;view=1up;seq=2

These were originally published shortly after the war, and are now in the public domain. These are stil useful to have, and can be downloaded free and legally for your own use. 1919-1920 Michelin Guides to the Battlefields (available on Archive.Org) Michelin Marne http://www.archive.org/details/battlefieldsofma00mill Michelin Yser and Belgian Coast http://www.archive.org/details/yserbelgiancoast00cler Michelin Ypres http://www.archive.org/details/ypresandbattles00unkngoog Michelin Arras http://www.archive.org/details/arraslensdouaiba00cler Michelin Somme Vol 1 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924088058940 Vol 2 http://www.archive.org/details/thesomme02cler Michelin Cambrai http://www.archive.org/details/stquentincambrai00cler Michelin Rheims http://www.archive.org/details/rheimsetlesbata00unkngoog Michelin Verdun http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924027945991 Michelin Verdun (larger) http://www.archive.org/details/verdunargonne00manu Michelin Americans in the Great War http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924087992826 Vol 1 http://www.archive.org/details/americansingreat01cler Vol 2 http://www.archive.org/details/americansingreat02cler Vol 3 http://www.archive.org/details/americansingreat03cler Michelin Alsace and Vosges Vol1 http://www.archive.org/details/lalsaceetlescom00michgoog Michelin Alsace and Vosges Vol 2 http://www.archive.org/details/lalsaceetlescom02michgoog Michelin Amiens http://www.archive.org/details/amiensbeforeduri00cler Michelin Soissons http://www.archive.org/details/soissonsbeforea00firgoog Michelin Metz and Morhange http://www.archive.org/details/metzetlabataill00ciegoog Michelin Strasbourg http://www.archive.org/details/strasbourg00cler

My father's mothers-mother family name is very uncommon. Years ago, I saw a camo'd and named m16 type Stahlhelm on ebay. The likelihood of the helmet having been worn by a family member is extremely high. The seller would not agree to a direct sale. I bid almost three times market value, and was outbid seconds before the auction closed. I contacted the winner, told him I was interested in the helmet (and exactly why) along with an offer to buy it if he ever got tired of it. The response? A nasty-gram.

Rauchenberger was awarded the PlM on 6 September 1917, and on 19 October 1918 was awarded the Oakleaves. When the Oaks were awarded, they were sent in a small box with the replacement three stripe neck ribbon, and the oaks (with the new ribbon). A second full award of the cross was not given after the first one. The oaks worn with the PlM were not unique to the PlM only, and the same exact design was used for a few other Prussian neck orders. The outer box shown in the photo above seems to indicate the award is for both the PlM (cross) -AND- the Oaks at the same time. It's known that Rauchenberger did not receive both at the same time, and the outer carton wrapper suggests ......something isn't right.

Several things happened in the early part of 1917 that don't get much attention, but put considerable pressure on the US government. American laws prevented direct US government loans to any of the belligerents, and all trade was supposed to be based on a cash and carry basis. Those same laws did not prevent privately owned American banks from lending cash, and by 1917, JP Morgan, Chase and other banks were heavily invested in the Allied cause. When the British Chancellor of the Exchequer notified his contacts in the US, that if the war continued much longer without US intervention, the Biritish government might default on repaying loans to American banks. That would have resulted in the US economy collapsing, and was something Wilson et al, could not ignore. Also, about the same time, the French government began floating the idea of a seperate negioated truce with the Germans if the US wasn't in the war by the summer of 1917, and letting the British continue the war on their own. If France pulled out of the war, that raises the question of British troops remaining in France, and if they could have withdrawn under the pressure of German troops focusing entirely on the British rather than French troops. All of this can be found in archived documents, and isn't made up. One of the first things the US government did following the April 1917 declaration of war against Germany, was a law passed by the US government to assume all of the private/commercial non-governmental loans to the Allies, and re-imbursement to American banks, etc. The possibility of these two events taking place aren't usually mentioned as motivating the US government's decision to enter the war, but the possibility of Britain defaulting on American loans, and Britain possibly losing the war without France's (or Russia as events were about to take place), would have seriously hampered Britain's war effort or even loss of the war.

I relocated my "Schlachten des Weltkrieges" series published by the Reichsarchiv between the wars. Various authors and contributors have resulted in a variety of writing styles, and the later publications reflect the post-war feelings about the war and then current politics. Despite that, there are many maps and sources which can be used as a starting point to get an idea of what units fought in certain battles, short sections of combat reports, orders and directives, etc. The series isn't the most impressive set of official histories on the war, however, it can be useful at times if you're interested in reading what German commanders were thinking.