Odulf

01-02-1941 Signature: Friedrich Ruge (RK 21-10-1940)

28-11-1944 Signature (stamp): Heinz Nordmann

08-08-1943 Signature: Günther Horstmann (DKiG08-11-1941)

Oslo, 18-12-1940 Signature: Hermann Boehm (DKiG 20-01-1941)

A strange bit of work. The crown (and it's finish with red enamel) looks almost Austrian, rather than the German Naval crown, but the shape of the sumbarine is almost modern, with the conning tower placed before the centre of the hull. The shape of the badge hints towards Germany, but the crown makes it a badge of a Royal Navy (not The RN!). Not many monarchies left after the Great War, so may be this could place you on futher course... My guess: perhaps a non-official veterans' badge of a society?

Intersting remarks Peter. What puzzles me, is that most ww2 award certificates to soldiers are in very good nick and unfolded, even when awarded to first line combat units. I cannot imagine these were dragged around in a pocket or haversack. Also, I have evidence, that after a man was KIA, MIA or DOW, the relatives received the certificates, other relevant documents, and Wehrpass together in one envelope. So they must have been stored in a safe place and not in his pockets, kit bag or whatever in the danger zone, so presumably at Regtl. HQ or so. The same applies to the Luftwaffe. Also, regarding the Kriegsmarine, many award documents of men who were lost at sea, survived; this leads to the conclusion that these documents were not kept on board, but ashore. Thinking about this, I have never encountered an award document marked as "replacement", indicating that the original slip was lost. How's that..?

To an RAD Unterfeldmeister Landkreis Sonnenberg (Thüringen)

The far majority of these are signed by some city council Clerc. I have never seen such a document signed by a military official, but most signed and awarded to reserve or serving military personnel were signed by the local police. Therefore, would it be possible to show the complete document (inclusive - future - rank or status) so that we have a reference, please? my contribution: the document of a future Major d.R. (Sud.M; KVK2mS; EK2)

The question is: did Germny aspire a fleet before they actually had a use for it (colonies and support of merchant travel), or was it the opposite. If my memory serves me well, the Emperor (W2) wanted a fleet, and because the nation could afford it, he was served. But without any purpose, this fleet was just a toy to puddle. So, he needed overseas territories, and that's how the balloon got up. In practice, in the (late) 19th century, nations with a shore more or less leeded an outward defense of their shores. Either by mines/mine sweeping, to guard river entrances or islands off the coast. visgery protedtion, but in general these were no large units or gun-platforms. Germany, inspired by the RN and flamed by the Emperot wanted a large fleet...., for future purposes. For what or whom? There was a Naval balance, but these German aspects did tip the balance, and so a naval weapons race was entertained as other sea faring nations felt the need to show their price cocks (?!). The Ottomans orderes batte ships in England (most to be taken in RN service), but also Russia, Japan and others joined this race of naval prestege. But, what is the use of maintaining such expensive military units without use? And how to test these, in combat? The money most colonial nations spent on armies was little compared to the spenditure on navies, and all for (good) reasons, to little use. Also the politicians, in firm trust in their "walls of steel" supported the navies (because funding a well established navy was considered cheaper than keeping and maintaining a ground army. Leaping ahead of the discussion, with the academical question: how would the Great War have ended without the war at sea, and how important was the sea regarded in the general concepts of a European war in 1913? How well established were the connections between the Admiralties and the General Staffs, and was there any coordination/liason or were these only seperate tools of the Secretary of War?

I have recently found some statement/remark (in a modern book, as I remember) that all medals and decorations issued in the field, were accompanied by the award document to the owner (however, the photos contradict, in most cases) . This raises the question, what happened to these documents? First they were prepared by the staff, signed by the commanding official (a Divisional or Regimental Commander - or were they signed in advance?), handed out with the decoration/medal, turned in again at the Paymasters-Office (or collected by the CSM or so), to be stored (or send home) or what? Was there a procedure or regulation about these documents, and was there a counter-regulagion to make it all less complex?

and another

and another

Another portrait of a veteran, whose medals I quite cannot make out.

A CdV picture with an old soldier, sporting: Iron Cross 1870 with clasp "25" War Commemoration Medal 1870-71 with 1 clasp Commemorative Cross 1864-66 ? Clasp for Long Service

When you ever get to Germany, see the NVA Museum in Prora (on the Isle of Rügen). They have it all. Pitty is, the lack the cash to keep it in a good state of conservaion since it is such a vast collection.

Thank you very much for this useful information Uwe

Recently I received this very nice portrait of Freiherr Alfred von Landsberg, a Landesführer in the Stahlhelm, dated 1933. I think that he is wearing the neck cross of a Rechtsritter of the Johanitterorden, but I am not quite sure because in some publications that cross is black. Can any one sihine his ligt on this, please? Does any one have further information about his career, and of the Land where he was presiding the Stahlhelm?

The Balkan Wars of 1912/1913 had very much to do with the ridding of Turkish ruling over these territories. The local entilments were enflamed by local nationalists, Russia, religious sentiments and the general feeling to be done with the Turks. However, I feel that all international intentions involved did not want war, and the Balkan nations were solving out themselves; but a lamb had to be slaughtered to satisfy the Gods, and all were eager not to hand the knife. The causes are many, but the reasons are to be discussed. To my opinion, the Balkan incidents were local, and no reason for such a reaction. But perhaps (or not) this reaction was the spark to ignite the welcomed blast. Serbia and other minor independencies in the region were solving their internal affairs, but the (Austrian/German) globalists did not believe in small states, they only accepted body and armor. And as these young nations did not apply to the general acceptances, they had to be consumed by old well established monarchies. In general (to my opinion) it was a clash between establishments. Why, did most of the European monarchies die, after the Great War? Because it showed the incapacity of the ruling Houses to lead nations. Since the defeat of Napoleon and the general revolts in Europe in 1848, and furthering on the fruits of the French Revolution, monarchies were bound to decline. An Emperor as general leader and leader of an army was overdue. The French lost their emperor, but were split in controversy, but still, since the mid-19th century, royal systems were proclaimed to be the best for new nations; that is why Rumania, Greece and other nations were proclaimed monarchies. Parliamentary democracy was the solution. European princes were established all over the newly found territories, and they did not poorly. They ran their countries well, but not well enough to the impatient established monarchies. Monarchism and eclectisism (as a form of state) do not marry, not in the Balkans where the Turks ruled for centuries, in their capacity of supporting one and punishing the other, but revering when it came in useful. Thus, no reason for a World War, but preparations were set, and Russia, could not refrain from retaliation. The Turks were bound, so let's settle this before anything severe happens. When not, only Russia to deal with, albeit the treaties with France and England.

Thank you for your kind comments. To this I may add that the international military complex, an important factor for war, had developed very much since the Crimean War. The navies of seafaring nations had expanded and large units (battle ships) became the back bone of the large countries (Britain, USA, Russia, Germany). Normally countries had no use for these, if they had no colonies to protect and merchant fleets (carrying raw materials) to escort. Germany, as I pointed out before, had always been a "land nation", but with Bismarck out of the way, Wilhelm II wanted to boost the international respect for the newly shaped German Reich, and what was a nation without colonies? Alas, Germany was too late; all Third World territories were either well established independencies or colonies, protectorates or allies in a wider sense of Western nations. That was the reason why Germany was attracted by Morocco, the last independent bit of Africa. The Moroccan affair ended with an agreement, that Germany would not get Morocco, but as compensation it received other territories such as Togo, Cameroon, German East and West Africa, Tsing-Tau (on the northern shores of China) and some other crumbs from the great colonial pie. This was second best, but it satisfied the newly felt sense of being a world nation of the German politicians. Morocco went to the French and some other swaps were made in Northern Africa. Morocco, however, was an important and strategic place, at the mouth of the Mediterranean, and with huge resources of coal, to fuel (battle) ships. Coaling facilities became of strategic importance for sea faring nations, and without these a large battle fleet, as Wilhelm II wanted (like a toy), was useless. His naval aspirations were fed by his honorary rank in his grandmother's Royal Navy, and in a future war, a battle fleet was a need to cut off European countries from their resources overseas. So one may presume that the building of a serious navy was one of Germany's first steps on the road to a European war. Also, other (heavy) weapons had been developed during the last half of the 19th century, such as great guns (with explosive shells) and machine guns, hand grenades, mortars. But also the tactics changed severely. Where the Crimean War was fought with principles dating back to Napoleonic times, the Boer War (not really an international war, but still an armed incident where observers from all nations learned lessons) and the Russo-Japanese War, made it clear that war would never be the same again. Not in the least, the supply and care of fighting troops was under construction; an important fact when a war was to be fought with specialist soldiers who were not easy expendable as the gun fodder from the past. The Russo-Japanese War had been an interesting experiment for the observers, as many tactics and tools were used, later to be seen in Europe, such as trenches, bunkers, mines and minefields, etc. All this crossed the minds of the German General Staff when they were preparing scenarios for a possible European War. The Czar and his advisors had fought many battles on all fronts of the immense Russia, partly suppressing local uprising, but the 'tour de force' was gaining a harbor (Port Arthur), not to freeze over in winter, on the Pacific. This ambition was blocked by Japan, and a reason for war. Since the naval action at Shimonoseki, in Japan, the empire was declared an open market for western nations to push modern technology and products of the technical revolution of the mid-19th century. Japan was quick to learn, and changed from isolanism to expansion; also in need for raw materials to feed the expanding industry. But Japan is far away from the Balkan, and not yet a factor in the future Great War. The French and British staffs were mainly pondering defense tactics, and how to keep their territories, but also maintaining contact with the overseas territories and gaining fuels for the industry. To summarize: The balance of power in Europe was shifting rapidly, with the potent new Germany (fragmented before 1870, but united since), and the (military) German-Austrian pact, inclusive the tools and newly developed strategies, and the right reasons. Russia was casting a shadow over the Balkan; industrialization cried out for new raw materials (from the colonies) and safe roads to get these to the 'home lands'; world competition (due to industrialization) became imminent. The USA was present in international politics, but the size of the country and the self-supporting nature created an atmosphere of isolationism. However, American products of industry were pushed on the European and world markets; a European clash in the Balkan region was not regarded as a starter of something bigger, yet. But why wait for something better when a smoking gun is detected?

An interisting and intreaguing thesis, which cannot be dissolved from the development of central Europe in an economic, political and military subjective. Apart from the Crimean war, half a century earlier, none of the large European countries (as possible participants in a full blown international incident) had any idea of the impact of a involving large countries who were rapidly adepting to modern warfare. So the matter was regarded from various corners, such as: what is to gain in a political, economical and military subjective. Since the latter stages of the 19th century, European countries tried to rub shoulders with the Ottoman Empire, not only by gaining access to the Suez canal, but also by selling arms and military knowledge (advisors), in the perspective of national arms productions, and to get a foothold in the Middle East. From the past England had a strong card, in cooperating with the Turks in the Egyptian War. Turkish diplomacy was cunning, and they played their cards well, to get the best of all worlds. So the French and Germans did their utmost to get the Turkish contracts and benefits. France lost it and the Germans gained, and supported Turkey with weapons and advisors (that is why Turkey was factual drawn into the war). Russia, on the other hand, worked hard to establish a grand Russian hemisphere, and thus furthered all initiatives for a Slavic inspired pact by supporting nationalist (anti Turkish, or anti muslem initiatives). The objective was to expand influence and get more access to the Mediterranean. Austria, which incorporated Hungary, streched from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, held so much difficult to control territory and was hungering for more to consolidate. The British tried to postpone clashes by diplomacy (for which Edward VII moved about quite a bit), because the politicians were not ready for war. In the mean time "peace keepers" from minor European countries were employed in the Balkan states to help the local rulers in enforcing their feeble governance. Tension was building up, but all countries hoped to keep the lid on by conferences and treaties. No country was prepared to risk lives on a foreign shore without a consolodated plan of attack, let alone a plan of retreat. The only countries whith some experience in a real war were Germany and France (Franco-German War), and Russia (in the East). In that respect Russia had the best cards, because of the unlimited resources of that country (in man power). Until about that time, the way to avoid wars was the policy of mariage (an old and crumbling mediaval manner, to consolidate alliances by monarchies), but since about 1848 the influence of monarchs was declining, and parliamentary factions (supported by the middle classes and workers) gained influence. The world had entered a new era, where other interests (such as industry and resources) prevailed. All these factors decided the hesitance of politicians, and also the state of the tools of politics; the armed forces. The British Forces were mainly based on a defense concept, and to maintain order in the colonies and dominions, and a powerful fleet to prevent invasions. The French Forces were equaly equipped to keep the colonies, and to defend france from a German attack. Germany, as it was established in Versailles, and under the enterprising Emperor Wilhelm II, wanted influence and colonies (which it gained, following the bluff poker after Morocco), but it wanted to blot out the Bismarck statement that Germany's future was not overseas. Russia wanted access to the Mediterranean, not by a Bosporus controlled by its enemy Turkey. Italy was a new state and eager to find a place in history. Austria wanted to consolidate, but history placed the Empire as a treshold against the Muslims, and they were looking for revenge for territories lost. The minor Balkan States were too busy suppressing local groups which strived for their own goals. Turkey was suffering from an ill government and ripe for the slaughter, as it concerned their influence in Europe. Bloody battles had been fought on the Balkan, between muslims and christians and nationalists. The problem with the area is, that the various factions could not/cannot claim any ground to consolidate. So, the best solution was to concer it all and put rule by Austrian Law to it (as they did it before). Though Prussia (and it's allies) and Austria had a war some 50 years earlier, these two countries had much more in common than all the other European nations. Together they were very powerfull, also in a military perspective, but a two front war was not a prospective future. Because of all the alliences (made in better times) hope was that the Western Democracies would not intervene, but... No country was ready for a war in 1912, and Wilhelm II was not a strategist, he was a foolish romanticus. However, the German General Staff worked like hell, in cooperation with the Austrians (not hampered by language) to work out concepts for war. But there was no iminent political reason yet, and the question is, if the murder on the Arch Duke Ferdinand was reason enough; it could have been regarded as another anarchist or seperatist action (there had been many like that). But the public (and the press) obviously felt strong enough for such an engagement, and politicians.... If war was a matter of military technicians only, there would have been less lives lost, and the world would benefit from it. But events take their turn...

Hi Morten, I'd like to be of help, but I'm confused by your request. What is it that you want?

Schwester Pia was said to be a member also...

From my collection. These are small because they were added/glued in the seaman's book.

Nice find Robin!

A similar shield (for a different Landesgruppe) is shown on page 18 of the book: "Wall Plaques and Official Sgnboards of Hitler's Third Reich - Amts-, Behörden- und Dienststellenschilder 1933-1945" by Wilhelm Saris and Philippe Gillain with Michael C. Shaner, Ph.D.; First Edition 2009.